

Online Appendix

The Ethnic Army and the State:
Explaining Coup Traps and the Difficulties of Democratization in Africa

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I. Key Independent and Dependent Variables: Complete Descriptions

Military coup attempts: I first cross-referenced McGowan’s data set on African coups (2003) with the Archigos data base on political leaders (Goemans et al. 2009). This data was then expanded with newspaper archives to cover the years 1952-1955 and 2002-2012, using McGowan’s coding procedures. A minimum of two reports citing evidence of actual military violence, military occupation of a government building, or military occupation of a communication or transportation center count as a coup attempt. All three dependent variables are constructed from this data: (1) the count of coup attempts in the 20 years following independence; (2) the number of years until the first coup attempt; and (3) coup attempts in the four years following constitutional transfers of power.

Prior ethnic violence: Coded 1 if, between the end of World War II and the year of independence for each country there were reports of either ethnic riots or violence conducted by ethnic political parties against other ethnic groups. Riots or violence directed by or against European settlers or colonial administrators was collected but not accounted for in the final coding. Europeans generally left Africa following independence or remained in insubstantial numbers. Thus, violence between them and other groups was less likely to influence post-independence politics and its inclusion might obfuscate the effect of violence between indigenous groups on later outcomes.

Loyalty choice: If the first head of state purposefully recruited officers and/or created a presidential guard from members of his own ethnic group—and, in some cases, their known allies—then loyalty choice was coded as *Ethnic*. On the other hand, if the first leader recruited officers from a diverse cross-section of society, then I coded loyalty choice as non-ethnic or *Inclusive*.

Unmatched or Matched officer corps: This variable indicates that the existing officer corps, at the time of decolonization, did not ethnically match the new civilian leadership. If an ethnic group dominated the officer corps, and the post-independence leader shared that identity, then this variable is coded as *Matched*. If there was no pre-existing officer corps, then there was no one to rebel against its restructuring along ethnic lines. Since this situation entails the same theoretical prediction (i.e., no rebellion), it is also coded as matched. In all other cases the variable is coded as *Unmatched*.

Ethnic change or continuity (power transfer): First, the ethnicity of each leader, before and after the constitutional (electoral) transfer of power, was coded at the highest level of ethnic aggregation—unless a compelling reason emerged to consider a sub-group. If the ethnic identity of the leader prior to the transition was different from that of the leader assuming

power, the power transfer was coded as an *Ethnic change*. Otherwise, it was coded as *Ethnic continuity*. Transitional leaders or committees overseeing constitutional processes of change require special consideration. Here, the “old leader” is coded as the leader who preceded the transitional government. For example, where the violent removal of a leader led directly to a transitional government that then quickly held elections within two years, the ethnicity of the deposed leader and the ethnicity of the newly elected leader are used to determine whether a change in ethnic leadership took place.

Prior ethnic stacking: This variable was coded 1 if the leader prior to the constitutional transfer of power had stacked the military with his own coethnics, and 0 otherwise. Similar concerns over coding identity, defining dominance, and identifying source material bias arose as with the *Unmatched officer corps* and *Ethnic change* variables and were handled in the same manner.

Table 1 – Decolonization Data

Country	Prior Ethnic Violence	Ethnic Loyalty	Unmatched Officer Corps	Years to First Coup	Total Coups (20yrs)
Algeria	no	yes	no	3	1
Angola	yes	no	yes	2	1
Benin	no	yes	yes	3	8
Botswana	no	no	no	-	0
Burkina Faso	?	?	no	6	2
Burundi	yes	yes	yes	3	4
Cameroon	no	yes	no	23	0
Cape Verde	?	?	?	-	0
Central African Republic	no	(prob yes)	?	6	4
Chad	no	yes	no	15	2
Comoros	?	?	?	10	4
Congo-Brazzaville	yes	yes	yes	3	6
Côte d'Ivoire	no	yes	no	39	0
DRC	no	uncodable	no	5	2
Djibouti	yes	yes	no	14	1
Egypt	no	no	no	30	0
Equatorial Guinea	no	yes	yes	11	4
Eritrea	yes	no	yes	-	0
Ethiopia	no	no	yes	19	1
Gabon	no	yes	yes	4	1
Gambia	no	(prob no)	?	16	1
Ghana	yes	no	yes	9	3
Guinea	?	no	?	12	1
Guinea-Bissau	yes	no	yes	5	2
Kenya	no	yes	yes	19	1
Lesotho	no	no	no	20	0
Liberia	no	yes	no	20	0
Libya	no	yes	no	18	1
Madagascar	no	yes	yes	12	3
Malawi	no	yes	no	-	0

Country	Prior Ethnic Violence	Ethnic Loyalty	Unmatched Officer Corps	Years to First Coup	Total Coups (20yrs)
Mali	no	no	yes	8	1
Mauritania	no	yes	no	18	2
Mauritius	yes	no	?	-	0
Morocco	no	no	yes	15	2
Mozambique	no	no	yes	0	1
Namibia	no	no	yes	-	0
Niger	no	yes	no	14	2
Nigeria	yes	no	yes	6	4
Rwanda	yes	yes	no	11	1
São Tomé and Príncipe	no	no	?	20	0
Senegal	no	no	yes	-	0
Seychelles	no	no	no	1	1
Sierra Leone	yes	yes	yes	6	4
Somalia	no	yes	yes	1	2
South Africa	yes	no	yes	-	0
Sudan	no	yes	(prob yes)	2	8
Swaziland	no	no	no	5	2
Tanzania	no	no	yes	-	0
Togo	no	yes	yes	3	3
Tunisia	yes	no	no	31	0
Uganda	no	yes	yes	9	10
Zambia	no	no	yes	16	1
Zimbabwe	yes	yes	yes	2	1

Table 2 – Democratization Data

Country	Year	Reason for Power Transfer	Ethnic Change?	Prior Ethnic Stacking?	Coup Attempt?	Years Until Coup
Algeria	1978	Natural Death	no	yes	no	-
Algeria	1999	Elections	no	yes	no	-
Angola	1979	Natural Death	no	no	no	-
Benin	1964	Coup then Elections	yes	yes	1965	1
Benin	1991	Elections	yes	yes	1992	1
Benin	1996	Elections	yes	no	no	-
Benin	2006	Elections	yes	no	no	-
Botswana	1980	Natural Death	no	no	no	-
Botswana	1998	Retirement	no	no	no	-
Burundi	1993	Elections	yes	yes	1993	0
Burundi	2003	Power Sharing Agreement	yes	no	no	-
Burundi	2005	Elections	no	no	no	-
Cameroon	1982	Retirement then Elections	yes	yes	1984	2
Cape Verde	1991	Elections	no	?	no	-
Cape Verde	2001	Elections	no	?	no	-
Central African Republic	1993	Elections	yes	yes	1996	3
Comoros	1990	Coup then Elections	yes	yes	1992	2
Comoros	1996	Coup then Elections	no	?	no	-
Comoros	1998	Natural Death	yes	?	1999	1
Comoros	2006	Elections	yes	?	no	-
Congo-Brazzaville	1992	Elections	yes	yes	1993	1
Côte d'Ivoire	1993	Natural Death	no	yes	no	-
Côte d'Ivoire	2000	Coup then Elections	yes	yes	2001	1
Djibouti	1999	Elections	no	yes	no	-
Egypt	1970	Natural Death	no	yes	no	-

