Online Supplementary Material

When Soldiers Rebel:
Ethnic Armies and Political Instability in Africa

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Appendix A

Pre-independence Ethnic Violence and Ethnic Politicization Data

A.1 Coding Guidelines

Original data was collected and coded for both ethnic violence and ethnic politicization in the immediate preindependence period. The coding rules for each variable are outlined below and then qualitative narratives are provided for each country with final coding decisions. The narratives first establish the landscape of political parties during the period of analysis and whether they have an ethnic basis of support. Any reported violent incidents are then discussed and their potential ethnic basis. The narratives were compiled from archival, journalistic, and historiographical sources.

Pre-independence ethnic violence: Two types of ethnic violence were coded for each African state in the period immediately preceding independence: ethnic riots and violence committed by ethnically-based political parties. The variable is coded 1 if any such incident took place between World War II and the year of decolonization for each African country, and 0 otherwise. Exceptions to this time frame of analysis include Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Liberia, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, which did not gain independence at the same time as the vast majority of African countries. For each of these cases, the period analyzed is justified at the beginning of the qualitative narrative. Not included are secessionist movements, anti-colonial rebellions (unless it contained an inter-ethnic dimension of violence), anti- foreign immigrant violence, or violence directed by or against European settlers. Riots are considered ethnic if evidence exists that the targets of violence were selected based on their ethnic identity. Political party violence was deemed ethic if both the political party was considered organized around the interests of an ethnic group, or small set of allied groups, and evidence exists that the victims of violence were selected based on their ethnic identity.

Pre-independence ethnic politicization: To capture ethnic politicization, I compiled data on the vote share captured by ethnic political parties in the elections immediately preceding independence. For each country, I first identified the last national election prior to decolonization and then identified the political parties competing for office. Each party was then coded as ethnic, non-ethnic, or multi-ethnic, following Kanchan Chandra's criteria for classification based on whether parties draw their support from a particular ethnic constituency (or constituencies) and whether they exclude other groups. Ethnic parties draw their support from specific ethnic group(s) while intentionally excluding others.

Multi-ethnic parties attract the support of specific ethnic group(s) but do not intentionally exclude. And non-ethnic parties draw diverse support across all groups.[1] I then tally the share of the total national vote captured by ethnic political parties in that final election prior to independence. Where some political parties could not be coded, usually because they drew little support and there is little written about them, I calculated the possible range of the vote captured by ethnic political parties, with the low end based on all missing parties being coded non-ethnic and the high end based on all missing parties being coded ethnic. I then take the mid-point of this range as the estimated captured vote share for ethnic political parties. For parliamentary elections only: when the actual vote percentage captured by each party was unavailable, but the number of seats won was, I used the percentage of seats won. If no elections were held in the ten years prior to independence, no coding could be made.

A.2   Qualitative Narratives with Coding Decisions

Algeria: Although several political parties existed in Algeria prior to the war for independence, they were systematically weakened by the French authorities. They were also not instrumental to the war effort, or actively joined the Front de Libration Nationale (FLN),and were irrelevant as separate organizations after victory had been achieved. The FLN was formed in 1954 to direct the political side of the revolution, while its armed wing, the Arme de Libration Nationale (ALN), conducted the war. A competing guerrilla organization, the Mouvement National Algrien (MLN) was also formed early in the war but was violently destroyed by the ALN. The ALN had strong representation from both the Berber and Arab communities and thus was not an ethnic party. Although there was vicious fighting against French settlers and against the rival MLN organization, Algerian Arabs and Berbers fought together during the revolution (Metz 1993). Neither Minorities at Risk Project 2009 nor Minority Rights Group 2010 report Arab versus Berber riots either during the revolution or immediately preceding it.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: none
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **NA**

Sources:

Metz, Helen Chapin. "Algeria: A Country Study." *Library of Congress Country Studies.* At http:// memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html, accessed December 22, 2010.

Minorities at Risk Project. 2009. "Minorities at Risk Dataset." College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. At http://www.cidcm. umd.edu/ mar, accessed December 1, 2010.

Minority Rights Group. 2010. "Country Overviews." World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. At http://www.minorityrights.org/directory, accessed December

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[1]Chandra 2011, 162-164. This also accords with Horowitz's understanding of what constitutes an ethnic political party (1985, 293).

1, 2010.

Angola: Here anti-colonial resistance organizations are considered as political parties as no elections were held prior to independence. During the armed struggle against Portuguese colonial rule, there were three main resistance organizations: the Movimiento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA), and the União para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA). These organizations roughly corresponded to the three main ethno-linguistic clusters in the country. The MPLA drew support from the Mbundu people, as well as from mestiços, the urban population, some Ovimbundu, and some white working class elements. The FNLA drew support from the Bakongo people and UNITA drew support from the Ovumbundu (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). Yet, the leadership structure of both the MPLA and FNLA differed ethnically and racially from their support bases and rank-and-file soldiers. The MPLA drew its leadership largely from the highly educated mestizo and assimilado communities and the FNLA traditionally had an assimilado leadership as well. UNITA was considered an anti-mestizo movement but also drew some of its leadership from assimilados (Minority Rights Group 2010). Ideologically, both the MPLA and UNITA had socialist/communist visions. In the early 1970s, facing a stalemate with the Portuguese Army, violence broke out along ethnic lines within the MPLA leading to an organizational split (Chabal 2002, 144). A three-way struggle for post-independence power between these three armed political organizations had already been under way for four months at the time of the Portuguese military withdrawal (Ibid, 145). With Cuban troop support, the MPLA ultimately won a military victory over both the FNLA and UNITA to take over the political governance of the entire country (Ibid, 147). The resistance organizations are all considered ethnically based, directing violence against one another and their support bases. No reports of riots were found.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: YES
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **YES**
Ethnic Parties: MPLA, FNLA, UNITA
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **NA**

Sources:

Chabal, Patrick. 2002. *A History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Minorities at Risk Project. 2009. "Minorities at Risk Dataset." College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. At http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/ mar, accessed December 1, 2010.

Minority Rights Group. 2010. "Country Overviews." World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. At http://www.minorityrights.org/directory, accessed December 1, 2010.

Benin: After the 1951 elections, the original (sole) political partythe UPDcollapsed. Three

regional/ethnic parties then consolidated around the three dominant political personalities from each: Apithys Parti des Nationalistes Dahoméens (PND) of the southern Yoruba and Gouns, Ahomadegbes Union Démocratique Dahoméenne (UDD) of the southern Fon, and Magas Rassemblement Démocratique Dahoméen (RDD) representing the Bariba and other small tribes of the north. In the 1960 elections, the PND won 84 seats, the UDD 71, and the RDD 70 (Decalo 1973, 453-454). Although there is a long history of rivalries between regions and ethnic groups in Benin—including consistent pre-colonial warfare (ending in 1891) between the two kingdoms of Abomey (Fon) and Porto Novo (Yoruba), and long-distance slave raiding by the northern Bariba—no ethnic violence is reported from the colonial period in either Minority Rights Group 2010 or in Levinson.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: PND, UDD, RDD
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **100%**

Sources:

Decalo, Samuel. 1973. "Regionalism, Politics, and the Military in Dahomey." *The Journal of Developing Areas* 7(3): 449-478.

Levinson, David. 1998. *Ethnic Groups Worldwide: A Ready Reference Handbook*. Phoenix, Arizona: The Orynx Press.

Minority Rights Group. 2010. "Country Overviews." World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. At http://www.minorityrights.org/directory, accessed December 1, 2010.

Botswana: The three primary political parties competing in the 1965 pre-independence elections were the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), the Botswana Peoples Party (BPP) and the Botswana Independence Party (BIP), winning 80%, 14%, and 4.6% of the vote respectively. According to Holm, "each basically won votes on a tribal basis. The BDP prevailed because it secured the support of all the various Tswana tribal areas except the Bakgatla in Mocudi. The Bakalanga (who are not a Tswana tribe) supported the BPP, as did the Mocudi Bakgatla, on the urging of their chief. The BIP won the votes of the Bayei because of their resentment for past domination by one of the Tswana tribes, the Batawana (1987, 122-123)." He also writes that the fact of the matter is that voters are not much interested in issues. They are primarily concerned with the ethnic association of the parties Even though the competition between Botswanas political parties is largely ethnic, it never erupts into serious violence among supporters of the various parties (Ibid, 133). Seretse Khama, the leader of the BDP, also had the backing of the cattle sector, both Europeans and Africans (Holm 1988, 186), as well as the civil service (Ibid, 186). Seretse specifically advocated for "non-racialism"—the removal of racial discrimination barriers without the construction of the racial quotas and power sharing systems advocated by multi-racialism (Tlou et al., 1995, 205-206). BDP campaign materials from the 1965 elections stated, " I wish to say quite unequivocally that I have a feeling of responsibility for all the citizens of Bechuanaland, of all races and classes, whether they vote for or against my

party (as cited in Tlau et al 1995, 227)." The only party considered ethnic is thus the BIP. In November 1963, a riot broke out in Francistown between the BPPs womens league (and the BPP youth league which came to their aid) and the police over the monopolization of beer brewing and sales (Ibid, 213), which is not considered ethnic in character. There are no other reports of riots or political party violence in Holm 1987, Holm 1988, Tlou et al. 1995, or Minority Rights Group 2010.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: BIP
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **5%**

Sources:

Holm, John D. 1987. "Elections in Botswana: Institutionalization of a New System of Legitimacy." In Fred M. Hayward, ed., *Elections in Independent Africa*. Boulder and London: Westview Press.

—. 1988. "Botswana: A Paternaliztic Democracy." In Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries (Volume Two): Africa*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Tlou, Thomas, Neil Parsons, and Willie Henderson. 1995. *Seretse Khama, 1921-1980*. South Africa: Macmillan Boleswa.

Minority Rights Group. 2010. "Country Overviews." World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. At http://www.minorityrights.org/directory, accessed December 1, 2010.

Burkina Faso: The Union Voltaïque (UV) was founded in 1945 by Mossi chiefs to advocate for the reconstitution of Upper Volta as a colony, which would then be demographically dominated by Mossi (Englebert 1996, 28). In 1955, the UV split into rival groups. The Parti Social pour lEmancipation des Masses Africaines (PSEMA) was, according to Englebert, a "defacto Mossi party" (Ibid, 30). The Mouvement Populaire dEvolution Africaine (MPEA), on the other hand, represented the interests of the west and, in particular, more autonomy for the the Bobo, Samo, Gurunsi, and Lobi ethnic groups (Ibid). The Union Dmocratique Voltaique (UDV) was founded in 1959 by Maurice Yaméogo and was the local branch of the interterritorial RDA. The Parti du Regroupment Africain (PRA) was founded in Senegal by Lopold Senghor. Two local parties, the Mouvement Démocratic Voltaïc and the Parti Social dEducation des Masses Africaines, were affiliated with the PRA (McFarland 1978, 128). According to Horowitz, the Mossi supported a single political party (Union Démocratique Voltaïc) and other, smaller groups then coalesced around the second party (Horowitz 1985, 299; Keesings 1966). The UDV is thus considered ethnic. No evidence was found that the PRA excluded the Mossi. In the 1959 Territorial Assembly Elections, the UDV won 56.21% of the vote and the African Regroupment Party 43.79% (African Elections Database). No mention of riots or political party violence in consulted sources. No minority at risk profile exists for Burkina Faso.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: ?
Ethnic Riots: ?
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **?**
Ethnic Parties: UDV
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **56%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Englebert, Pierre. 1996. *Burkina Faso: Unsteady Statehood in West Africa*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

Horowitz, Donald. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Keesings Archive of World Events. 1966. Dahomey. Volume 12 (January).

McFarland, Damiel Miles. 1978. *Historical Dictionary of Upper Volta*. Metuchen, N.J. and London: The Scarecrow Press, Inc.

Minority Rights Group. 2010. "Country Overviews." World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. At http://www.minorityrights.org/directory, accessed December 1, 2010.

Burundi: There were two main political parties prior to independence: the Union pour les Progrés National (UPRONA) and the Parti Démocrate Chrétien (PDC). UPRONA was a nationalistic party led by Prince Louis Rwagascore, a Tutsi, and was seen as more sympathetic to Hutu interests than the conservative and pro-Belgian PDC (Minority Rights Group 2010). Both UPRONA and the PDC were based in competing factions of the monarchy—UPRONA in the Bezi dynasty and the PDC in the Batare dynasty. When UPRONA won the pre-independence elections of 1961, the PDC—with the knowledge and support of Belgian authorities—assassinated Rwagascore. UPRONA then split into Hutu and Tutsi backed branches. The Tutsi branch used their affiliated Jeunnesses Nationalistes Rwagasore (JNR) as a para-state police force to target Hutus associated with two smaller political parties, the Parti du Peuple and the Syndicats Chretiens. In January of 1962, the JNR murdered four Hutu leaders (Loft 1988, 90). Morrison et al. also mention a final small party, the Parti Démocrate Ruraux, founded in 1957 (1972, 187). No major inter-ethnic conflicts noted in Burundi in the decade preceding independence but there is a Hutu revolt in neighboring Rwanda in 1959 that causes large numbers of Tutsi refugees to flee to Burundi (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). No mention of riots in the sources. Results of 1961 legislative elections: UPRONA= 80.97%, Common Front (i.e. PDC)= 17.86%, no other party received more than 1% (African Elections Database). At the time of the 1961 election, both UPRONA and the PDC were still drawing cross-ethnic support.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: YES

Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **YES**
Ethnic Parties: none
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **0%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Loft, Francis and Frances Loft. 1988. "Background to the Massacres in Burundi." *Review of African Political Economy* 43: 88-93.

Minorities at Risk Project. 2009. "Minorities at Risk Dataset." College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. At http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/ mar, accessed December 1, 2010.

Minority Rights Group. 2010. "Country Overviews." World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. At http://www.minorityrights.org/directory, accessed December 1, 2010.

Morrison, Donald George, Robert Cameron Mitchell, John Naber Paden and Hugh Michael Stevenson, eds. 1972. *Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook*. New York: The Free Press.

Cameroon: A resistance movement against French rule began in Cameroon around 1955. Both the armed wing of this movement, the Armée de Liberation Nationale Kamerun (ALNK), and its associated political party, the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC), were dominated by members of the southern Bamiléké and Bassa ethnic groups (Minority Rights Group 2010). However, the UPC adopted an anti-imperialist, Marxist ideology and insurgents received military training and support from various communist governments, including both China and the USSR. Both the British and the French perceived the ALNK/UPC as an extreme security threat to the regionand the UPC was thus banned as a political party (British National Archives, War Office 208/4386, Document 52A). The insurgency movement and its political sympathizersand southerners more generallywere then excluded from government, even prior to independence (Minority Rights Group 2010).The French attempted to encourage the growth of moderate political parties in opposition to the UPC from 1949 until independence: ESOCAM, INDECAM, and RENAICAM. These and other small political movements were largely regionally or tribally based. INDECAM, for example, relied on the support of the Bassa. Two non-ethnic parties also formed: the BDC and USC that drew support from urban areas and catholic missions/trade unions/civil servants respectively (Atangana 2010, 15). The first elections marked by universal adult suffrage were for local assemblies and conducted in December of 1956. These were also the last elections held prior to independence. The UPC was banned from participation and, in response, organized and implemented a campaign of sabotage—including the assassination of several candidates. The victorious candidates then organized themselves into parliamentary groups which later evolved into political parties: the Groupe dUnion Camerounaise (UC) with 30 seats, Parti des Démocrates

Camerounais with 20 seats, Paysan Indépendent with 9 seats, and Mouvement dAction Nationale Camerounaise (MANC) with 8 seats (Awasom 2002, 8; see also African Elections Database). Thus, prior to independence, there were no political parties as such that contested elections and hence no ethnic political parties. Additional elections were held in 1959 in the rebellious regions prior to the constitutional debates (Ibid, 10). "The U.P.C.'s organization, methods, and propaganda were formed on the Communist Party model; its policy was one of revolutionary action against French imperialism (Ardener 1962, 347)." Violence by the UPC is thus interpreted as anti-colonial and there is no evidence that other tribes or ethnic groups were targeted. Trade union riots occurred in Douala in September 1945, killing 9 and wounding 20 (Atangana 2010, 2). Riots also occurred in Bamiléké and Bassa areas as well as in Douala, Nkongsamba, and Yaoundé in May of 1955 between UPC supporters and the French colonial administration (Ibid, 17). Neither of these riots are characterized as ethnic.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: none
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **0%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Ardener, Erwin. 1962. "The Political History of Cameroon." *The World Today* 18(8): 341-350.

Atangana, Martin. 2010. *The End of French Rule in Cameroon*. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America.

Awasom, Nicodemus Fru. 2002. "Politics and Constitution-Making in Francophone Cameroon, 1959-1960." *Africa Today* 49(4): 3-30.

Minority Rights Group. 2010. "Country Overviews." World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. At http://www.minorityrights.org/directory, accessed December 1, 2010.

Cape Verde: The population of Cape Verde is considered creole, with differences in origins long ago too mixed up to classify. The Portuguese had considered the colony more European than African and had never applied the "native statute," rather treating the islands' inhabitants as Portuguese citizens (MacQueen 1997, 110-11). Although the joint war for independence with Guinea had been waged entirely on Guinean soil, the PAIGC had been operating clandestinely in Cabo Verde during the war and began open political mobilization after the coup in Portugal (Ibid, 111-112). Two other parties also emerged after the coup, the União Democrática de Cabo Verde (UDCV), an anti-independence party, and the União do Povo das Ilhas de Cabo Verde (UPICV), a Trotskyist party of mainly students (Ibid, 112). There were no competitive elections prior to independence in

1975. Only PAIGC candidates were allowed to stand in the constituent assembly elections immediately following independence (Ibid, 114). Without ethnic differentiation, ethnic political parties and ethnic violence were not possible.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: none
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **NA**

Sources:

MacQueen, Norrie. 1997. *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire.* London: Longman Pub Group.

Central African Republic: The Mouvement dEvolution Sociale en Afrique Noire (MESAN) was founded in 1952 by Barthélemy Boganda. His aim from the beginning was to make the party interterritorial and to establish a central African state from the AEF territories (Thompson and Adloff 1960, 394-395). Although Boganda died in a plane crash just prior to the 1959 elections, MESAN still won 48 of 50 seats in the territorial assembly, which unanimously appointed David Dacko as premier (Ibid, 396). The local RDA branch, also called the Union Oubanguienne, excluded Europeans (Ibid, 392). In their speeches, both Boganda and Dacko stressed "the need to abolish all traces of tribalism and racialism (Ibid)." In the 1959 legislative elections, MESAN won 97.62% of the vote, the MSA 1.74%, and the RDA 0.64% (African Elections Database). In the 1930s, the French recruited "antagonistic tribes" to crush a revolt by the Baya against the concessionary companies (Ibid, 388). There was also violence reported between the Baya and Europeans in 1954 (Ibid, 392-393). The sources do not indicate any pre-independence inter-ethnic violence, however. No Minorities at Risk report exists for the Central African Republic.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: none
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **0%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Thompson, Virginia McLean and Richard Adloff. 1960. *The Emerging States of French Equatorial Africa.* Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Minority Rights Group. 2010. "Country Overviews." World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. At http://www.minorityrights.org/directory, accessed December 1, 2010.

Chad: In the pre-independence period, two dominant political parties competed in elections: the Union Démocratique Tchadienne (UDT), which later changed its name to the Action Sociale Tchadienne (AST), and the Parti Progressiste Tchadien (PPT), which began as a territorial branch of the French inter-territorial RDA. However, both parties were dominated by ex-patriots living in Europe and more than two dozen smaller political parties and coalitions formed in opposition to them. The PPT was supported mainly by non-Muslim southerners, of various tribes and ethnic groups, while the UDT/AST was supported primarily by the Muslim sahelian belt (Collelo, 1988). The PPT did have a solid core of support among the ethnic Sara (Decalo 1977, 217). The AST was viewed as a "chiefly, Mosleman conservative alliance for the preservation of traditional and European power against the 'radical' upstarts of the south, the PPT (Ibid, 26)." In the 1957 elections, the PPT and its allied smaller parties won 47/65 seats in the Territorial Assemblybut this majority coalition could only hold together for a year, at which point factions representing various tribal chiefs withdrew their support. As independence approached, in 1959, Franois Tombalbaye was able to consolidate enough support to reassert PPT and southern dominance in Parliament (Collelo 1988). Other, smaller political parties included the Groupement des Indpendents et Ruraux du Tchad (GIRT), the Mouvement Socialist Africain (MSA), and the Union Dfense des Intéréts Tchad (UDIT). In the 1959 Legislative Assembly elections, the PPT won 68.7% of the vote, UDIT 7.27%, AST 4.5%, GIRT 7.82%, MSA 9.77%, and MESAN 1.94% (African Elections Database). Just prior to independence, the GIRT, MSA, and UDIT, all of which were based in the Muslim north, merged into the Parti National Africain (Morrison et al. 1972, 206). Tensions between groups in the country occurred mostly along the North-South divide, which separates the nomadic and cattle-herding Muslim and/or Arab tribes of the Sahelian region from the Christian or Animist black, farming communities of the South (Levinson, 1998). No reports of inter-ethnic or north-south violence prior to independence in the consulted sources, including Minorities at Risk Project 2009 and Minority Rights Group 2010.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: GIRT, MSA, PPT, UDIT, UDT/AST
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **100%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Collelo, Thomas (ed.). 1988. "Chad: A Country Study." *Library of Congress Country Studies.* At http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html, accessed June 12, 2011.

Decalo, Samuel. 1977. "Historical Dictionary of Chad." *African Historical Dictionaries*, no.13. London: The Scarecrow Press, Inc.

Levinson, David. 1998. *Ethnic Groups Worldwide: A Ready Reference Handbook.* Phoenix, Arizona: The Orynx Press.

Minorities at Risk Project. 2009. "Minorities at Risk Dataset." College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. At http://www.cidcm. umd.edu/ mar, accessed December 1, 2010.

Minority Rights Group. 2010. "Country Overviews." World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. At http://www.minorityrights.org/directory, accessed December 1, 2010.

Morrison, Donald George, Robert Cameron Mitchell, John Naber Paden and Hugh Michael Stevenson, eds. 1972. *Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook.* New York: The Free Press.

Comoros:

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: ?
Ethnic Riots: ?
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **?**
Ethnic Parties: ?
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **?**

Sources:

Congo-Brazzaville: The three main competing political parties in the legislative elections of 1959, from which the government of independence was formed, were the Union Démocratique pour la Défense des Interêts Africains (UDDIA), the Mouvement Socialiste Africain (MSA), and the Parti Progressiste Congolais (PPC). The MSA grew out of the older, local branch of the inter-territorial, socialist Section Franais de lInternationale Ouvriére (SFIO) and was led by Jacques Opangault. Its support base was concentrated in the North in Mbochi territory (Gauze 1973, 1-2). The PPC was launched by Jean-Félix Tchicaya and had a "notably ethnic political following" amongst the coastal Vili (Ibid, 3-4). The UDDIA was founded by Abbé Youlou in Brazzaville with the stated aim to unite all Congelese in the pursuit of a common ideal. The legislative elections of 1956 saw the division of the electorate into three blocks, corresponding to the three ethnic-geographic regions of the territory: "Youlou controlled the Lari area in the southeast, Opangault the northern Likouala-Mossaka and Alima-Léfini regions, and in the southwest Tchicaya dominated in the Niari and Kouilou (Ibid, 21)." Violence broke out in Brazzaville on election day between supporters of Youlou and those of the other candidates, largely falling along tribal lines but occasionally they would set aside their differences to jointly attack the police forces (Ibid, 22). Youlou intended to transcend his dependence on a single ethnic group, the Lari, which had supported him in the 1956 elections (Ibid, 24). Youlou promoted Stéphane Tchichelle, formerly of the PPC. as party vice-president who then vigorously campaigned amongst the Vili on behalf of the UDDIA (Ibid, 25). Youlou also attempted to recruit support amongst the Bakoukoya and Bambouba (Ibid, 26), the évolués (Ibid), and the Batéké (Ibid, 31). Riots broke out on January 11, 1958 between supporters of the UDDIA and the MSA which also tended to fall along tribal lines at Dolisie and resulted in one fatality, several wounded, and the burning of a few houses (Ibid, 40). Rioting between tribal groups occurred again in Pointe Noire between

November 28-30, 1958, resulting in 5 fatalities, 20 serious casualties, and much pillaging and burning of houses (Ibid, 65). "Mbochi attacked zlari, the Vili of Diosso those of St. Paul, and the Babembé the Boucougni (Ibid, 66)." Rioting broke out again in the diverse Poto-Poto neighborhood of Brazzaville on February 16, 1959. This time there is clear evidence that higher level MSA party officials gave a go-ahead signal to party affiliated militants to start a disturbance after the UDDIA used procedural obstacles to block setting a date for the next elections. Most of the violence was directed against Lari individuals by Mbochi party militants: "Within two hours, nearly 40 Lari were thus attacked, and eight of them died from wounds inflicted by side arms. Any person who failed to reply in the Mbochi tongue to a question asked in that language was automatically considered a Lari and therefore to be killed the only victims were Lari (Ibid, 69-70)." The following day the Lari of Poto-Poto sought revenge on the Mbochi, resulting in widespread violence for three days throughout Brazzaville. In total, around 100 people were killed, another 200 injured, and over 300 houses destroyed (Ibid, 70; Horowitz 1973, 11). In the 1959 legislative elections, the MSA-PPC alliance still dominated the north of the country while the UDDIA dominated the south. However, prior to the election, UDDIA officials had attempted to gerrymander districts across the country to most advantageously benefit their partyand they won 51/61 seats (Gauze 1973, 74-75). By this time, the MSA-PPC coalition operated as "a means of self-defense against the Lari, who formed the majority element in the UDDIA. The Mbochi and Sangha constituted the militant backbone of the MSA, while a few Vili and Bacougni were the last remnants of the PPC. Traditionally, all of those tribal groups were strongly anti-Lari (Ibid, 81)." In the 1959 Territorial Assembly elections, the UDDIA won 59.46% of the vote and the MSA-PPC 40.54% (African Elections Database).