Country	Year	Reason for Power Transfer	Ethnic Change?	Prior Ethnic Stacking?	Coup Attempt?	Years Until Coup
Gabon	1967	Natural Death	yes	yes	no	-
Ghana	1969	Resignation then Elections	yes	yes	1972	3
Ghana	1979	Coup then Elections	yes	yes	1981	2
Ghana	2000	Elections	yes	no	no	-
Guinea Bissau	2000	Coup then Elections	yes	no	2000	0
Guinea Bissau	2005	Coup then Elections	yes	yes	2008	3
Kenya	1978	Natural Death	yes	yes	1982	4
Kenya	2002	Elections	yes	yes	no	-
Lesotho	1993	Coup then Elections	no	yes	1994	1
Lesotho	1998	Elections	no	yes	no	-
Liberia	1971	Natural Death	no	yes	no	-
Liberia	1997	Peace Treaty then Elections	no	?	no	-
Liberia	2005	Elections	yes	no	no	-
Madagascar	1993	Elections	no	no	no	-
Madagascar	1996	Impeachment then Elections	no	no	no	-
Madagascar	2002	Elections	yes	no	2006	4
Malawi	1994	Retirement then Elections	yes	no	no	-
Malawi	2004	Elections	yes	yes	no	-
Mali	1992	Coup then Elections	no	no	no	-
Mali	2002	Elections	no	no	no	-
Mauritania	2007	Coup then Elections	no	yes	2008	1
Mauritius	1982	Elections	no	no	no	-
Mauritius	1995	Elections	no	no	no	-
Mauritius	2000	Elections	no	no	no	-
Mauritius	2003	Elections	yes	no	no	-

Country	Year	Reason for Power Transfer	Ethnic Change?	Prior Ethnic Stacking?	Coup Attempt?	Years Until Coup
Mauritius	2005	Elections	yes	no	no	-
Mozambique	1986	Natural Death	no	?	no	-
Mozambique	2005	Elections	yes	yes	no	-
Namibia	2004	Elections	no	no	no	-
Niger	1993	Elections	yes	yes	1996	3
Niger	1999	Coup then Elections	yes	no	2002	3
Nigeria	1979	Elections	yes	no	1983	4
Nigeria	1999	Natural Death then Elections	yes	yes	no	-
Nigeria	2007	Elections	yes	no	no	-
Rwanda	2000	Resignation	yes	no	no	-
São Tomé and Príncipe	1991	Elections	no	?	1995	4
São Tomé and Príncipe	2001	Elections	yes	?	2003	2
Senegal	1981	Retirement	no	no	no	-
Senegal	2000	Elections	yes	no	no	-
Seychelles	2004	Resignation	no	yes	no	-
Sierra Leone	1964	Natural Death	no	yes	no	-
Sierra Leone	1967	Elections	yes	yes	1967	0
Sierra Leone	1996	Coup then Elections	yes	no	1996	0
Sierra Leone	2007	Elections	yes	no	no	-
Somalia	1967	Elections	yes	yes	1969	2
South Africa	1994	Elections	yes	no	no	-
South Africa	1999	Elections	no	no	no	-
Sudan	1986	Coup then Elections	no	?	1989	3
Tanzania	1985	Retirement	yes	no	no	-
Tanzania	1995	Elections	yes	no	no	-
Tanzania	2005	Elections	?	no	no	-
Tunisia	1987	Retirement	no	yes	no	-
Zambia	1991	Elections	no	no	no	-
Zambia	2002	Elections	yes	no	no	-

II. Control Variables: Complete Descriptions (alphabetical)

African Union member (AU.member): Coded 1 if, after the Lomé Declaration of July 2000 that required coups to be condemned and sanctions imposed, the country was a non-suspended member of the African Union in the year of the power transfer or the power transfer was part of a planned return to civilian rule that led to the reinstatement of membership. Morocco has never been a member of the AU. Eritrea voluntarily broke with the AU from Nov 2009-Jan 2011. Suspensions (see Omorogbe 2011): Côte d'Ivoire (Nov 2010-Apr 2011), Guinea (Dec 2008-Dec 2010), Guinea-Bissau (Apr 2012-present), Madagascar (Mar 2009-current), Mali (Mar-Oct 2012), Mauritania (Aug 2005-Mar 2007; Aug 2008-Jul 2009), Niger (Feb 2010-Mar 2011), and Togo (Feb-May 2005). In practice, every election after 1999 received a coding of 1.

Change in Military Personnel (change.mil.personnel): Percent change in the natural log of military personnel (Ln MilPersonnel) in the four years following a power transfer. If a coup or other change in leadership occurred prior to four years, the window of observation was truncated and the variable calculated from the shorter time period.

Change in Civil Liberties (change.cl): Coded as the difference in the Freedom House civil liberty score between the year in which the election was held and the end of the four year windows of observation after the power transfer. If a coup or other change in leadership occurred prior to four years, the window of observation was truncated and the variable calculated from the shorter time period. A negative score indicates that civil liberties have improved, for example if the score changed from 2 to 1.

Civil Liberties: The Freedom House civil liberties score for the year of the power transfer. Coded on a scale from 1-7 with 1 being the highest, or most free.

Civil war: Civil wars may generate separate pressures on civil-military relations and inspire coup attempts for reasons outside the scope of the theory articulated here. Thus a control variable is included for whether there is an ongoing civil war. For the decolonization data, the civil war variable is coded 1 if a civil war breaks out within 5 years of independence, and 0 otherwise. For the democratization data, the civil war variable is coded 1 if there is an ongoing civil war in the year of the transition or in any part of the four year observation window following it, and 0 otherwise.

Counterbalancing: A measure of the number of ground-combat effective military organizations in a country in a given year, developed by Pilster and Böhmelt (2011): $C_{it} = \frac{1}{\sum_j s_{jit}^2}$

where s_{jit} is the personnel share of the ground-combat compatible military or paramilitary organizations j in country i in year t . “The higher the value of that measure, the higher the effective number of military organizations in a country (Ibid, 340).”

Coup caused transfer: Coded 1 if the constitutional or electoral transfer of power immediately followed a successful coup (within two years), and 0 otherwise.

Decrease in Military Personnel (change.mil.personnel): Largest consecutive percent decrease in the natural log of military personnel (Ln MilPersonnel) in the four years following a power transfer. If military size only decreased between any two years, that percent difference was calculated. If military size decreased for two or more consecutive years, the total percent decrease for that period was calculated. If a coup or other change in leadership occurred prior to four years, the window of observation was truncated and the variable calculated from the shorter time period. If military personnel monotonically increased the variable is coded as 0.

Diamond production: Drawn from Macartan Humphrey’s data (2005). Yearly production in carats per capita.

Economic shock ($\leq -1\%$): Coded 1 if, in any year during the four year period following the leadership transition, the country experienced a negative growth rate of 1% or more, and 0 otherwise. If during the four year period of observation there was a coup attempt or another constitutional change in leadership, the period was truncated so as not to introduce the potential for reverse causality or other threats to inference. Coup attempts themselves have been known to have disastrous effects on economic growth, especially when they descend into widespread violence.

Economic shock ($\leq -3\%$): Coded parallel to *Economic shock ($\geq -1\%$)* but for a negative growth rate of 3% or more in the four year period following the leadership transition.

Economic shock ($\leq -5\%$): Coded parallel to *Economic shock ($\geq -1\%$)* but for a negative growth rate of 5% or more in the four year period following the leadership transition.

Economic shock ($\leq -10\%$): Coded parallel to *Economic shock ($\geq -1\%$)* but for a negative growth rate of 10% or more in the four year period following the leadership transition.