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: YES
Ethnic Riots: YES
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **YES**
Ethnic Parties: MSA-PPC
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **41%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Gauze, Rene. 1973. *The Politics of Congo-Brazzaville*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.

Horowitz, Donald. 1973. "Direct, Displaced, and Cumulative Ethnic Aggression." *Comparative Politics* 6(1): 1-16.

Côte d'Ivoire: Regionalism defined electoral politics from the 1940s, when, in the absence of established political parties, electoral candidates for French offices sought to mobilize support through regionally defined mutual aid societies. These societies then became the building blocks of political alliances and invested ethnicity with a charged political significance. Subsequent electoral campaigns sharpened ethnic self-consciousness and identification (Weiskel 1988, 365-366). The Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI) originated from a political consolidation between the Syndicat Agricole Africain, founded in 1944 and

led by Felix Houphouët-Boigny, and the existing town associations (Schachter-Morgenthau 1964, 178-182). The PDCI ethnically and regionally balanced its candidate lists. After the 1948 elections, the PDCI contributed 21 representatives to the Conseil Général, drawn from 18 different ethnic groups with no more than three counseilers from a single group (Ibid, 183). However, as the party rapidly grew in the late 1940s, it became organization-ally structured around the ethnic mutual aid societies and other ethnic organizations in both rural and urban areas. Focused on the struggle against the European planters and other colonialists, the party leaders felt they needed to rapidly incorporate existing groups and could not spend time or risk internal divisions by dismantling these ethnic structures (Ibid, 185). Thus, before and after independence, the basic organization units of the party were ethnic sub-committees and candidates nominated through these sub-committees were viewed as advocates and representatives for their respective ethnic groups (Zolberg 1963). The only two other political parties, both minor, were the Socialist Party, limited to the Bété, and the Parti Progressiste de la Côte dIvoire, which was based in Agni support (Schachter-Morgenthau 1964, 181). By the 1957 territorial assembly elections, the PDCI had won 58/60 seats and 95% of the vote (Ibid, 214). A riot occurred on 6 February 1949 in Abidjan, killing one and wounding several others, between PDCI supporters and members of the small opposition party, the Bloc Démocratique Eburnéen (a regional party in the southern lagoon area), that the French had created to undermine the PDCI (Ibid 188). Other violent and non-violent "incidents" occurred during the French repression of the PDCI from 1949-1951, including mass protests and demonstrations. Although members of anti-PDCI tribes were involved in harassing PDCI leaders and local organizations, the violence seemed to be entirely limited to disputes between the colonial administration and PDCI members. After the repression, tensions remained between "traitors" and "loyalists" which, in some localities, fell along ethnic lines (Ibid, 207). None of the violence seemed to involve ethnic targeting. In 1958, there were also riots against immigrant Dahomeans (Schachter 1961, 207).

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: PP, SP
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **5%**

Sources:

Schachter, Ruth. 1961. "Single-Party Systems in West Africa." *American Political Science Review* 55(2): 294-307.

Schachter-Morgenthau, Ruth. 1964. *Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Weiskel, Timothy. 1988. "The Ivory Coast 'Miracle' Reconsidered." In Prosser Gifford and WM. Roger Louis, eds., *Decolonization and African Independence: The Transfers of Power, 1960-1980.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Zolberg, Aristride R. 1963. "Mass Parties and National Integration: The Case of the Ivory Coast." *Journal of Politics* 25(1): 36-48.

Democratic Republic of the Congo: The first round of elections (held in provincial capitals) in 1957-58 was marked by the transformation of ethnic associations into ethnic political partiesincluding the Abako (Bakongo), the migrant Kasai association, and Conakat (Shaba of Katanga). However, the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC), led by Patrice Lumumba, also formed at this time with an expressed interest in transcending ethnicism. Lumumba believed strongly in both pan-Africanism and a strong central government that could be used to weaken ethnicism (Mazrui and Tidy 1984, 95-96). Many other Congolese political parties (there were over ten) were ethnically based and even adopted obviously ethnic names, including Abako, Unimo, and Balubakat (Young 1965, 305). In the May 1960 Chamber of Representatives Election the MNC-Lumumba and allies won 31.63% of the vote, the National Progress Party and its allies won 11.94%, the African Solidarity Party won 12.54%, Abako 9.47%, CEREA 4.3%, the National Unity Party and allies 5.34%, CONAKAT 4.72%, MNC-Kalonji and allies 7.28%, the Katangan Cartel (including Balubakat) 4.95%, Congolese Regrouping (RECO) 1.85%, Bayanzi Alliance 0.95%, RDLK 0.57%, and UNIMO 0.75% (African Elections Database). The CEREA, African Solidarity Party, and National Unity Party were confined to being regional but transcended being merely ethnic parties (Ngoy-Kangoy 2006, 17). Combining the above information, for the 1960 election, we get ethnic parties capturing at least 19.1% of the vote (Abako 9.47%, CONAKAT 4.72%, Katangan Cartel 4.95%), non-ethnic or multi-ethnic parties capturing 61.1% (MNC-Lumumba and allies 31.63%, MNC-Kalonji and allies 7.28%, National Unity Party and allies 5.34%, African Solidarity Party 12.54%, CEREA 4.3%), and 19.8% of the vote share unable to code (National Progress Party and its allies 11.94% and RECO 1.85%). While a massive riot did occur from January 4-6, 1959 in Leopoldville, the violence was directed against Portuguese shops and visible symbols of colonialism and did not involve clashes between ethnic groups (Ibid, 290-291). The consulted sources do not mention any other instances of violence.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: Abako, CONAKAT, Katangan Cartel
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: [range=19-39%] **29%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Mazrui, Ali A. and Michael Tidy. 1984. Nationalism and New States in Africa. London: Heinemann.

Young, Crawford. 1965. Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Djibouti: Many political parties and independence movements formed and competed for power in the run-up to independence. At first, after the Loi Cadre of 1952 which devolved significant autonomy onto African colonies, two multi-ethnic coalitions formed, but soon

split into separate Somali and Afar organizations (Kadamy 1996, 514). The French established ethnic quotas in the territorial assembly. In 1967, 16 seats were designated for Afars, 11 for the Issas, and 1 for Arabs (Agonafer 1979, 138). Two types of political parties then developed: those that exclusively represented one community, such as the Union des Issas, as well as those that cut across ethnic divides and captured both Afar and Issa seats in the Territorial Assembly, such as the Progress and Unity Party (Ibid, 138). The Front for Liberation of the Somali Coast (FLCS) were backed by Issa extremists and by Somalia. They were behind most of the political agitation, including several assassination attempts and bombings of civilian targets, through the early 1970s (Ibid, 140). The Ligue Populaire Africaine pour l'Indépendance (LPAI) was formed by the merger of several small political parties in opposition to the FLCS and had both Issa and Afar members (Ibid, 142), although the Issa dominated (Kadamy 1996, 512). The Mouvement Populaire de Libération (MPL) was a predominantly Afar organization although it attempted to reach out to other social groups (Ibid, 512-514). The November 1977 Constituent Assembly elections, just prior to independence, were boycotted by the National Union for Independence, the MPL, and the Djibouti Liberation Movement. The only party that seems to have contested the election was the Peoples Rally for Independence (RPI) which won 100% of the votes. In the 1973 Chamber of Deputies elections, voters opted for one of three lists of candidates: "pro-government," "moderate opposition," and "hard opposition" (African Elections Data). There is thus no basis to judge ethnic parties share of vote. There were riots against European residences in September of 1967 (Ibid, 75). During De Gaulles visit in 1966, the Issa-based Parti Mouvement Populaire precipitated a series of riots to demand immediate independence (Marks 1974, 102). Pro-independence Somali rioters (i.e., Issas) targeted both Europeans and the Ethiopian quarter (i.e., Afars) in the Capital city (Keesings 1966, December). De Gaulle held an immediate referendum, resulting in a positive vote for continuation of the French mandate, which, in turn, led to more demonstrations and riots (Marks 1974, 102).

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: YES
Ethnic Riots: YES
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **YES**
Ethnic Parties: FLCS, Union des Issas
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **NA**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Agonafer, Fantu. 1979. *Djiboutis Three-Front Struggle for Independence, 1967-77.* Dissertation Manuscript. At http://worldcat.org/oclc/9570102 [accessed May 21, 2012].

Kadamy, Mohamed. 1996. "Djibouti: Between War and Peace." *Review of African Political Economy* 70: 511-521.

Keesings Archive of World Events. 1966. "French Governments Decisions on Referendum." Volume 12 (December).

Marks, Thomas A. 1974. "Djibouti: France's Strategic Toehold in Africa." *African Affairs*

73(290): 95-104.

Egypt: Egypt gained independence in 1922, and thus the 1900-1922 period was analyzed for ethnic violence. The first political party, the National Party, was founded in 1907. In 1911, anti-European riots broke out after Turkish victories in Tripoli (New York Times 1911). In 1919, there was a series of crowd attacks on British military and police stations, resulting in dozens of Egyptian deaths, and riots that destroyed many houses (San Francisco Chronicle 1919). In 1921, anti-colonial protests turned violent in Cairo and Alexandria. Egyptians died in both places when military police fired on crowds (New York Tribune 1921, March 12 and December 25). In May of 1921, anti-European and particularly anti-Armenian riots consumed Alexandria resulting in 37 deaths and hundreds of injuries (New York Tribune 1921, May 24). No reports of riots involving Copts or Jews in any Proquest Historical Newspaper searches.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: ?
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **?**

Sources:

New York Times, The. 1911. "Fatal War Riot in Egypt" (November 2).

New York Tribune. 1921. "37 Slain, 151 Wounded in Egyptian Riot" (May 24).

—. "Three Killed in Egypt in Anti-British Riot" (March 12).

—. "5 Killed, 20 Hurt, in New Riot in Egypt" (December 25).

San Francisco Chronicle. 1919. "British Slain, Houses Sacked in Egypt Riots" (March 27).

Equatorial Guinea: There were five political parties in Equatorial Guinea in 1968 just prior to independence: the Movimiento de Unión Nacional de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MUNGE), the Movimiento Nacional de la Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MONALIGE), the Idea Popular de la Guinea Ecuatorial (IPGE), the Unión Bubi, and the Unión Democrática Fernandina. Both of the latter two represented Bubi (and often European) interests on the island of Fernando Po and were founded largely in fear of invasion by the majority Fang of the mainland after independence (Pélissier 2005, 64-66). MUNGE, MONALIGE, and IPGE were all based on the mainland and supported the preservation of a unified territory (Sundiata 1988, 16). There is no indication from any of the sources that they excluded the Bubi or other groups of Fernando Po and indeed some evidence that they tried to recruit/campaign there. The IPGE did support unification with Cameroon on the basis of shared Fang identity (Pélissier 2005, 46). No reports of inter-ethnic or north-south violence prior to independence in Minorities at Risk Project 2009, Minority Rights Group 2010, Pélissier, Campos, Sundiata, or Levinson, which is unsurprising

since the territories of the Fang and Bubi (between which there were pre-independence tensions) are separated by water. In the first round of the 1968 Presidential Elections, one month prior to independence, IPGEs candidate won 40.05% of the votes, MUNGEs 34.84%, MONALIGEs 19.88%, and Unin Bubis 5.23% (African Elections Database).

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: Unión Bubi, Unión Democrática Fernandina
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **5%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Campos, Alicia. 2003. "The Decolonization of Equatorial Guinea: The Relevance of the International Factor." *The Journal of African History* 44(1): 95-116.

Levinson, David. 1998. *Ethnic Groups Worldwide: A Ready Reference Handbook*. Phoenix, Arizona: The Orynx Press.

Minorities at Risk Project. 2009. "Minorities at Risk Dataset." College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. At http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/ mar, accessed December 1, 2010.

Minority Rights Group. 2010. "Country Overviews." World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. At http://www.minorityrights.org/directory, accessed December 1, 2010.

Pélissier, René. 2005. *Afrique Espagnole: Etudes sur la Fin d'un Empire*. Orgeval, France: Editions Pélissier.

Sundiata, Ibrahim K. 1988. "The Roots of African Despotism: The Question of Political Culture." *African Studies Review* 31(1): 9-31.

Eritrea: Eritrea gained de facto independence from Ethiopia in 1991 and official independence in 1993. For ethnic violence, the preceding 15-20 years are analyzed. No elections have been held, apart from the 1993 Independence Referendum (African Elections Database) and Eritrea has been ruled ever since as a one-party state under the Peoples Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), successor to the rebel organization, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). Since pure political parties did not exist during the struggle for independence, the rebel organizations are analyzed in their place. The EPLF succeeded the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF or Jebha), which, from its inception, represented a diverse coalition of Muslim tribes (Woldemariam 2012, 96). Christian highlanders also became an important part of the rebel organization as early as 1965 with a massive influx of Christian recruits occurring in 1975 (Ibid 99-100 and 114). In 1975, however, factional in-fighting between Christians and Muslims erupted after the ELF/Jebha

leadership determined that Christian votes would count as 1/3 of a Muslim vote in organization elections. Known as the Falool uprising, both defecting Christian leaders and Muslim ELF leaders targeted each other, and their followers, for violence. Eventually, the Christians largely defected to a rival rebel organization, Shaebia (Ibid, 120-121).

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: YES
Ethnic Riots: ?
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **YES**
Ethnic Parties: none
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **na**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Woldemariam, Michael H. 2011. *Why Rebels Collide: Factionalism and Fragmentation in African Insurgencies.* Available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global. (907104745).

Ethiopia: Ethiopia was only briefly colonized by Italy during WWII and regained independence immediately thereafter. Due to its long history of independence and lack of colonial history, the post-WWII to 1960 period was still analyzed as the most comparable to other cases. Emperor Haile Selassie established a bicameral parliament in 1931 for which the lower house would be elected. However, political parties were not allowed to operate or participate in these elections (African Elections Database; see also Hess and Loewenberg 1964). In 1946, Sudanese soldiers rioted in Asmara after one of their own was killed, resulting in 45 deaths (New York Times 1946). In 1949, railway workers rioted and attacked the company officers of the Franco-Ethiopian Railroad Company, injuring around 50 people (New York Times 1949). There was also reports of racial riots between Eritreans and European settlers in Asmara in 1949 (The Irish Times 1949). In 1950, Italian immigrants in Asmara rioted against British troops (Keesings 1950). There are also reports of riots between Christians and Muslims in Eritrea in 1950, sparked by a Coptic movement to join Eritrea to Ethiopia, resulting in the deaths of at least 32 and widespread arson (New York Times 1950 (Feb 24 and March 19); Daily Boston Globe 1950). The only potential ethnic riot amongst these is the 1950 religious violence in Eritrea. Since Eritrea was not integrated into Ethiopia until later that year, it is not counted as violence in Ethiopia. No other reports of ethnic riots between 1945-1960 in Minorities at Risk Project 2009, Minority Rights Group 2010, *Keesings*, Proquest Historical Newspapers searches, or any of the cited sources.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: none
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **na**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Daily Boston Globe, The. 1950. "Religious Rioters Attempt to Destroy Eritrean Village" (February 24).

Hess, Robert L. and Gerhard Loewenberg. 1964. "The Ethiopian No-Party State: A Note on the Functions of Political Parties in Developing States." *The American Political Science Review* 58(4): 947-950.

Irish Times, The. 1949. "Italians Reported Dead in Racial Riots" (April 22).

Keesings Archive of World Events. 1950. "U.N. commission's Visits to Eritrea, Addis Ababa, Cairo, and Rome." Volume 7-8 (July).

Minorities at Risk Project. 2009. "Minorities at Risk Dataset." College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. At http://www.cidcm. umd.edu/ mar, accessed December 1, 2010.

Minority Rights Group. 2010. "Country Overviews." World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. At http://www.minorityrights.org/directory, accessed December 1, 2010.

New York Times, The. 1946. "45 Ethiopians Slain in Riot" (September 8).

—. 1949. "Ethiopian Rail Men Riot" (August 27).

—. 1950. "Ethiopia Denies Report: Embassy Says Riots in Eritrea Were Instigated from Abroad" (March 19).

Gabon: Only three significant political parties competed in pre-independence elections: the Union démocratique et sociale gabonaise (UDSG), the Bloc démocratique gabonais (BDG), and the Parti dunion nationale gabonaise (PUNGA) (Morrison et al. 1972, 243). The UDSG was founded in 1947 by Jean-Hilaire Aubame was a centrist party that enjoyed the support of the missions and the French administration. Aubame drew most of his support from the northern Fang of Woleu-Ntem (Reed 1987, 291-296). The UDSG was affiliated with Léopold Senghor's Parti de Regroupement Africain and, according to Ndombet, wanted to appeal to multiple ethnic groups: "se voulut un parti proche des différentes nationalités" (2009, 59). The BDG was formed in 1954 by Paul Indjenjet Gondout and was controlled by the Fang and Myènè groups. Upon his return from exile, Léon M'Ba—who had led an early but now defunct political organization, the Comité mixte gabonais, that was primarily Fang but tried to attract support from other groups—joined the BDG (Reed 1987, 291-296). The BDG was a merger of two earlier political parties, the Comité mixte and the Parti démocratique africain (PDA) (Ndombet 2009, 51). An internal Fang division between the northern clans, clustered around Woleu Ntem ,and the Estuary clans, clustered around Libreville, crystallized around the Aubame/UDSG and M'ba/Comité Mixte/BDG, respectively (Thompson and Adloff 1960, 348 and 351). By

the late 1950s, M'Ba was increasingly reaching out to, and including, Mpongwés, other non-Fang tribes, and Europeans in the BDG, even including non-Fang on party candidate lists (Ibid, 355). René-Paul Sousatte and Jean-Jacques Boucavel formed the PUNGA in 1958 in order to unite southern ethnic groups, particularly the Bapounou and Eshira, in opposition to Fang and Myènè dominance (Reed 1987, 295.) In the March 1957 Territorial Assembly Elections, the UDSG won 18 seats (45%), the BDG and allies 16 (40%), the Defense of Gabonese Interests (assuming they got the name wrong and this is PUNGA since there is no mention of DGI anywhere else, including on google) 3 (7.5%), and Independents 3 (7.5%) (African Elections Data). Thompson and Adloff mention violent "incidents" that took place in June of 1953 directed against Togolese and Dahomean immigrant workers in Port Gentil (1960, 353-354). No other mention of riots or pre-independence violence in any of the sources.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: PUNGA
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **8%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Morrison, Donald George, Robert Cameron Mitchell, John Naber Paden and Hugh Michael Stevenson, eds. 1972. *Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook.* New York: The Free Press.

Ndombet, Wilson-André. 2009. *Partis Politiques et Unité Nationale au Gabon, 1957-1989.* Karthala.

Reed, Michael C. 1987. "Gabon: A Neo-Colonial Enclave of Enduring French Interest." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 25(2): 283-320.

Thompson, Virginia McLean and Richard Adloff. 1960. *The Emerging States of French Equatorial Africa.* Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Gambia: Three political parties won seats in the 1962 legislative elections: the Peoples Progressive Party (formerly the Protectorate Peoples Party), the Democratic Congress Alliance (DCA), and the United Party (Keesings 1962, November). The DCA was formed in May of 1960 from an alliance between the Democratic Alliance Party and the Muslim Congress Party (British National Archives Colonial Office 554/2429, Document 4). Since the DCA evolved from the Muslim Congress, which appealed to a religious identity shared by most of Gambias ethnic groups (including the Mandinka, Wolof, Serer, and Fulani), it is considered non-ethnic. The Democratic Alliance Party was founded in 1951, the Muslim Congress in 1952, and the United Party in 1952. Originally, the parties were only allowed to compete in the urban areas, until reforms in 1960, excluding rural voters who were largely Mandinka. When politics were allowed to extend into the countryside, in 1959, the

PPP was founded by D.K. Jawara and appealed to the rural, Mandinka population (Sallah 1990, 621-622). Indeed, the Peoples Progressive Party was dominated by Mandinka since prior to independence (Minority Rights Group 2010). The leaders of the other parties came primarily from the urban areas and from the Wolof and Aku (Creole) ethnic groups (Sallah 1990, 622). Historically, there arose an ethnic difference between the urban capital, Bathurst, and the countryside with the Mandinka numerically dominant in the rural areas and the Wolof and Aku dominant in the town (Hughes 1975, 63). In the 1962 elections, the United Party denounced the PPP as a Mandinka party and appealed to rural minority ethnic groups in the upper areas of the country, although they did this by being derisive and exclusionary towards the Mandinka (Ibid, 65). Mandinka voters thought of the PPP "as their own," but the party consistently sought alliances with parties and leaders of other ethnic identities and called for national unity under their leadership (Ibid, 67). The United Party is thus coded as ethnic because of its exclusion of the Mandinka while the PPP is coded as multi-ethnic. In the 1962 House of Representatives elections, the PPP won 57.7% of the votes, the DCA 4.28%, and the UP 37.91% (African Elections Data). Labor strikes in 1929, 1960, 1961 remained non-violent and succeeded in obtaining their economic goals (see Hughes and Perfect 1989). No other mention of pre-independence social violence, ethnic or otherwise, in the consulted sources.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: United Party
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **38%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Hughes, Arnold. 1975. "From Green uprising to National Reconciliation: The Peoples Progressive Party in the Gambia, 1959-1973." *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 9(1): 61-74.

Hughes, Arnold and David Perfect. 1989. "Trade unionism in the Gambia." *African Affairs* 88(353): 549-572.

Keesings Archive of World Events. 1962. "New Constitution in Force—General Election—New Cabinet—Proposals for Future Association between the Gambia and Senegal." Volume 8 (November).

Minority Rights Group. 2010. "Country Overviews." World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. At http://www.minorityrights.org/directory, accessed December 1, 2010.

Sallah, Tijan M. 1990. "Economics and Politics in the Gambia." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 28(4): 621-648.

Ghana: Pre-independence elections were held in July of 1956. From 1954-1956, the governing CPP party and its supporters repeatedly clashed violently with the Asante-backed National Liberation Movement (NLM) and its supporters (Mazrui and Tidy 1984, 59). The violence was "widespread and persistent" and was concentrated in the Asante region, resulting in the death of some, the destruction of many homes, and the inability of CPP leaders to visit Asantis capital, Kumasi, for fear of their personal safety (Ibid, 88). The CPP was a nationalist party that transcended ethnic rivalries. The National Liberation Movement (NLM), Northern Peoples Party (NPP), and Togoland Congress party (TCP) were, on the other hand, ethnic parties representing the Ashanti, an alliance of non-Akan northern ethnic groups, and the Ewe respectively (Ibid, 87-88). The Muslim Association Party was founded to support and represent Muslim immigrants to the large towns and urban areas and was allied with the NPP (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004, 233). Violence in Asante was directed by an ethnic political party against non-Asante. In the 1956 Legislative Assembly Elections, the CPP won 57.1% of the vote, the NPP 10.39%, the NLM 20.89%, the TCP 2.92%, the Muslim Association Party 1.59% and the Federation of Youth 5.57% (African Elections Data).

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: YES
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **YES**
Ethnic Parties: Muslim Association Party, NLM, NPP, TCP
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **36%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Asante, Richard and E. Gyimah-Boadi. 2004. "Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance of the Public Sector in Ghana." Report of the United National Research Institute for Social Development. At http://www.unrisd.org/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Mazrui, Ali A. and Michael Tidy. 1984. *Nationalism and New States in Africa.* London: Heinemann.