Ethnic Diversity: In baseline models, Roeder’s ELF score is used (2001). Alternative measures include the ethnic fractionalization scores of Alesina et al. (2003), Fearon (2003), and Posner (2004(a)).

Expenditures per Soldier (exp.per.sold): Calculated by dividing military expenditures (Mil.Expend) by military personnel for each year.

Free and fair: Indicates whether an election was considered free and fair (1 if yes; else 0). Drawn from Lindberg's data on African elections (2009).

Group over 50% of pop: Drawn from James Fearon's data on ethnic fractionalization (2003). Indicator variable coded 1 if any ethnic group constitutes over 50% of the total population, and 0 otherwise.

Herbst difficult geography (herbst.difficult): Coded 1 if a country fits Herbst's categories of "difficult" or "hinterland" geography, and 0 otherwise. Difficult geography entails either noncontiguous territory or two or more dense population centers separated by wide swaths of poorly inhabited territory. Hinterland geography refers to a single dense population center around the capital with large areas of relatively uninhabited territory extending far away from the capital. Each of these conditions theoretically makes it difficult for countries to consolidate power over their entire territory, increasing the capacity of potential dissenters to mount a challenge.

Highest Popular Unrest: An index of assassinations, purging of government officials, guerrilla activity, protests, riots, and strikes as coded by Banks 2001, from Powell 2012. Coded as the highest level of instability faced by the leader in the four years following the coup attempt (or the year of the transfer if a coup unseated the leader that same year). If during the four year period of observation there was a coup attempt or another constitutional change in leadership, the period was truncated so as not to introduce the potential for reverse causality or other threats to inference.

Largest group % of pop: Drawn from James Fearon's data on ethnic fractionalization (2003). Percent share in the total population of the largest ethnic group.

Late mineral discovery: Coded 1 if minerals become a principal export at any point in the 20 years following independence, and 0 otherwise.

Ln GDP/k: Natural log of GDP per capita from the year of independence (decolonization data) or the year of the power transfer (for democratization data), calculated from Maddison's historic data on world population and GDP (2008).

Ln mil.personnel: Natural log of the total number of military personnel in the year of the

power transfer. From Powell 2012. Also available from the Correlates of War National Military Capabilities dataset, version 3.02 (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972).

Lowest CAB as % of GDP: An alternative measure was constructed for economic shocks using the country's lowest (i.e., worst) current account balance (CAB) as a percentage of GDP in the four year window following the power transfer was also used to capture economic downturns. Large current account balance deficits tend to cause (or at least reflect) greater financial struggles as well as a government's inability to pay its employees—including the military.

Margin of victory: Drawn from Staffan Lindberg's African elections data (2009). The margin of victory is measured by subtracting the vote share of the second place candidate or party from that of the winner.

Military expenditures (mil.expend): Military expenditures in thousands of 2001 U.S. dollars. From the Correlates of War National Military Capabilities dataset, version 3.02 (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972).

Military Personnel (mil.personnel): Number of military personnel in thousands. From the Correlates of War National Military Capabilities dataset, version 3.02 (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972).

Mineral Exporter: Coded 1 if minerals were a principal export at the time of independence, and 0 otherwise.

Oil or diamonds: Coded 1 if, in the year of the power transfer, the country was an exporter of oil or diamonds, and 0 otherwise.

Oil production: Drawn from Macartan Humphrey's data (2005). Oil production is calculated as the daily per capita barrel production for the year of the power transfer.

Oil reserves: Drawn from Macartan Humphrey's data (2005). Oil reserves are calculated as thousands of barrels of known reserves per capita.

Paramilitary: The ratio of paramilitary to regular military personnel in the year of the power transfer. From Powell 2012.

Polity: Polity score from the Polity IV dataset, on a scale from -10 to 10 with -10 being most autocratic and 10 most democratic. Coded for the year of the power transfer or, if for

instability reasons that year is uncoded and the regime survives, the following year.

Popular Unrest: An index of assassinations, purging of government officials, guerrilla activity, protests, riots, and strikes as coded by Banks 2001, from Powell 2012. Coded in the year of the power transfer to capture the general environment of instability facing the incoming elected leader.

Previous transfers: A count of the number of constitutional transfers of power experienced by the country prior to the power transfer being observed.

Prior coups: The count of the total number of coup attempts, both successes and failures, in the 10 years prior to the constitutional or electoral transfer of power.

Prior successful coups: The count of the total number of successful coups in the 10 years prior to the constitutional or electoral transfer of power.

Prior successful electoral transfer: Coded 1 if at any point in the past—no matter how long ago—elections led to the transfer of executive power without a successful coup attempt occurring within the subsequent four years, and 0 otherwise.

Regime continuity: Drawn from Staffan Lindberg's African elections data (2009). Coded 1 if the pre- and post-transition leaders belong to the same political party or if the pre-transition leader held an integral post in the prior administration, such as the vice-president, foreign minister, or secretary of state. Else, coded 0.

Regime type: Based on Lindberg and Clark 2008 (p.91; also see their Appendix on p.101-103), but coded to allow for overtime variation. An electoral democracy has free and fair elections, as coded by Lindberg 2009, and a Freedom House civil liberties score of 3 or higher (i.e., 1, 2, or 3). A liberalizing regime does not qualify as an electoral democracy, but holds elections and either has a civil liberties of 3 or higher or has improved prior to holding elections compared to two years prior. All other regimes holding elections are coded as electoral authoritarianism. Coverage also expanded using *Free and fair* and *Civil Liberties* variables.

Years since last coup attempt (yrs.attempt): The number of years prior to the constitutional transfer of power since the last coup attempt. If a country had never experienced a coup attempt, the variable was coded as the time since independence (consistent with Powell 2012).

III. Summary Statistics

Table 3 – Summary Statistics for Decolonization Variables

Variable	Min	Max	% coded 1	Mean	Std Dev	N
Ethnic loyalty choice	0	1	48.9			47
Unmatched officer corps	0	1	60.5			43
Prior ethnic violence	0	1	31.9			47
Ln GDP/k	5.883	8.339		6.903	0.600	43
Mineral Exporter	0	1	39.5			43
Late mineral discovery	0	1	53.5			43
ELF	0.04	0.93		0.633	0.270	43
EF Alesina	0.04	0.93		0.633	0.246	43
EF Fearon	0.039	0.953		0.648	0.256	41
Posner's PREG	0	0.71		0.360	0.250	36
Largest group % of pop	0.12	0.98		0.489	0.260	43
Group over 50% of pop	0	1	39.5			43
Herbst difficult geography	0	1	37.2			43
Civil war (decolonization)	0	1	4.7			43
Coup count	0	10		1.767	2.169	43

Table 4 – Summary Statistics for Democratization Variables (All Constitutional)