Guinea: From early on in the transfer of democratic institutions to Guinea, France had encouraged the formation of both ethnically based unions and political parties (Mazrui and Tidy 1984, 89-90). Between 1954 and 1958, three supra-ethnic parties came to dominate the political scene: the BAG, DSG (later affiliated with the inter-territorial MSA), and PDG. The BAG appealed to the customary elite, merchants, and high-ranking civil servants while the DSG/MSA never gained enough support to play a dominant role. The DSG appealed to an educated elite, rather than an ethnic base of support (OToole and Baker 2005, 160). The PDG attracted lower-echelon clerks, unionists, and young urban dwellers (Kaba 1988, 231). The Parti Démocratique del la Guinée (PDG) was founded as a territorial branch of the pan-French West African Rassemblement Dmocratique Africain (RDA). During the 1950s, Sékou Touré rose to the forefront of the party and was also an avowed opponent of Guineas rampant ethnicism of the time (Mazrui and Tidy 1984, 89-90). After 1951, under Touré's leadership, the PDG broadened its support base to

include the peasantry, trading groups, and civil servants (Kaba 1988, 232) and became a broad-based ethnic and class alliance incorporating multiple religious and linguistic groups which envisioned an inclusive political community based on nationalism (Schmidt 2005, 7). Although the leadership of the PDG promoted ethnic inclusiveness, local activists often had sectarian leanings and engaged in ethnic violence (Ibid, 10). Leaders were often unable to convince grassroots members of the value of trans-ethnic nation building (Ibid, 145). Peuhl and Fulani aristocrats led and dominated other parties, such as the BAG and the DSG (Ibid, 147; Schachter-Morgenthau 1964, 181). Many RDA activists, like their antagonists, and despite elite efforts to the contrary, saw the RDA as the party of the Malinkes (from which Sékou Touré originated) and Susus and the BAG as the party of the Peuhls (Ibid, 155-156). Ethnic tensions exploded frequently and violent quarrels occurred between RDA Susus and BAG Peuhls (Ibid, 166). Political party competition led to anti-Fulani riots in the 1950s (Horowitz 1973, 9). In the 1954 elections, the ethnic political parties united as the Bloc to contest the PDG (Mazrui and Tidy 1984, 89-90). In the 1957 Territorial Assembly Elections, the PDG/RDA won 77.39% of the vote, the DSG 10.28%, and the BAG 6.02% (African Elections Database). After winning 56/60 seats in the 1957 elections for the Territorial Assembly, the PDG "then decided that all assembly members should be responsible to the electorate in areas different from those of their ethnic origin (Ibid, 90)." They also abolished chieftaincy in order to undermine a traditional basis of ethnic power and, after independence, outlawed ethnically or racially based discrimination and propaganda in the new constitution (Ibid, 90-91).

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: YES
Ethnic Riots: YES
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **YES**
Ethnic Parties: BAG
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **6%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Horowitz, Donald. 1973. "Direct, Displaced, and Cumulative Ethnic Aggression." *Comparative Politics* 6(1): 1-16.

Kaba, Lansiné. 1988. "From Colonialism to Autocracy: Guinea under Sékou Touré." In Prosser Gifford and WM. Roger Louis, eds., *Decolonization and African Independence: The Transfers of Power, 1960-1980.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Mazrui, Ali A. and Michael Tidy. 1984. *Nationalism and New States in Africa.* London: Heinemann.

O'Toole, Thomas and Janice E. Baker. 2005. *Historical Dictionary of Guinea (4th Edition).* Maryland: Scarecrow Press, Inc.

Schachter-Morgenthau, Ruth. 1964. *Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Schmidt, Elizabeth. 2005. *Mobilizing the Masses: Gender, Ethnicity, and Class in the Nationalist Movement in Guinea, 1939-1958.* Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.

Guinea-Bissau: As there were no elections prior to decolonization and no real political parties, independence movements are considered in their place. The independence struggle was led by the PAIGC and their armed wing, the FARP, an integrated movement between Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau led by Amilcar Cabral. Within Guinea, the PAIGC was supported by the Balanta and Nalu ethnic groups while the Fula frequently lent their support to the Portuguese government and joined the colonial army (Keegan 1983, 239-240; Minority Rights Group 2010). Balanta recruits dominated the revolutionary army and then the new national army (Chabal 2002, 251; Minority Rights Group 2010). The PAIGC failed to make inroads, politically or militarily, into the Fula region where they faced resistance from the chiefs (Chabal 1983, 197; MacQueen 1997, 39). Horowitz claims that the independence movement was dominated by the Balanta with no real support from the Fula (1985, 10). The PAIGC was, nonetheless, a national movement aspiring to the integration of Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau and attempted to politically integrate recruits from different ethnic origins—and was successful apart from the Fula (Chabal 1983, 191). However, the ethnic divide between colonial and anti-colonial military forces meant that the violence of the revolution pitted ethnic groups against each other. No mention of ethnic riots in any of the sources.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: YES
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **YES**
Ethnic Parties: none
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **na**

Sources:

Chabal, Patrick. 2002. *A History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Horowitz, Donald. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Keegan, John. 1983. *World Armies.* Detroit, Michigan: Gale Research Company.

MacQueen, Norrie. 1997. *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire.* London: Longman Pub Group.

Minority Rights Group. 2010. "Country Overviews." World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. At http://www.minorityrights.org/directory, accessed December 1, 2010.

Kenya: The Kenyan African National Union (KANU) was created in 1960 by the Kikuyu and Luo ethnic groups. KADO was created to represent the smaller ethnic groups, including the Kalenjin but was defeated by KANU in the first general elections, and in subsequent

elections until Kenyattas death in 1978 (Minorities at Risk 2009). British intelligence reports from 1960 indicate a fracturing of politics along tribal lines after the Lancaster House Conference to design the constitution. There were especially high emotions over future landholding possibilities by the Kikuyu and Kalenjin in the white highlands. There was also a struggle emerging between the Kikuyu and Nyanza factions within KANU. The fracturing was attributed to the resurgence of the Kikuyu in national politics after the emergency ended and their presumed quest for dominance (British National Archives Colonial Office 822/2056, Document 15). KADU was formed by tribal groups opposed to KANU and afraid of its Kikuyu and Luo dominance. The new party included the Kalenjin, Masai, and Somalis (British National Archives Colonial Office 822/2056, Document 8). In the immediate pre-independence legislative elections of 1963, KANU won 53.6% of the vote, KADU 25.83%, the African Peoples Party 7.43%, and Independents 11.84% (EISA 2012). The African Peoples Party, led by Paul Ngei, fell out from KANU and represented the Kamba (Oyugi 1997, 44). British intelligence reports from 1961 indicate tense relations between the Kalenjin and Kikuyu and that both were stockpiling armaments (British National Archives Colonial Office 822/2056, Document 19). The reports also note tensions between the Kamba and Masai over stock thefts (British National Archives Colonial Office 822/2056, Document 16). No reports in the military intelligence files of riots or political party violence. The Mau Mau uprising had been an insurgency against the state that devolved into intra-Kikuyu violence but not intra-ethnic violence (See Bennett 2013; Branch 2009; Elkins 2005).

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: African People's Party, KADU
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **33%**

Sources:

Bennett, Huw. 2013. *Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counterinsurgency in the Kenya Emergency.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Branch, Daniel. 2009. *Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and Decolonization.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

EISA (Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa). 2012. "Election Archive." At http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/ea.htm [accessed June 14, 2012].

Elkins, Caroline. 2005. *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya.* New York: Henry Holt and Company.

Minorities at Risk Project. 2009. "Minorities at Risk Dataset." College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. At http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/ mar, accessed December 1, 2010.

Oyugi, Walter O. 1997. "Ethnicity in the Electoral Process: The 1992 General Elections in Kenya." *African Journal of Political Science* 2(1): 41-69.

Lesotho: Three political parties contested the 1960 District Council elections (who then elected delegates to the Legislative Council): the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP), and the Basultoland National Party (BNP). All three political parties advocated for a government that was "answerable to the Basotho" (Gill 1993, 211). Divides between the parties occurred along urban/rural cleavages as well as between conservative Catholics and more radical nationalists (Ibid, 213). The BCP spoke openly about the need to reduce the role of Europeans in both commerce and government (Ibid). In the 1965 legislative campaigns, the BNP advocated the need to work with the South African apartheid regime because of Lesothos economic dependency on it. In the 1965 National Assembly elections, the BNP won 41.63% of the vote, the BCP 39.66%, the Marematlou Freedom Party 16.49%, and the Marema Tlou Party 2.19% (African Elections Database). In late 1964, MFP supporters under the direction of one of the partys leaders opened fire on a BCP rally (Ibid, 215). Since both sides were comprised of Basotho, this is not coded as ethnic violence. 99% of the population of Lesotho is Basotho, the remainder being a mixture of Europeans, Asians, and Xhosa (Minority Rights Group 2010). Due to this ethnic homogeneity, political parties are not considered ethnic.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: none
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **0%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Gill, Stephen J. 1993. *A Short History of Lesotho*. Lesotho: Morija Museum & Archives.

Minority Rights Group. 2010. "Country Overviews." World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. At http://www.minorityrights.org/directory, accessed December 1, 2010.

Liberia: Since Liberia was never colonized, variables are coded from in between WWII and 1960 to be most comparable to other cases. Under President William Tubman, who ruled from 1944-1971, Liberia was a virtual one-party state under the True Whig Party (TWP)a patronage-based organization dominated by some 300 Americo-Liberian families that held undisputed power from 1870-1980 (Ellis 1995, 174-175; Keegan 1983, 364-365). Occasionally, splinter parties from the TWP would run a candidate in the Presidential elections, such as in 1951 and 1955, but would face heavy repression (Okolo 1981, 151). As of 1980, there were still property qualifications to vote. Americo-Liberians comprised less than 5% of the total population, while 95% came from 16 indigenous tribes (Keesings 1980). The first mention of riots in the consulted sources is in 1979: a demonstration over a proposed government hike in the price of rice turned violent, resulting in rioting and looting which killed between 40-100 people, wounded another 500, and damaged millions of dollars in property (Okolo 1981, 152). Okolo states that there was an "absence of such

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massive demonstrations in Liberias history" and that "President Tolbert called the riots an 'unprecedented national tragedy (Ibid).'" In both the 1959 and 1963 Presidential elections, the True Whig candidate won 99.99-100% of the vote (African Elections Database).

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: True Whig Party
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **100%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Ellis, Stephen. 1995. "Liberia 1989-1994: A Study of Ethnic and Spiritual Violence." *African Affairs* 94(375): 165-197.

Keegan, John. 1983. *World Armies.* Detroit, Michigan: Gale Research Company.

Keesings Archive of World Events. 1980. "Military Coup and Death of President Tolbert." Volume 26 (August).

Okolo, Julius Emeka. 1981. "Liberia: The Military Coup and Its Aftermath." *The World Today* 37(4): 149-157.

Libya: Independence was achieved under the monarchy of King Idris. The first Parliamentary elections were held one year after independence, in 1952. Since this is quite close to independence, the country was coded on the basis of these elections. Early political parties formed along regional lines. The National Congress Party of Tripolitania, led by Bashir Bey al-Sa'dawi, opposed federation and equality between Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan. Rather, the Congress Party advocated for a unitary state that would give dominance to Tripolitania by weight of numbers (Lewis and Gordon 1954, 46). The National Front, a semi-party endorsed by Idris, initially pressed for unilateral independence for Cyrenaica but eventually supported federation under a weak central government (Metz, 1987). In the election, most candidates stood as independents pledging support for the King and the existing government (The Times of India, 1952) but the Congress Party won 7 of 55 seats (Lewis and Gordon 1954, 46). Violence erupted on election day in February, 1952 in Tripoli, resulting in eight deaths (Lewis and Gordon 1954, 46). The riots were directed at polling stations and were put down by the police fairly quickly (The Manchester Guardian, 1952). No reports that they were ethnic or tribal in character.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: Congress Party
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **13%**

Sources:

Lewis, William H. and Robert Gordon. 1954. "Libya After Two Years of Independence." *Middle East Journal* 8(1): 41-53.

Manchester Guardian, The. 1952. "Disorders in Libya: Incitement by National Congress Party" (February 28).

Metz, Helen Chapan, ed. 1987. "Libya: A Country Study." Library of Congress Country Studies. At http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html, accessed July 22, 2012.

Times of India, The. 1952. "Election Clash in Libya" (February 23).

Madagascar: The first political party to form, in 1946, was the Democratic Movement for Malagasy Renewal (MDRM), whose leadership included both Merina and Côtier intellectuals (Marcus and Ratsimbaharison 2005, 498) but which was Merina-dominated (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). The Merina intellectuals in charge of the party felt that they, the historic pre-colonial rulers of the island, should inherit power upon independence (Minorites at Risk Project 2009). Yet, MDRM membership was drawn from a broad and representative base that cut across ethnic groups (Metz 1994). In response to Merina domination of the MDRM, Côtiers soon created an alterative party, the Party of Disinherited Malagasy (PADESM). A revolt against colonial rule broke out in 1947 and killed 50,000-80,000 people (Minorites at Risk Project 2009). The French blamed the MDRM and banned electoral politics for seven years. During this time, political leaders set up ethnic and cultural associations, which were still allowed, in order to sustain their organizational base. These then became the basis of the new political parties when the ban on political activity was finally lifted in 1954. At first, over 35 small parties formed, each centered around a block of ethno-regional support (Marcus and Ratsimbaharison 2005, 499). Eventually, they coalesced into three major parties: the Social Democratic Party (PSD) was founded by leaders of the old PADESM and drew on both Côtier and moderate Merina support; the National Movement for the Independence of Madagascar (MONIMA) was supported by the Antandroy (one of the Côtier ethnic groups); and the Congress of the Independence Party of Madagascar (AKFM), which was a coalition of ideologically disparate groups united by their shared Merina identity (Minorities at Risk Project 2009; Marcus and Ratsimbaharison 2005, 499). According to Minorities at Risk, "the rivalry between the PSD and AKFM reinforced the long-standing conflict between Merina and côtiers." The Social Democratic Party (PSD) was côtier-supported and gained dominance just prior to independence in 1959. Its leader, Philibert Tsiranana became President upon independence. The opposition party, the Congress Party of the Independence of Madagascar (AKFM), was supported by the Merina aristocracy (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). In the 1960 Legislative elections, the PSD won 61.64% of the vote, the AKFM 11.76%, and other partiespresumably MONIMA plus other small, ethno-regional parties, 26.61% (EISA 2012). There were reports of anti-colonial demonstrations and railroad strikes in Tananarive in 1946 (New York Times 1946, June 24). No other reports of riots or ethnic violence in Proquest Historical Newspapers, Minority Rights Group 2010, Minorities at Risk Project 2009, *Keesings*, or any other consulted source.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO

Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: PADESM, MONIMA, AKFM
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **38%**

Sources:

EISA (Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa). 2012. "Election Archive." At http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/ea.htm [accessed June 14, 2012].

Marcus, Richard R. and Adrien M. Ratsimbaharison. 2005. "Political Parties in Madagascar: Neopatrimonial Tools or Democratic Instruments?" *Party Politics* 11(4): 495-512.

Metz, Helen Chapan, ed. "Madagascar: A Country Study." Library of Congress Country Studies. At http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html, accessed July 27, 2012.

Minorities at Risk Project. 2009. "Minorities at Risk Dataset." College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. At http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/ mar, accessed December 1, 2010.

Minority Rights Group. 2010. "Country Overviews." World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. At http://www.minorityrights.org/directory, accessed December 1, 2010.

New York Times, The. 1946. "Madagascar Unrest Seen" (June 24).

Malawi: The Nyasaland African Congress was founded in 1944 with an appeal to "all Africans resident in Nyasaland" and a belief that "unity is strength" (McCracken 1998, 233). Membership was open, from the beginning, to all individuals from "aboriginal races" (Ibid, 235). There were riots in 1953 in the Shire highlands by tenants against European landlords (Mazrui and Tidy 1984, 110). In the elections immediately prior to independence, the Malawi Congress Party (formerly the Nyasaland African Congress) ran unopposed for all of the 50 common roll seats in the legislature (another 3 seats were reserved for independents). Prior to at least 1964, under Hastings Banda and the Congress Party, politics was focused on resisting federation and white settler control with little division amongst Africans along ethnic lines. Indeed, ethnic rivalries and tensions did not play an important role in Malawi until after independence (Ibid, 111). In the 1961 Legislative elections, the MCP won 98.79% of the vote, the United Federal Party 0.84%, and the Christian Liberation Party 0.37% (African Elections Database). Anti-government/settler rioting occurred in 1959 with no reported European deaths and four African deaths (French 2011, 57).

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: none
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **0%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

French, David. 2011. *The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945-1967.* Oxford University Press.

Mazrui, Ali A. and Michael Tidy. 1984. *Nationalism and New States in Africa.* London: Heinemann.

McCracken, John. 1998. "Democracy and Nationalism in Historical Perspective: The Case of Malawi." *African Affairs* 97(387): 231-249.

Mali: In the 1945-55 period, two political parties formed: The Union Soudanaise (US), supported by the Malinké and Songhai, and the Parti Progressiste Soudanais (PSP), supported by the Marka/Sarakollé, Bambara, Minianka, and Fulani (Horowitz 1985, 299; Zolberg 1967, 459-460). The center of PSP strength was amongst the Bambara and Fulani (Schachter-Morgenthau 1964, 280). Both parties attempted to recruit smaller ethnic groups such as the Dogon, who switched sides repeatedly, while the Sahara nomads were never incorporated (Zolberg 1967, 460). Nonetheless, the Union Soudanaise (US) was a mass-based political party that claimed to represent all of the people (Schachter 1961, 295) and its leader, Keita, deliberately sought support from all of Malis regions and ethnic groups (Dickovik 2008, 1127). Moreover, the executives of both parties spanned ethnic groupings and over-lapped with each other: both had Malinke, Bamabara, Songhai, and Sarakole members (Schachter-Morgenthau 1964, 278). Small, ethnic or regional parties occasionally formed and allied with one of the larger parties, such as the Union Kayesienne, the Union Dogon, and the Union Peulh, but never lasted long (Ibid, 279-280). Trade unions were of great significance within the US (Schachter 1961, 300). I could not find the results for the 1957 Territorial Assembly Elections or the 1959 Legislative Assembly elections. Both were marked by a two-party system comprised by the US and PSP (African Elections Database). But since neither political party was ethnic in character the ethnic party share of vote can still be calculated as 0%. In 1959, two rival local political factions clashed in Segou resulting in 3 deaths and 40 injuries (Washington Post 1959). No other mention of violence or riots in any of the sources or a *Keesings* search.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: none
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **0%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Dickovick, J. Tyler. 2008. "Legacies of Leftism: Ideology, Ethnicity and Democracy in

Benin, Ghana, and Mali." *Third World Quarterly* 29(6): 1119-1137.

Horowitz, Donald. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Schachter, Ruth. 1961. "Single-Party Systems in West Africa." *American Political Science Review* 55(2): 294-307.

Schachter-Morgenthau, Ruth. 1964. *Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Washington Post, The. 1959. "Riots Sweeping Across Africa" (February 26).

Zolberg, Aristride R. 1967. "Patterns of National Integration." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 5(4): 449-467.

Mauritania: Only one party competed in the 1959 National Assembly Election, the Mauritanian Regroupment Party (PRM) and, unsurprisingly, received 100% of the vote (African Elections Database). Just prior to the election, Daddah charged the opposition party, the Mauritanian National Resistance Party (Nahda), with corruption and banned it from participation (Handloff 1988). The PRM was formed in 1958 from the merger of several parties representing both Maure and black interests, including the Mauritanian Progressive Union, parts of the Mauritanian Entente, and the Gorgol Democratic Bloc (a party formed by southern minority groups). The PRM advanced a platform of building local party organizations across the country to integrate all groups and communities into the party as well as to balance Maure and black interests (Ibid). Nahda attempted "to rally diverse opposition to the traditional Mauritanian Regroupment Party, [but] the call for rapprochement with Morocco caused Nahda's opponents to label it a Maure party, which cost it the support of the black minorities." No mention of ethnic riots in Minority Rights Group 2010, Minorities at Risk Project 2009, *Keesings* , or any of the cited sources. The first reports of ethnic riots and inter-communal violence are from early 1966, sparked by policies that made the teaching of Arabic obligatory in schools (Scipion 1966, 115).

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: none
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **0%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Handloff, Robert E., ed. 1988. "Mauritania: A Country Study." Library of Congress Country Studies. At http://countrystudies.us/mauritania/, accessed July 23, 2012.

Scipion, Philippe. 1966. "New Developments in French-Speaking Africa." *Civilizations*

16(1): 109-124.

Minorities at Risk Project. 2009. "Minorities at Risk Dataset." College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. At http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/ mar, accessed December 1, 2010.

Minority Rights Group. 2010. "Country Overviews." World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. At http://www.minorityrights.org/directory, accessed December 1, 2010.

Mauritius: At the time of independence, both the Mauritius Labour Party (MLP) and the Independence Forward Block (IFB) were dominated by Hindus, the Mauritian Social Democratic Party (MSDP) represented Creoles and the Franco-Mauritians, and the Muslim Committee (CAM) was dominated by Muslims (Mukonoweshuro 1991, 200-201). The CAM pushed for reserved seats for each ethnic community in the post-independence government (Carroll and Carroll 1999, 183). The MLP, IFB, and CAM allied together in the 1967 elections under the Independence Party coalition to advocate for independence, which the MSDP opposed. According to Carroll and Carroll, there was little to no sense of national identity at independence and "politics was seen as an inter-group competition in which vigilance was essential if members wished to get their 'fair share'of benefits (1999, 185)." In the 1967 Legislative Council Elections, the Mauritius Labour Party won 24 seats (38.7%), the Independent Forward Block 11 seats (17.7%), the Muslim Committee of Action 4 seats (6.5%), and the Mauritian Social Democratic Party 23 seats (37.1%) out of a total of 62 elected seats. (African Elections Database). There were inter-ethnic riots in both 1965 and 1968 (Carroll and Carroll 1999, 183): Armed clashes between Hindus and Creoles necessitated British intervention in 1965 (Metz 1994) and communal fighting between Muslim and Creole communities erupted in Port Louis during the 1967 elections (Mukonoweshuro 1991, 202).

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: ?
Ethnic Riots: YES
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **YES**
Ethnic Parties: Independent Forward Block, MLP, MSDP, Muslim Committee of Action
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **100%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Carroll, Barbara Wake and Terrance Carroll. 1999. "The Consolidation of Democracy in Mauritius." *Demcoratization* 6(1): 179-197.

Metz, Helen Chapan, ed. 1994. "Mauritius: A Country Study." Library of Congress Country Studies. At http://countrystudies.us/mauritius/, accessed May 20, 2016.

Mukonoweshuro, Eliphas G. 1991. "Containing Political Instability in a Poly-Ethnic Society: The Case of Mauritius." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 14(2): 199-224.

Morocco: The nationalist movement was spear-headed by Istiqlal, or the party of independence, founded in 1944, which had grown from Moroccos first political party, the Comité d'Action Marocaine that had been founded in 1934. Istiqlal was Salafiyyist and prior to WWII had little support beyond the major urban centers (Joff'e 1985, 294). By 1942, the nationalist parties in the Spanish zone had all merged with Istiqlal. There was a small Communist Party based in the trade unions, founded in 1943 and outlawed in 1952, which never gained electoral strength and which tried to ally with Istiqlal but was rebuffed (Mitchell 1955, 430-431). There was also the Parti Démocrate de l'Indépendance, which broke off from Istiqlal in 1946 (Joffé 1985, 305). The nationalist movement was finally able to penetrate the rural countryside in 1947, following a speech by the Sultan which signaled his support and the spread of radios (Ibid, 306). Yet, the first general elections were not held until 1963, 7 years after independence. Anti-colonial demonstrations in Fez in 1944 resulted in colonial troops firing into the crowd, killing over 30 (Clayton 1993, 132). There were riots in Casablanca in 1947 in which several hundred people were killed by French troops (Joffé, 305-306). Clayton argues that the riots began when a soldier from the Tirailleurs Sénégalais (black African troops brought in from West Africa for security purposes) molested an Arab woman (Clayton 1993, 133). Riots broke out again in Casablanca in 1952, after the murder of a trade unionist in Tunisia sparked a solidarity demonstration by workers, killing a handful of colons and about 100 others. Small riots in other urban areas followed (Ibid, 135; Howe 1956, 3-4). In 1953, there was a Berber revolt, supported by the French, against the Sultan and led by cheiftans privileged by the French. There were rallies, demonstrations, and threats of violence but the sources do not mention actual violence. France then used the unrest to justify deposing the Sultan (Howe 1956, 4-6). After the French deposed the Sultan, in 1953, a "clash" between Sultan loyalists and Europeans in Oujda resulted in the deaths of several colons and Foreign legion soldiers (Clayton 1993, 136). By the end of the year, full-scale revolt against colonial rule had broken out across the country. The armed struggle for independence was waged primarily by the Armé e de Liberation Nationale (ALN), which was formed by a core of Berber tribesmen who had fought in the French Army in WWII and in Vietnam (Keegan 1983, 399-406). During the war, the violence was between Moroccans (Berber and Arab) versus the settler population and the colonial regime, including the Organisation de Défense Anti-Terroriste, a colon counter-terrorist group (see Clayton 1993, 137- 139). Severe rioting was reported in Khenifra in 1955 with Berbers marching from the mountains to support the urban dwellers (Ibid, 138). In 1956, anti-French riots again broke out in several cities, mostly to protest events in Algeria (Ibid, 141). Berber tribes participated on both sides of the conflict, some serving in the French colonial army while others formed the foundation of the liberation army (Ibid, 142).

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: none
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **na**

Sources:

Clayton, Anthony. 1993. "Emergency in Morocco, 1950-1956." *The Journal of Imperial*

and Commonwealth History 21(3): 129-147.

Howe, Marvine. 1956. "The Birth of the Moroccan Nation." *Middle East Journal* 10(1): 1-16.