Variable	Min	Max	% coded 1	Mean	Std Dev	N
DV						
Coups Attempt	0	1	32.9			79
Ethnicity						
Ethnic change	0	1	57.7			78
Prior ethnic stacking	0	1	46.4			69
ELF	0.04	0.93		0.599	0.277	69
EF Alesina	0	0.91		0.649	0.230	69
EF Fearon	0.039	0.953		0.684	0.219	67
Posner's PREG	0	0.71		0.380	0.240	63
Largest group % of pop	0.12	0.98		0.450	0.225	69
Group over 50% of pop	0	1	37.7			69
Wealth and Growth						
Ln GDP/k	6.153	9.466		7.171	0.825	69
Economic shock ($\leq -1\%$)	0	1	36.2			69
Economic shock ($\leq -3\%$)	0	1	18.8			69
Economic shock ($\leq -5\%$)	0	1	11.6			69
Economic shock ($\leq -10\%$)	0	1	5.8			69
Lowest CAB as % of GDP	-57.33	14.52		-9.307	13.56	60
Natural Resources						
Oil production	0	0.068		0.005	0.015	69
Diamond production	0	13.11		0.322	1.682	69
Oil reserves	0	0.481		0.036	0.098	67
Oil or diamonds	0	1	52.2			69
Military						
Military expenditures	2347	4071000		346300	810152.3	49
Expenditures per soldier	428.57	54280		8714.04	10390.4	47
Military personnel	0	255		28.84	46.82	49
Ln military personnel	0	5.44		2.47	1.34	52
Δ Military personnel	-0.23	0.58		0.02	0.12	43
Decrease Military personnel	-9.96	0		-0.24	1.50	44
Counterbalancing	1	3.33		1.70	0.74	34
Paramilitary	0	3.13		0.62	0.75	23
Democracy						
Civil liberties	1	7		3.89	1.32	61
Δ Civil liberties	-2	1		-0.25	0.63	60
Polity	-9	10		3.59	5.12	66
Polity ²	1	100		42.89	26.42	66

Variable	Min	Max	% coded 1	Mean	Std Dev	N
Previous transfers	0	4		0.71	0.93	69
Prior successful (const) transfer	0	1	39.1			69
Electoral Democracy	0	1	38.6			57
Liberalizing	0	1	42.1			57
Prior Coups						
Prior coups	0	6		0.899	1.374	69
Prior successful coups	0	3		0.348	0.638	69
Coup caused transfer	0	1	15.9			69
Years since attempt	0	44		13.90	12.36	69
Instability						
Civil war	0	1	30.0			69
Popular Unrest	0	8		0.92	1.68	39
Highest Popular Unrest	0	8		1.38	1.84	34
Herbst difficult geography	0	1	18.8			69
AU member	0	1	36.2			69

Table 5 – Summary Statistics for Democratization Variables (Electoral Only)

Variable	Min	Max	% coded 1	Mean	Std Dev	N
DV						
Coup Attempt	0	1	40.7			59
Ethnicity						
Ethnic change	0	1	68.6			51
Prior ethnic stacking	0	1	43.1			51
ELF	0.04	0.93		0.630	0.261	51
EF Alesina	0	0.91		0.685	0.201	51
EF Fearon	0.255	0.953		0.721	0.173	50
Posner's PREG	0	0.71		0.396	0.234	48
Largest group % of pop	0.12	0.85		0.410	0.184	51
Group over 50% of pop	0	1	33.3			51
Wealth and Growth						
Ln GDP/k	6.153	9.466		7.080	0.796	51
Economic shock ($\leq -1\%$)	0	1	29.4			51
Economic shock ($\leq -3\%$)	0	1	19.6			51
Economic shock ($\leq -5\%$)	0	1	9.8			51
Economic shock ($\leq -10\%$)	0	1	5.9			51
Lowest CAB as % of GDP	-57.33	14.52		-8.887	12.89	47
Natural Resources						
Oil production	0	0.067		0.004	0.012	51
Diamond production	0	0.999		0.057	0.169	51
Oil reserves	0	0.353		0.029	0.085	51
Oil or diamonds	0	1	49.0			51
Military						
Military expenditures	2347	4071000		384344.6	950068.8	34
Expenditures per soldier	428.57	54280		8939.91	11325.17	32
Military personnel	0	164		23.71	36.81	34
Ln military personnel	0	5.32		2.39	1.29	37
Δ Military personnel	-0.23	0.11		-0.02	0.06	29
Decrease Military personnel	-9.96	0		-0.35	1.81	30
Counterbalancing	1	3.33		1.74	0.77	25
Paramilitary	1	3.13		0.61	0.84	15
Democracy						
Civil liberties	1	7		3.73	1.20	48
Δ Civil liberties	-2	1		-0.27	0.64	48
Polity	-7	10		5.27	3.77	49
Polity ²	1	100		41.67	27.57	49

Variable	Min	Max	% coded 1	Mean	Std Dev	N
Previous transfers	0	4		0.86	0.94	51
Prior successful (elect) transfer	0	1	49.0			51
Free and fair	0	1	76.0			50
Margin of victory	1.3	100		32.03	28.68	51
Regime continuity	0	1	44.0			50
Electoral Democracy	0	1	37.5			48
Liberalizing	0	1	47.9			48
Prior Coups						
Prior coups	0	5		1.039	1.341	51
Prior successful coups	0	3		0.451	0.702	51
Coup caused transfer	0	1	21.6			51
Years since attempt	0	44		12.63	12.47	51
Instability						
Civil war	0	1	19.6			51
Popular unrest	0	8		1.22	1.91	27
Highest popular unrest	0	8		1.48	2.04	23
Herbst difficult geography	0	1	27.5			51
AU member	0	1	41.2			51

IV. Additional Descriptive Statistics Tables

Table 6 – Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence and Military Loyalty

		Loyalty Choice	
		inclusive	ethnic
Prior Ethnic Violence	yes	9	6
	no	15	17
Correlation= -0.14; $\chi^2 = 0.2768$ (p>0.5988)			
Missing Cases: Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Gambia.			

Table 7 – Reasons for Constitutional Changes of Leadership, 1950-2007

Elections (n=59)	
Planned democratization or regularly scheduled	40
By transitional government after coup	13
After retirement, resignation, impeachment, or death of leader	5
By transitional government after peace treaty	1
Non-Electoral Successions (n=20)	
After death in office (natural) of leader	11
After retirement (non-coerced) of leader	4
After resignation (non-militarily coerced) of leader	3
By terms of power sharing agreement	1
Appointed by elected body	1
Total	79

Table 8 – Periodization of Constitutional (Electoral) Changes of Leadership

Decade	Number of Leadership Changes	Number Followed by Coup Attempts	Percentage Followed by Coup Attempts
1950-59	0 (0)	0 (0)	-
1960-69	6 (3)	4 (3)	67% (100%)
1970-79	7 (2)	3 (2)	43% (100%)
1980-89	8 (3)	2 (2)	25% (67%)
1990-99	29 (27)	11 (10)	38% (37%)
2000-07	28 (24)	6 (6)	21% (25%)
Total	78 (59)	26 (23)	33% (40%)

V. Robustness Checks

Most Homogeneous Subset of Electoral Transitions Table 27
(regularly scheduled or planned democratization)

Table 9 – Alternative Measures and Additional Variables Robustness Checks

Concept (Main Variable)	Alternative Measures	Models	Tables
ethnic diversity (ELF)	EF Alesina EF Fearon Posner's PREG largest group % of pop group over 50% of pop	all	10,12,20
Herbst difficult geography		all	11,19,26
civil war		all	11,19,26
mineral exporter	late mineral discovery	count	11
economic shock ($\leq -1\%$)	lowest CAB as % of GDP economic shock ($\leq -3\%$) economic shock ($\leq -5\%$) economic shock ($\leq -10\%$)	logit	13,21
natural resource wealth (oil production)	oil reserves diamond production oil or diamonds	logit	14,22
military organization	expenditures per soldier ln military personnel Δ military personnel counterbalancing	logit	15