Joffé, E.G.H. 1985. "The Moroccan Nationalist Movement: Istiqlal, the Sultan, and the Country." *The Journal of African History* 26(4): 289-307.

Keegan, John. 1983. *World Armies.* Detroit, Michigan: Gale Research Company.

Mitchell, Harriett. 1955. "The Development of Nationalism in French Morocco." *Phylon* 16(4): 427-434.

Mozambique: Here anti-colonial resistance organizations are considered as political parties as no elections were held prior to independence. FRELIMO, founded in 1962, fought an armed insurgency against the Portuguese colonial regime. Members came from all over the country: guerrilla recruits were drawn heavily from both the exile community in Tanzania and from the northern tribes of Mozambique, especially the Makonde (Seegers 1986, 59; Horowitz 1985, 10; MacQueen 1997, 25). Most of the Frelimo political leadership came from the south, particularly from the Shangana (Chabal 2002, 189; Horowitz 1985, 10) and, after 1969, most of its effective membership came from the south as well (Chabal 2002, 190). A series of military set-backs in the mid-1960s led to the formation of a splinter movement, COREMO in 1965, which conducted operations in the central region of the country. COREMO also drew heavily from the Makonde for fighters (MacQueen 1997, 43-44). The Portuguese tried to weaken the movement by focusing on ethnic differences and calling attention to the domination of southerners within the leadership (Ibid, 45-46). Yet, Machel, the leader of FRELIMO and first President after independence, was motivated by a non-tribal and non-racial nationalism (Chabal 2002, 207). There is thus evidence of internal tensions and southern bias, but the movement as a whole seemed to be trying to appeal to everyone on a national basis. In May of 1974, as the Portuguese army was giving up, white demonstrations in towns and urban centers turned violent (Ibid, 129). More racial violence occurred in August and September (Miller 1975, 144). There was also a European settler-based campaign of sabotage and terrorism (MacQueen 1997, 141). Also in 1974, a surge of new political parties formed. They ranged from a white separatist party to several ethno-nationalist parties. Yet no viable alternative to FRELIMO emerged (Ibid, 136-142). All violence thus appeared to be anti-colonial and anti-European and did not turn inter-ethnic.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: none
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **na**

Sources:

Chabal, Patrick. 2002. *A History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Horowitz, Donald. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

MacQueen, Norrie. 1997. *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire.* London: Longman Pub Group.

Seegers, Annette. 1986. "From Liberation to Modernization: Transforming Revolutionary Paramilitary Forces into Standing Professional Armies." In Bruce E. Arlinghaus and Pauline H. Baker, eds., *African Armies: Evolution and Capabilities.* Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

Namibia: Namibia was under foreign domination, by apartheid South Africa, until 1990. The period of armed struggle in the 15-20 years prior to independence was thus analyzed. The armed struggle to end rule by apartheid South Africa was led by the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), founded in 1960, which developed from the Ovamboland People's Organization. SWAPO's fight, launched in 1966, was waged primarily against the South African occupying forces (Vigne 1987, 85). While SWAPO's leadership was drawn from both the south and the north, the organization as a whole was dominated by the Ovambo (Horowitz 1985, 10; Minorities at Risk 2009). Yet, unity and transcendence of traditional divisions was constantly stressed (Leys and Saul 1995, 13). SWAPO's official policy was to steer clear of ethnic politics (Ibid, 199). SWAPO had "committed itself to 'combat any manifestations and tendencies of tribalism, regionalism, ethnic orientation and racial discrimination (Fosse 1997, 432).'" The Democratic Turhalle Alliance (DTA) was formed in 1977 from an amalgamation of smaller ethno-regional parties and became a catch-all opposition party for non-Ovambo groups, including whites, Caprivians, and Herero (Forrest 1992, 744; Minorities at Risk 2009; Wilder 1990, 12). In 1980, the Caprivi African National Union (CANU) split from SWAPO and became part of the DTA (Leys and Saul 1995, 32). Other parties included the Aksie Christelik Nasionaal, an all-white party, the United Democratic Front (UDF), which was supported primarily by the Damara, and the Namibia National Front, also of the Herero (Cliffe 1989, 157-158; Lindeke 1995, 9). In the 1989 elections, SWAPO won 57.3% of the popular vote, giving them 41 of 72 parliamentary seats, while the DTA won 28.6% and 21 seats. Other smaller parties and their share in the vote were the ACN (3.5%), CDA (0.4%), FCN (1.6%), NNDP (0.1%), NNF (0.8%), NPF (1.6%), SWAPO-D (0.5%), and UDF (5.6%) (Cliffe 1989, 157-158). To calculate the ethnic parties share of vote, I added the DTA (28.6%), NNF (0.8%), UDF (5.6%), and ACN (3.5%), for a minimum ethnic party vote share of 38.5%. I could not code the CDA (0.4%), FCN (1.6%), NNDP (0.1%), NPF (1.6%), giving a possible maximum ethnic party vote share of 42.2% and an average of 40.4%. In the Ovambo region, the DTA managed to win 11,000 votes out of 236,000, or 4.7% (Leys and Saul 1995, 199). In 1984, there was a "spy drama" within SWAPO that led to internal violence and the targeting of mostly educated southerners (non-Ovambo) as victims. Targeting, however, seemed to be a function of educational levels, age, and exile wave rather than ethnic identity. Because there was southern regional overlap with these other factors, non-Ovambo ended up being the primary victims of the spy drama (Leys and Saul 1995, 84). Also, because both SWATF and PLAN recruited across ethnic categories, they are not considered ethnic parties nor is their violence coded as ethnic.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: ACN, DTA, NNF, UDF
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: [range=39-42%] **40%**

Sources:

Cliff, Lionel. 1989. "Namibia Postscript: The Election Results." *Review of African Political Economy* 16(45-46): 157-158.

Forrest, Joshua Bernard. 1992. "A Promising Start: The Inauguration and Consolidation of Democracy in Namibia." *World Policy Journal* 9(4): 739-753.

Fosse, Leif John. 1997. "Negotiating the Nation: Ethnicity, Nationalism and Nation-Building in Independent Namibia." *Nations and Nationalism* 3(3): 427-450.

Horowitz, Donald. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Leys, Colin and John S. Saul. 1995. *Namibia's Liberation Struggle: The Two-Edged Sword*. Athens: Ohio University Press.

Lindeke, William A. 1995. "Democratization in Namibia: Soft State, Hard Choices." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 30(1): 3-29.

Minorities at Risk Project. 2009. "Minorities at Risk Dataset." College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. At http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/ mar, accessed December 1, 2010.

Vigne, Randolph. 1987. "SWAPO of Namibia: A Movement in Exile." *Third World Quarterly* 9(1): 85-107.

Wilder, Paul. 1990. "The Namibian Election November 1989: 'An Exemplary Lesson in Democracy.'" *Representation* 29(107): 12-14.

Niger: There is a significant divide in Niger between the East (Hausa) and West (Derma/Songhai) regions of the country. Diori's party, the Parti Progressiste Nigérien (PPN), was founded in 1946 and initially included members and leaders from both regions (Fuglestad 1975, 128). When Niger was granted a second seat in the French parliament in 1948, the party failed to nominate an easterner (the first seat was already held by Diori) causing a serious rift. The eastern Hausas seceded from the party and intended to set up a purely regional party, which they would call the Parti Indépandant du Niger-Est. Fearing escalating regional tensions, the French Governor, Toby, interceded, and brought the disgruntled Hausas into a new national party, the Union Nigérienne des Indépendants et Sympathisants (UNIS), that also received backing from the Western Derma/Songhai chiefs (Ibid, 128-129). Two splits from UNIS subsequently occurred: the Union Progressiste Nigérienne (UPN) in 1953 and the Bloc Nigérienne d'Action (BNA) in 1955, both

of which re-merged with UNIS and the UDN to form the Movement Socialiste Nigérien in 1956 (renamed Sawaba in 1958) (Ibid, 132). Sawaba effectively straddled the east-west regional divide with electoral strongholds in both Hausa and Djerma territory (Idrissa and Decalo 2012). The PPN was dominated by the Songhai and particularly the Djerma subgroup (Minority Rights Group 2010). The PPN, however, was pan-Africanist in orientation and, in 1957, sought a merger of all French Equatorial and West African political parties (Idrissa and Decalo 2012). In the 1958 Constituent Assembly elections, Sawaba and its allies won 11/60 seats (18.3%) and the PPN and its allies won 49/60 seats (81.7%) (African Elections Datacbase). Diori became President upon independence and immediately banned other parties and appointed Djerma loyalists to positions of power (Minority Rights Group 2010). The Union Démocratique Nigérienne (UDN) was led by Djibo Bakary (Zerma) and other Zerma's (Fuglestad 1975, 132) but also staffed by Hausas and had a strong following amongst members of the Tijaniyya brotherhood (Van Walraven 2003, 225). No mention of pre-independence ethnic violence by political parties or riots in any of the sources consulted. After independence, Sawaba did engage in violence, culminating in the 1964-65 rebellion (see Van Walraven 2003).

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: none
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **0%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Fuglestad, Finn. 1975. "Unis and Bna: The Role of 'Traditionalist' Parties in Niger, 1948-1960." *The Journal of African History* 16(1): 113-135.

Idrissa, Abdourahmane and Samuel Decalo. 2012. *Historical Dictionary of Niger.* Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press.

Minority Rights Group. 2010. "Country Overviews." World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. At http://www.minorityrights.org/directory, accessed December 1, 2010.

Van Walraven, Klaas. 2003. "Sawaba's Rebellion in Niger (1964-1965): Narrative and Meaning." In J. Abbink, M.E. de Bruijn, and Klaan van Walraven, eds., *Rethinking Resistance: Revolt and Violence in African History.* Leiden: Brill. 218-252.

Nigeria: The Macpherson Constitution of 1951 established a federal system based on regional divisions that favored the three major ethnic groups, with the North (conservative, less well-educated Muslims) receiving half of the seats in parliament and the two Southern regions (modernizers, more educated, and generally Christian) each receiving one quarter. Fearing the domination of the North, since they could easily obtain a majority by gaining even one ally from the South, nationalists in the South quickly turned to building party

loyalty on the basis of identity and Southern interests. The three main political parties that formed were thus regionally-based and corresponded to the main ethnic groups of those regions: the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) was supported by the Hausa-Fulani of the North, the Action Group (AG) was supported by the Yoruba of the Southwest, and the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC) was supported by the Ibo of the Southeast (Mazrui and Tidy 1984, 92-95; Horowitz 1985, 71). In the 1959 House of Representatives elections, the NPC and its allies won 146 seats (46.8%), the Northern Elements Progressive Union 8 seats (2.6%), the NCNC 81 seats (26%), the AG 73 seats (23.4%), and independents 4 seats (1.3%) (African Elections Database). Tensions over a motion for self-government in 1953 led to 4 days of riots between northerners and southerners in Kano Citys "strangers quarter" in which 36 people died and 200 were wounded (Diamond 1983, 472). During the 1959 pre-independence federal election the AG sent members into Ibo and Hausa-Fulani territories to campaign amongst their minority ethnic groups (Mazrui and Tidy 1984, 92-95). As Diamond writes, "In the North, the Action Group alliances with minority movements in the Middle Belt converged with aggressive challenges to its Hausa heartland by both the Action Group and the NCNC (allied with the radical NEPU) to threaten seriously the political domination of the Fulani aristocracy. This accounted for the substantial political intimidation and repression with which the latter responded during the 1959 campaign. But the North was not unique. The huge stakes in the election made it a fierce contest throughout the nation, pressing each party to resort to fanatical tactics—vituperative personal condemnations, hateful ethnic recriminations, official intimidation and obstruction, and physical violence by party thugs (1983, 477)."

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: YES
Ethnic Riots: YES
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **YES**
Ethnic Parties: AG, NCNC, NPC
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **96%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Diamond, Larry. 1983. "Class, Ethnicity, and the Democratic State: Nigeria, 1950-1966." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 25(3): 457-489.

Horowitz, Donald. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Mazrui, Ali A. and Michael Tidy. 1984. *Nationalism and New States in Africa*. London: Heinemann.