Concept (Main Variable)	Alternative Measures	Models	Tables
democratic consolidation	civil liberties Δ civil liberties polity polity ² electoral democracy liberalizing previous transfers prior successful (const) transfer	logit	16,17,23,24
prior coups	prior successful coups coup caused transfer years since attempt	logit	18,25
IO deterrence	AU member	logit	19,26

Table 10 – Count (Negative Binomial) Model: Ethnic Diversity Robustness Checks

DV= number of coup attempts in first 20 years after independence standard errors, n=43						
Ethnic & unmatched	1.871** (0.639)	1.666* (0.737)	2.112* (0.880)	1.438* (0.693)	1.925** (0.701)	2.089** (0.667)
Ethnic & matched	0.417 (0.706)	0.247 (0.784)	0.70595 (0.868)	-0.026 (0.802)	0.505 (0.732)	0.628 (0.708)
Inclusive & unmatched	0.704 (0.558)	0.431 (0.774)	0.862 (0.919)	0.212 (0.757)	0.691 (0.749)	0.890 (0.720)
Prior ethnic violence	0.221 (0.298)	0.241 (0.304)	0.242 (0.342)	0.398 (0.347)	0.205 (0.311)	0.167 (0.315)
Ln GDP/k	-0.172 (0.262)	-0.199 (0.266)	-0.285 (0.297)	-0.203 (0.317)	-0.180 (0.269)	-0.180 (0.271)
Mineral exporter	-0.168 (0.340)	-0.105 (0.335)	-0.028 (0.362)	-0.245 (0.455)	-0.114 (0.342)	-0.098 (0.345)
Ethnic diversity	0.462 (0.541)					
EF Alesina		0.613 (0.755)				
EF Fearon			0.280 (0.826)			
PREG				0.311 (0.827)		
Largest group % of pop					-0.143 (0.645)	
Group over 50% of pop						0.136 (0.317)
Intercept	0.392 (1.886)	0.573 (1.877)	0.914 (2.052)	1.139 (2.268)	0.694 (2.011)	0.436 (1.961)
*** = $p \leq 0.001$, ** = $p \leq 0.01$, * = $p \leq 0.05$						

Table 11 – Count (Negative Binomial) Model: Other Robustness Checks

DV= number of coup attempts in first 20 years after independence standard errors, n=43				
Ethnic & unmatched	1.871** (0.639)	1.931** (0.640)	1.822** (0.644)	1.879** (0.639)
Ethnic & matched	0.417 (0.706)	0.383 (0.703)	0.223 (0.736)	0.386 (0.711)
Inclusive & unmatched	0.704 (0.558)	0.598 (0.710)	0.233 (0.787)	0.549 (0.705)
Prior ethnic violence	0.221 (0.298)	0.122 (0.298)	0.363 (0.336)	0.212 (0.301)
Ln GDP/k	-0.172 (0.262)	-0.321 (0.282)	-0.133 (0.265)	-0.165 (0.264)
Ethnic diversity	0.462 (0.541)	0.362 (0.547)	0.652 (0.581)	0.438 (0.542)
Mineral exporter	-0.168 (0.340)		-0.246 (0.349)	-0.170 (0.342)
Late mineral discovery		0.209 (0.330)		
Herbst difficult geography			0.652 (0.581)	
Civil War				0.312 (0.671)
Intercept	0.392 (1.886)	1.311 (1.948)	0.012 (1.929)	0.3523 (1.8962)
*** = $p \leq 0.001$, ** = $p \leq 0.01$, * = $p \leq 0.05$				

Table 12 – All Constitutional Transfers of Power: Ethnic Diversity Robustness Checks

Logit, DV= Coup Attempt within 4 Years						
robust errors						
Ethnic change & stacking	21.30*** (1.627)	20.58*** (0.696)	20.63*** (0.732)	22.28*** (1.402)	20.62*** (0.943)	20.83*** (0.807)
Ethnic change & no stacking	17.96*** (1.369)	17.26*** (0.832)	17.41*** (0.693)	18.51*** (1.13)	17.35*** (0.952)	17.56*** (0.698)
Ethnic continuity & stacking	18.35*** (1.208)	18.45*** (0.927)	18.37*** (0.848)	19.37*** (1.185)	18.33*** (1.025)	18.24*** (0.987)
Prior coups	0.494 (0.458)	0.681 (0.393)	0.584 (0.368)	0.323 (0.429)	0.597 (0.376)	0.532 (0.404)
Ln GDPk	-1.361 (1.075)	-1.317 (1.049)	-1.211 (1.051)	-2.084 (1.295)	-1.226 (1.013)	-1.286 (1.004)
Economic shock	1.122 (0.847)	0.911 (0.833)	0.901 (0.830)	1.637 (0.851)	0.928 (0.811)	0.951 (0.823)
Oil production	14.26 (25.45)	13.39 (25.68)	11.255 (26.01)	29.66 (35.66)	11.17 (24.98)	12.61 (24.51)
ELF	-1.417 (2.443)					
EF Alesina		2.809 (1.754)				
EF Fearon			1.328 (1.917)			
PREG				-4.867* (2.445)		
Largest group % of pop					-1.401 (1.920)	
Group over 50% of pop						-0.048 (0.88197)
Intercept	-10.44 (7.193)	-13.23 (7.155)	-12.85 (7.226)	-5.342 (8.715)	-11.22 (6.939)	-11.44 (6.800)
N	69	69	67	63	69	69
*** = $p \leq 0.001$, ** = $p \leq 0.01$, * = $p \leq 0.05$						

Table 13 – All Constitutional Transfers of Power: Economic Shock Robustness Checks

Logit, DV= Coup Attempt within 4 Years					
robust errors					
Ethnic change & stacking	21.30*** (1.627)	23.50*** (1.382)	22.78*** (1.574)	21.87*** (1.756)	20.30*** (1.534)
Ethnic change & no stacking	17.96*** (1.369)	18.51*** (1.086)	18.74*** (1.139)	18.33*** (1.449)	17.84*** (1.566)
Ethnic continuity & stacking	18.35*** (1.208)	19.49*** (1.419)	19.40*** (1.505)	18.74*** (1.494)	17.69*** (1.448)
Prior coups	0.494 (0.458)	0.283 (0.379)	0.329 (0.427)	0.446 (0.466)	0.583 (0.464)
Ln GDPk	-1.361 (1.075)	-1.388 (1.198)	-1.829 (1.421)	-1.697 (1.287)	-1.228 (0.808)
Oil production	14.26 (25.45)	12.84 (27.35)	15.96 (29.32)	14.23 (28.19)	23.14 (22.38)
Ethnic diversity	-1.417 (2.443)	-4.219 (2.208)	-2.501 (2.025)	-1.809 (2.108)	-0.530 (2.844)
Economic shock ($\geq -1\%$)	1.122 (0.847)				
Economic shock ($\geq -3\%$)		4.385** (1.352)			
Economic shock ($\geq -5\%$)			3.612** (1.299)		
Economic shock ($\geq -10\%$)				2.821* (1.323)	
Lowest CAB as % GDP					0.038 (0.039)
Intercept	-10.44 (7.193)	-10.188 (8.260)	-7.482 (9.477)	-8.067 (8.382)	-10.90 (5.695)
N	69	69	69	69	60
*** = $p \leq 0.001$, ** = $p \leq 0.01$, * = $p \leq 0.05$					

Table 14 – All Constitutional Transfers of Power: Natural Resources Robustness Checks

Logit, DV= Coup Attempt within 4 Years				
robust errors				
Ethnic change & stacking	21.30*** (1.627)	21.26*** (1.413)	21.21*** (1.469)	21.31*** (1.561)
Ethnic change & no stacking	17.96*** (1.369)	18.03*** (1.377)	17.95*** (1.474)	17.83*** (1.467)
Ethnic continuity & stacking	18.35*** (1.208)	18.03*** (1.167)	18.18*** (1.130)	17.57*** (1.178)
Prior coups	0.494 (0.458)	0.520 (0.453)	0.493 (0.444)	0.434 (0.484)
Ln GDPk	-1.361 (1.075)	-0.612 (0.863)	-0.976 (0.721)	-1.323 (0.752)
Ethnic diversity	-1.417 (2.443)	-1.440 (2.546)	-1.358 (2.472)	-2.234 (2.455)
Economic shock ($\geq -1\%$)	1.122 (0.847)	1.062 (0.847)	1.137 (0.847)	1.359 (0.918)
Oil production	14.26 (25.45)			
Oil Reserves		0.390 (3.749)		
Diamond Production			-0.016 (1.895)	
Oil or Diamonds				1.160 (0.813)
Intercept	-10.44 (7.193)	-15.41* (6.230)	-12.97* (5.095)	-10.597* (5.249)
N	69	67	69	69
*** = $p \leq 0.001$, ** = $p \leq 0.01$, * = $p \leq 0.05$				

Table 15 – All Constitutional Transfers of Power: Military Organization Robustness Checks

Logit, DV= Coup Attempt within 4 Years					
robust errors					
Ethnic change & stacking	21.30*** (1.627)	28.09*** (3.981)	23.24*** (1.769)	31.80*** (5.146)	27.93*** (3.056)
Ethnic change & no stacking	17.96*** (1.369)	18.13*** (1.077)	17.98*** (1.083)	26.45*** (4.532)	22.91*** (3.453)
Ethnic continuity & stacking	18.35*** (1.208)	18.99*** (1.364)	16.70*** (1.124)	21.23*** (2.295)	18.42*** (2.190)
Prior coups	0.494 (0.458)	2.586 (1.657)	1.452* (0.570)	1.382 (0.895)	1.211 (0.805)
Ln GDPk	-1.361 (1.075)	-3.407 (2.962)	-1.639 (1.241)	-2.396 (1.386)	-0.505 (0.778)
Ethnic diversity	-1.417 (2.443)	-1.781 (1.922)	-1.923 (1.715)	-9.854 (5.871)	-7.878* (3.710)
Economic shock ($\geq -1\%$)	1.122 (0.847)	2.443 (1.571)	3.147** (1.049)	4.977* (2.097)	3.124* (1.290)
Expenditures per soldier		-0.000 (0.000)			
Ln military personnel			-0.453 (0.578)		
Δ military personnel				17.18 (13.54)	
Counterbalancing					0.367 (0.739)
Intercept	-10.44 (7.193)	1.618 (18.49)	-8.925 (7.995)	-6.834 (7.360)	-17.84** (5.769)
N	69	47	52	43	34
*** = $p \leq 0.001$, ** = $p \leq 0.01$, * = $p \leq 0.05$					

Table 16 – All Constitutional Transfers of Power: Democracy Robustness Checks

Logit, DV= Coup Attempt within 4 Years					
robust errors					
Ethnic change & stacking	21.30*** (1.627)	20.90*** (1.079)	20.81*** (1.332)	24.89*** (2.527)	26.14*** (2.250)
Ethnic change & no stacking	17.96*** (1.369)	17.89*** (1.150)	17.97*** (1.324)	20.35*** (2.030)	21.59*** (2.006)
Ethnic continuity & stacking	18.35*** (1.208)	18.73*** (1.460)	18.57*** (1.232)	20.31*** (2.000)	21.48*** (2.124)
Prior coups	0.494 (0.458)	0.405 (0.399)	0.389 (0.381)	1.386** (0.505)	1.465** (0.475)
Ln GDPk	-1.361 (1.075)	-0.879 (0.854)	-0.793 (0.793)	-1.103 (0.874)	-1.360 (0.887)
Ethnic diversity	-1.417 (2.443)	-0.781 (2.682)	-0.874 (2.870)	-4.930 (2.771)	-4.956* (2.272)
Economic shock ($\geq -1\%$)	1.122 (0.847)	1.425 (0.985)	1.299 (0.774)	2.293 (1.231)	2.179* (1.020)
Civil liberties		-0.196 (0.474)			
Δ Civil liberties			0.400 (0.653)		
Polity				0.054 (0.116)	
Polity ²					0.017 (0.027)
Intercept	-10.44 (7.193)	-13.16 (7.117)	-14.31* (5.925)	-13.87* (5.899)	-13.82* (5.422)
N	69	61	60	66	66
*** = $p \leq 0.001$, ** = $p \leq 0.01$, * = $p \leq 0.05$					

Table 17 – All Constitutional Transfers of Power: Regime Type and Prior Transfers Robustness Checks

Logit, DV= Coup Attempt within 4 Years					
robust errors					
Ethnic change & stacking	21.30*** (1.627)	21.09*** (1.291)	21.13*** (1.345)	22.98*** (2.095)	23.28*** (2.636)
Ethnic change & no stacking	17.96*** (1.369)	18.15*** (1.260)	18.00*** (1.314)	19.37*** (2.098)	19.71*** (2.324)
Ethnic continuity & stacking	18.35*** (1.208)	17.76*** (0.936)	17.89*** (0.857)	18.92*** (1.705)	19.15*** (2.126)
Prior coups	0.494 (0.458)	0.704 (0.542)	0.510 (0.499)	1.050** (0.401)	1.078** (0.401)
Ln GDPk	-1.361 (1.075)	-1.294 (0.786)	-1.130 (0.739)	-0.821 (0.939)	-0.795 (0.890)
Ethnic diversity	-1.417 (2.443)	-0.881 (2.828)	-1.164 (2.907)	-3.730 (2.783)	-3.734 (2.811)
Economic shock ($\geq -1\%$)	1.122 (0.847)	0.872 (0.822)	0.955 (0.855)	1.950 (1.398)	1.622 (1.180)
Previous transfers		-1.431 (0.814)			
Prior successful (const) transfer			-1.521 (1.018)		
Electoral democracy				0.494 (1.445)	
Liberalizing					-0.524 (0.988)
Intercept	-10.44 (7.193)	-10.39 (5.765)	-11.39* (5.410)	-14.75* (6.358)	-14.77* (6.174)
N	69	69	69	57	57
*** = $p \leq 0.001$, ** = $p \leq 0.01$, * = $p \leq 0.05$					

Table 18 – All Constitutional Transfers of Power: Prior Coup Robustness Checks

Logit, DV= Coup Attempt within 4 Years robust errors, n=69				
Ethnic change & stacking	21.30*** (1.627)	21.49*** (1.343)	58.75*** (4.972)	22.30*** (2.334)
Ethnic change & no stacking	17.96*** (1.369)	18.11*** (1.343)	55.13*** (5.126)	18.82*** (1.972)
Ethnic continuity & stacking	18.35*** (1.208)	17.93*** (1.091)	37.47*** (3.998)	18.61*** (1.436)
Ln GDPk	-1.361 (1.075)	-1.215 (1.038)	-1.191 (1.059)	-1.686 (1.277)
Ethnic diversity	-1.417 (2.443)	-1.561 (2.321)	-1.889 (2.060)	-2.559 (3.517)
Economic shock ($\geq -1\%$)	1.122 (0.847)	1.226 (0.937)	1.431 (1.369)	1.054 (0.997)
Oil production	14.26 (25.45)	14.38 (25.07)	28.66 (32.03)	9.672 (26.69)
Prior coups	0.494 (0.458)			
Prior successful coups		1.838** (0.695)		
Coup caused transfer			38.66*** (2.710)	
Years since attempt				-0.119* (0.049)
Intercept	-10.44 (7.193)	-11.68 (7.217)	-48.9*** (10.21)	-6.223 (9.044)
N	69	69	69	69
*** = $p \leq 0.001$, ** = $p \leq 0.01$, * = $p \leq 0.05$				

Table 19 – All Constitutional Transfers of Power: Other Robustness Checks

Logit, DV= Coup Attempt within 4 Years				
robust errors				
Ethnic change & stacking	21.30*** (1.627)	21.08*** (1.456)	21.30*** (1.687)	21.42*** (1.388)
Ethnic change & no stacking	17.96*** (1.369)	17.91*** (1.366)	17.95*** (1.505)	18.42*** (1.419)
Ethnic continuity & stacking	18.35*** (1.208)	17.90*** (1.160)	18.34*** (1.290)	17.97*** (1.066)
Prior coups	0.494 (0.458)	0.522 (0.404)	0.496 (0.463)	0.475 (0.448)
Ln GDPk	-1.361 (1.075)	-0.959 (0.738)	-1.354 (1.103)	-1.087 (0.671)
Ethnic diversity	-1.417 (2.443)	-1.567 (2.320)	-1.420 (2.470)	-1.869 (2.440)
Economic shock ($\geq -1\%$)	1.122 (0.847)	1.299 (0.727)	1.121 (0.848)	1.079 (0.848)
Civil War		-0.723 (1.161)		
Herbst difficult geography			0.072 (0.914)	
AU member				-1.477 (1.131)
Intercept	-10.44 (7.193)	-12.81* (5.396)	-10.50 (7.492)	-11.57* (4.718)
N	69	69	69	69
*** = $p \leq 0.001$, ** = $p \leq 0.01$, * = $p \leq 0.05$				

Table 20 – Electoral Transfers of Power: Ethnic Diversity Robustness Checks

Logit, DV= Coup Attempt within 4 Years						
robust errors						
Ethnic change & stacking	29.53*** (4.588)	21.38*** (1.372)	21.68*** (1.614)	27.78*** (4.717)	21.69*** (1.514)	21.55*** (1.443)
Ethnic change & no stacking	24.19*** (3.300)	18.05*** (1.096)	18.54*** (1.207)	22.58*** (2.570)	18.53*** (1.208)	18.45*** (1.121)
Ethnic continuity & stacking	23.55*** (3.742)	20.38*** (1.976)	19.72*** (1.690)	22.66*** (2.158)	19.85*** (1.662)	19.64*** (1.734)
Prior coups	0.896 (0.550)	0.777 (0.549)	0.644 (0.502)	0.696 (0.560)	0.655 (0.504)	0.690 (0.496)
Ln GDPk	-1.617 (1.544)	-1.604 (1.034)	-1.772 (1.054)	-4.557 (3.337)	-1.790 (1.045)	-1.666 (1.069)
Economic shock	5.131* (2.049)	2.234 (1.217)	2.035 (1.293)	2.248 (1.490)	2.056 (1.295)	2.055 (1.272)
Oil production	61.97 (39.44)	34.95 (28.37)	38.25 (29.04)	212.4 (174.3)	39.04 (28.22)	37.95 (27.47)
Prior successful electoral transfer	-6.574* (3.278)	-0.784 (1.861)	-1.143 (1.914)	-2.766 (1.596)	-1.125 (1.870)	-1.064 (1.782)
ELF	-9.924* (4.603)					
EF Alesina		2.186 (3.566)				
EF Fearon			-1.472 (4.120)			
PREG				-12.30 (7.125)		
Largest group % of pop					1.199 (3.354)	
Group over 50% of pop						0.687 (1.254)
Intercept	-11.48 (9.571)	-11.86 (6.993)	-8.052 (7.281)	9.725 (21.82)	-9.508 (7.110)	-9.995 (7.301)
N	51	51	50	48	51	51
*** = $p \leq 0.001$, ** = $p \leq 0.01$, * = $p \leq 0.05$						

Table 21 – Electoral Transfers of Power: Economic Shock Robustness Checks

Logit, DV= Coup Attempt within 4 Years					
robust errors					
Ethnic change & stacking	29.53*** (4.588)	26.35*** (3.162)	38.05*** (2.2969)	37.18*** (2.930)	29.31*** (3.538)
Ethnic change & no stacking	24.19*** (3.300)	21.01*** (2.090)	34.12*** (1.434)	33.69*** (2.546)	26.89*** (2.467)
Ethnic continuity & stacking	23.55*** (3.742)	20.46*** (2.528)	33.63*** (2.845)	32.59*** (3.586)	23.12*** (1.613)
Prior coups	0.896 (0.550)	0.697 (0.513)	0.729 (0.503)	0.944 (0.510)	2.325* (0.950)
Ln GDPk	-1.617 (1.544)	-1.066 (1.807)	-1.943 (1.903)	-1.859 (1.649)	-2.120* (0.968)
Oil production	61.97 (39.44)	40.46 (41.66)	36.97 (36.32)	38.36 (35.17)	30.29 (44.97)
Ethnic diversity	-9.924* (4.603)	-9.488* (4.028)	-6.314* (2.721)	-5.819* (2.540)	-8.397** (2.777)
Economic shock (\geq -1%)	5.131* (2.049)				
Economic shock (\geq -3%)		5.707** (2.081)			
Economic shock (\geq -5%)			19.77*** (1.845)		
Economic shock (\geq -10%)				18.82*** (2.019)	
Lowest CAB as % GDP					0.181* (0.080)
Intercept	-11.48 (9.571)	-11.87 (11.52)	-19.60 (12.78)	-19.84 (11.17)	-8.159 (6.699)
N	51	51	51	51	47
*** = $p \leq 0.001$, ** = $p \leq 0.01$, * = $p \leq 0.05$					

Table 22 – Electoral Transfers of Power: Natural Resources Robustness Checks

Logit, DV= Coup Attempt within 4 Years				
robust errors				
Ethnic change & stacking	29.53*** (4.588)	28.83*** (4.217)	28.71*** (3.797)	32.25*** (4.394)
Ethnic change & no stacking	24.19*** (3.300)	23.81*** (3.187)	23.78*** (3.027)	25.77*** (3.306)
Ethnic continuity & stacking	23.55*** (3.742)	23.17*** (3.545)	23.05*** (3.398)	23.17*** (4.061)
Prior coups	0.896 (0.550)	0.820 (0.504)	0.802 (0.547)	0.856 (0.661)
Ln GDPk	-1.617 (1.544)	-0.9162 (1.550)	-0.277 (1.041)	-0.990 (1.107)
Ethnic diversity	-9.924* (4.603)	-9.242* (4.377)	-8.936* (3.810)	-13.60** (4.424)
Economic shock ($\geq -1\%$)	5.131* (2.049)	4.906** (1.890)	5.065** (1.856)	6.809*** (1.943)
Oil production	61.97 (39.44)			
Oil Reserves		3.770 (6.257)		
Diamond Production			8.673 (7.887)	
Oil or Diamonds				2.741* (1.202)
Intercept	-11.48 (9.571)	-15.88 (9.864)	-20.36 (7.598)	-16.79 (7.281)
N	51	51	51	51
*** = $p \leq 0.001$, ** = $p \leq 0.01$, * = $p \leq 0.05$				

Table 23 – Electoral Transfers of Power: Democracy Robustness Checks

Logit, DV= Coup Attempt within 4 Years						
robust errors						
Ethnic change & stacking	29.53*** (4.588)	28.40*** (3.169)	33.27*** (7.377)	47.08 (24.94)	33.08*** (6.678)	28.32*** (3.419)
Ethnic change & no stacking	24.19*** (3.300)	23.94*** (2.143)	28.16*** (5.941)	35.45* (16.22)	26.26*** (4.571)	23.54*** (2.699)
Ethnic continuity & stacking	23.55*** (3.742)	21.91*** (2.497)	28.32*** (6.209)	31.61* (13.75)	27.42*** (4.654)	22.83*** (2.643)
Prior coups	0.896 (0.550)	1.025 (0.580)	0.180 (0.550)	3.008 (1.650)	1.590 (0.939)	0.805 (0.501)
Ln GDPk	-1.617 (1.544)	0.006 (1.260)	-0.626 (0.880)	-0.876 (1.680)	-0.215 (1.148)	-0.457 (1.017)
Ethnic diversity	-9.924* (4.603)	-9.221** (3.245)	-12.341 (6.314)	-29.73 (25.05)	-12.50 (7.035)	-8.610* (3.561)
Economic shock ($\geq -1\%$)	5.131* (2.049)	4.281** (1.631)	7.482* (3.463)	13.40 (11.35)	6.112* (2.676)	4.788*** (1.454)
Civil liberties		0.712 (0.738)				
Δ Civil liberties			2.304 (1.328)			
Polity				-0.601 (0.500)		
Polity ²					0.030 (0.027)	
Free and fair						0.043 (1.104)
Intercept	-11.48 (9.571)	-24.59* (10.07)	-19.79** (6.186)	-17.89* (8.015)	23.82** (8.798)	-18.87** (7.261)
N	51	48	48	49	49	50
*** = $p \leq 0.001$, ** = $p \leq 0.01$, * = $p \leq 0.05$						

Table 24 – Electoral Transfers of Power: Regime Type and Prior Transfers Robustness Checks

Logit, DV= Coup Attempt within 4 Years				
robust errors				
Ethnic change & stacking	29.53*** (4.588)	35.14*** (7.336)	29.40*** (4.750)	38.44*** (8.366)
Ethnic change & no stacking	24.19*** (3.300)	29.27*** (5.242)	23.90*** (3.458)	29.15*** (5.013)
Ethnic continuity & stacking	23.55*** (3.742)	26.19*** (3.994)	24.44*** (3.920)	31.01*** (5.370)
Prior coups	0.896 (0.550)	1.491* (0.631)	0.758 (0.488)	1.149 (0.834)
Ln GDPk	-1.617 (1.544)	-1.507 (1.659)	-0.953 (1.167)	-2.169 (1.303)
Ethnic diversity	-9.924* (4.603)	-12.85* (5.545)	-8.988* (4.385)	-15.71** (6.054)
Economic shock ($\geq -1\%$)	5.131* (2.049)	6.770** (2.620)	5.923* (2.612)	11.07* (4.402)
Previous transfers		-4.288 (2.195)		
Electoral democracy			1.718 (1.852)	
Liberalizing				-5.593* (2.458)
Intercept	-11.48 (9.571)	-13.32 (11.33)	-16.63* (6.865)	-8.066 (7.782)
N	51	51	48	48
*** = $p \leq 0.001$, ** = $p \leq 0.01$, * = $p \leq 0.05$				

Table 25 – Electoral Transfers of Power: Prior Coup Robustness Checks

Logit, DV= Coup Attempt within 4 Years				
robust errors				
Ethnic change & stacking	29.53*** (4.588)	29.51*** (5.611)	59.16*** (4.141)	35.07*** (6.304)
Ethnic change & no stacking	24.19*** (3.300)	24.40*** (3.939)	54.81*** (3.814)	28.35*** (4.854)
Ethnic continuity & stacking	23.55*** (3.742)	23.89*** (4.552)	37.11*** (3.317)	25.93*** (4.214)
Ln GDPk	-1.617 (1.544)	-1.886 (1.686)	-0.057 (0.876)	-0.545 (0.870)
Ethnic diversity	-9.924* (4.603)	-9.421 (5.018)	-7.329* (3.251)	-13.79* (5.975)
Economic shock ($\geq -1\%$)	5.131* (2.049)	5.343* (2.453)	4.003* (1.987)	7.903** (2.927)
Oil production	61.97 (39.44)	51.52 (34.43)		
Prior coups	0.896 (0.550)			
Prior successful coups		1.695 (1.136)		
Coup caused transfer			36.81*** (2.057)	
Years since attempt				-0.189** (0.065)
Intercept	-11.48 (9.571)	-9.849 (10.06)	-53.0*** (7.558)	-17.30** (5.828)
N	51	51	51	51
*** = $p \leq 0.001$, ** = $p \leq 0.01$, * = $p \leq 0.05$				

Table 26 – Electoral Transfers of Power: Other Robustness Checks

Logit, DV= Coup Attempt within 4 Years				
robust errors				
Ethnic change & stacking	29.53*** (4.588)	29.62*** (4.683)	29.88*** (4.557)	30.48*** (4.855)
Ethnic change & no stacking	24.19*** (3.300)	24.28*** (3.362)	24.50*** (3.114)	25.65*** (4.011)
Ethnic continuity & stacking	23.55*** (3.742)	23.65*** (3.863)	24.42*** (4.106)	24.20*** (4.086)
Prior coups	0.896 (0.550)	0.885 (0.555)	0.821 (0.566)	0.718 (0.514)
Ln GDPk	-1.617 (1.544)	-1.604 (1.538)	-1.625 (1.515)	-0.334 (0.883)
Ethnic diversity	-9.924* (4.603)	-9.947* (4.612)	-9.203* (3.921)	-10.59* (4.655)
Economic shock ($\geq -1\%$)	5.131* (2.049)	5.252** (1.892)	5.713** (2.121)	5.269** (1.876)
Oil production	61.97 (39.44)	65.34 (43.57)	73.98 (50.78)	
Civil War		-0.269 (1.152)		
Herbst difficult geography			-1.152 (1.654)	
AU member				-1.852 (1.526)
Intercept	-11.48 (9.571)	-11.63 (9.532)	-11.91 (9.391)	-19.73** (6.220)
N				
*** = $p \leq 0.001$, ** = $p \leq 0.01$, * = $p \leq 0.05$				

Table 27 – Most Homogenous Subset of Elections Data (Regularly Scheduled or Planned Democratization)

Logit, DV= Coup Attempt within 4 Years robust errors, n=35	
Ethnic change & stacking	47.44*** (10.06)
Ethnic change & no stacking	36.62*** (6.383)
Ethnic continuity & stacking	8.482 (6.155)
Prior coups	3.261* (1.585)
Ln GDPk	0.574 (1.568)
Ethnic diversity	-27.02** (9.542)
Economic shock ($\geq -1\%$)	12.06* (4.258)
Δ civil liberties	3.609 (2.000)
Intercept	-32.78** (11.79)
*** = $p \leq 0.001$, ** = $p \leq 0.01$, * = $p \leq 0.05$	