Rwanda: In 1959, the Rwandan revolution unseated the Tutsi monarchy and resulted in a series of local anti-Tutsi riots and pogroms, killing hundreds and causing many more to flee (Uvin 1999, 256). The 1960 municipal elections were also characterized by inter-ethnic violence with fatalities numbering in the hundreds and around 200,000 people internally

displaced (Minority Rights Group 2010). The 1961 legislative elections were also marked by high levels of violence and intimidation, largely carried out by operatives of the Paramehutu party against Tutsis (British National Archives Colonial Office 822/2064, document 30). The Paramehutu party was a Hutu dominated, radically anti-Tutsi organization (Uvin 1999, 256). There were also two moderate parties contesting the elections—the Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse (APROSOMA) and the Rassemblement Démocratique Ruandais (RADER)—both of which tried to downplay ethnicity and appeal to all peoples facing disadvantages and hardship (Newbury 1998, 13). Yet, the support base of APROSOMA was largely Hutu while that of RADER was largely Tutusi (Ibid). The Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR) was founded in 1959 and served as an opposition Tutsi party (Morrison et al. 1972, 321) that supported independence under the Tutsi monarchy (Mamdani 2001, 120). In the 1961 Legislative Elections, Parmehutu won 77.58% of the vote, UNAR 16.87%, APROSOMA 3.56%, RADER 0.33%, and others 1.64% (African Elections Database). In March of 1962, mere months prior to independence, British intelligence sources reported that there were widespread clashes between Hutus and Tutsis in the north of the country and that Hutus had moved from attempting to drive Tutsi's out of the country to exterminating them (British National Archives CO 822/2064, document 36, 3-4).

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: YES
Ethnic Riots: YES
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **YES**
Ethnic Parties: Paremehutu, UNAR
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: [range=95-96%] **95%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Mamdani, Mahmood. 2001. *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Minority Rights Group. 2010. "Country Overviews." World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. At http://www.minorityrights.org/directory, accessed December 1, 2010.

Morrison, Donald George, Robert Cameron Mitchell, John Naber Paden and Hugh Michael Stevenson, eds. 1972. *Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook*. New York: The Free Press.

Newbury, Catharine. 1998. "Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda." *Africa Today* 45(1): 7-24.

Uvin, Peter. 1999. "Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda: Different Paths to Mass Violence." *Comparative Politics* 31(3): 253-271.

São Tomé and Príncipe: In the first elections, the 1975 Constituent Assembly Election, only one political party was legally allowed to compete, the Movimento de Libertaçao de

São Tomé e Príncipe or MLSTP. Naturally, the MLSTP won all 16 seats (African Elections Database). Forros are descendants of the original African immigrants and slaves to arrive on the island. They maintained strict social, cultural, and ascriptive boundaries between themselves and the forced contract laborers or serviçais (and their children or tongas) brought from other Portuguese colonies to work the plantations (Eyzaguirre 1989, 673). In 1953, the Portuguese attempted to make the forros work on the European cocoa plantations, leading to a forro rebellion, colonial repression, and the deaths of hundreds of forros (Ibid, 674; Minority Rights Group 2010). In 1963, the serviçais organized a general strike of the plantations. The labor unrest lasted over a year as negotiations for independence were being conducted (MacQueen 1997, 118-119). No other reports of riots or ethnic violence in Minority Rights Group 2010, *Keesings*, Proquest Historical Newspaper searches, or any other sources cited.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: none
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **0%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Eyzaguirre, Pablo B. 1989. "The Independence of Sao Tome e Principe and Agrarian Reform." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 27(4): 671-678.

MacQueen, Norrie. 1997. *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire.* London: Longman Pub Group.

Minority Rights Group. 2010. "Country Overviews." World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. At http://www.minorityrights.org/directory, accessed December 1, 2010.

Senegal: Senegal's two primary political parties, the Section Français de l'International Ouvriére (SFIO) and the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais (BDS), later the UPS after a merger with the SFIO, originated in a split of the former in 1948. The two factions represented the more included and assimilated citizens of the communes (SFIO) and the previously un-enfranchised subjects of the countryside (BDS). It was thus a divide between the urban and the rural rather than between ethnic groups. Indeed, Léopold Sédar Senghor, the BDS leader, hoped to transform ethnic parties from other territories into non-ethnic, pan-African parties within the context of the French National Assembly, before being forced by the direction of events to concentrate solely on territorial politics (Mazrui and Tidy 1984, 90-91). In the 1959 Legislative Assembly Elections, the UPS won 82.99% of the vote, the Parti de la Solidarite Sngalaise 12.07%, and the Parti du Regroupement Africain-Senegal 4.89% (African Elections Database). No reports of ethnic violence in consulted sources.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: none
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **0%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Mazrui, Ali A. and Michael Tidy. 1984. *Nationalism and New States in Africa*. London: Heinemann.

Seychelles: Both the Seychelles People's United Party (SPUP), under the leadership of France Albert René, and the Seychelles Democratic Party (SDP), led by James Mancham, were formed in 1964. The two parties defined themselves over the issue of independence, with SPUP supporting it and SDP seeking to remain part of Britain. Prior to independence, there were no clear social differences explaining party support—not even economic ones (Ostheimer 1975, 177). As Seychelles is 92% creole with no indigenous population, ethnic differences are unlikely to be a basis of party competition (WDMIP). After the introduction of universal suffrage, both parties competed in all electoral districts: in 1967, 1970, and 1974 (Ibid 179). In the 1974 Legislative Assembly Elections, the Seychelles Democratic Party won 52.37% of the vote and the Seychelles Peoples United Party (SPUP) 47.63% (African Elections Database). In 1972, striking workers threw stones at police and besieged the government building in the first incident of its kind in the colony's history (The Irish Times 1972). No other reports of riots in WDMIP, Keesings, Proquest Historical Newspapers or any other sources cited.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: none
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **0%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Irish Times, The. 1972. "Seychelles Workers Besiege Ministers." (April 13).

Ostheimer, John M. 1975. "The Seychelles: Politics in the Islands of Love." *The Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 13(2): 174-192.

Sierra Leone: In 1949, Krio elites formed an alliance with conservative tribal chiefs called the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP), headed by Sir Milton Margai, an ethnic Mende

(Minority Rights Group 2010). In September of 1960, an opposition party was formed, the All Peoples Congress (APC), that appealed to northern interests and was headed by Siaka Stevens, a northern Limba. The APC was also initially supported by the Temne, Susu, Loko and Mandingo peoples. According to Cox, "just prior to independence, the APC 'turned to more violent means of persuasion' and one APC leader, M.O. Bash-Taqi was alleged to have urged his supporters to attack ministers, 'stop traffic, sink launches, stop trains' and to break up meetings of SLPP supporters (Cox 1976, 36)." As a result, Sir Milton Margai declared a state of emergency, mobilized the Mende-dominated military, and detained several APC leaders (Ibid). The United Progressive Party (UPP), led by Cyril Rogers-Wright, was predominantly a Krio party and ran on a platform of uniting the country against the polarization of the SLPP (Fyle 2006, xxii and 218). The SLPIM formed out of the merger of the Kono Progressive Movement and the Sierra Leone Independence Movement. It advocated for national unity and independence, and competed nationally, but was based amongst the Kono and emphasized reform of the diamond trade and development of rural areas. Indeed all four of its elected representatives in 1962 came from the Kono region (Hayward 1972, 15-17). I consider the 1962 House of Representatives elections, which occurred just after independence, instead of the 1957 elections because political parties underwent great changes in the interim, with the new parties consolidating prior to independence. In these elections, the SLPP won 34.67% of the vote, the APC 17.23%, the SLPIM 5.25%, the UPP 0.25%, and Independents 42.6% (African Elections Database).

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: YES
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **YES**
Ethnic Parties: APC, SLPP
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **52%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Cox, Thomas S. 1976. *Civil-Military Relations in Sierra Leone: A Case Study of African Soldiers in Politics.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Fyle, C. Magbaily. 2006. *Historical Dictionary of Sierra Leone.* Oxford: Scarecrow Press.

Hayward, Fred M. 1972. "The Development of a Radical Political Organization in the Bush: A Case Study in Sierra Leone." *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 6(1): 1-28.

Minority Rights Group. 2010. "Country Overviews." World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. At http://www.minorityrights.org/directory, accessed December 1, 2010.

Somalia: In Italian Somalia, the major pre-independence political parties were the Somali Youth League (SYL), the United Somali Party (USP), and the Somali National League (SNL) (Morrison et al. 1972, 339-340). According to 1959 British intelligence documents,

the SYL drew its membership in the Italian protectorate primarily from the Hawiya and Darod tribes but cut across clan lines in the British protectorate, with its most active support coming from the Eastern half of the Protectorate and in the non-Ishaak district of Borama (British National Archives, Colonial Office 1015/1507 Document 8B, 7-8). The SNLs principal backing, on the other hand, came from the Habr Yunis tribe, part of the Ishaak clan (British National Archives, Colonial Office 1015/1507 Document 8B, 4-6). Other parties included the National United Front and Hizb'allah. The National United Front was a moderate party that enjoyed solid support from the H.T. tribe, also part of the Ishaak clan as well as from merchants (British National Archives, Colonial Office 1015/1507 Document 8B, 2-3). Hizb'allah (probably Hizbia Destour Mustaque Somalia) was practically entirely confined to the Habr Yunis tribe, a section of the Ishaak, who had historically provided the majority of Somali government officials, clerks, and interpreters and considered themselves agents of the colonial government (British National Archives, Colonial Office 1015/1507 Document 8B, 9-11). In the 1959 Legislative Assembly Elections in Italian Southern Somalia, the Somali Youth League won 237,124 votes, the Somali Independent Constitutional Party (Hizbia or HDMS) 40,857, and the Liberal Somali Youth Party 35,769 out of 313,760 total valid votes. In the 1960 British Somaliland Legislative Council Elections, the Somali National League won 42,395 votes, the United Somali Party 13,350, the National United Front 20,249, and the Somali Youth League 4,626 out of a total of 81,366 valid votes (African Elections Database). Combining the two elections, the SYL won 61.2% (241,760 total votes in both elections), the HDMS 10.3%, the PLGS 9.1%, the SNL 10.7%, USP 3.4%, and the NUF 5.1%. Combining the two ethnic parties (HDMS and SNL) with the uncodable parties (USP and PLGS) gives an ethnic party vote share range of 21%-33.5% with an average of 27%. There were anti-Italian riots in Mogadishu in 1948 that killed 52 Italian civilians and 44 Somalis (Manchester Guardian 1949; Keesings 1948). In 1959, riots were reported in Italian Somaliland between nationalists and police. Some of the rioters may have been targeting Italians for assault (Washington Post 1959). Riots broke out again in Mogadishu against Italian residents in March of 1960, just prior to independence (Mohamed 2002, 1202). In July of 1960, as the Italian and British territories were officially being merged, demonstrations led by an opposition party who had boycotted the previous election, the Greater Somali League, turned into riots (Christian Science Monitor 1960). The Greater Somali League aimed for the unification of all Somalis into one territory, under one government (Guardian 1960). All of these riots are against the colonial government or Europeans, with no evidence of clan targeting amongst Somalis. No other mention of riots or ethnic/clan violence in Proquest Historical Newspaper searches or *Keesings.*

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: HDMS, SNL
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: [range=21-34%] **27%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Christian Science Monitor, The. 1960. "Republic of Somalia Bows in Amid Riots" (July

2).

Keesings Archive of World Events. 1948. "Anti-Italian Riot in Mogadishu." Volume 6-7 (February).

Manchester Guardian, The. 1949. "Anti-Italian Riots in Mogadishu" (October 7).

Mohamed, Jama. 2002. "Imperial Policies and Nationalism in the Decolonization of Somaliland, 1954-1960." *English Historical Review* 117(474): 1177-1203.

Morrison, Donald George, Robert Cameron Mitchell, John Naber Paden and Hugh Michael Stevenson, eds. 1972. *Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook.* New York: The Free Press.

South Africa: Throughout the empirical analysis, South Africa is coded at the time of transition to majority rule, or out of internal colonialism, rather than when formal independence was gained from British colonialism. Thus, here, the 15-20 years preceding the 1994 elections is analyzed for ethnic violence. During this period, the African National Congress (ANC) constituted the primary political organization resisting apartheid. The ANC pursued non-racialist policies, equal rights for all South Africans, inclusive nationalism, and reached out to all social factions, including whites (Cawthra 2003, 32 & 49). Other parties championed ethnically or racially based interests, such as the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) of the Zulu and the parties of the Afrikaner right, including the National Party and the Vryheidsfront/Freedom Front (see party website: http://www.vryheidsfront.co.za/index.asp?l=e). The Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) pursued policies of "Africa for the Africans"—of privileging indigenous black Africans—and opposed the non-racialist policies of the ANC that would give equal rights to all South Africans ("Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania"). The Democratic Party (DP) emerged out of a succession of opposition parties under apartheid. They advocated for equal rights but opposed government by the majority ("Democratic Party"). In the 1994 National Assembly Elections, the ANC won 62.65% of the vote, the NP 20.39%, the IFP 10.54%, the VF/FF 2.17%, the DP 1.73%, the PAC 1.25% and a bunch of other small parties won less than 1% of the vote (African Elections Database). During the transition, some armed groups mobilized along ethnic lines including the right wing Afrikaners. The Zulu-based IFP mobilized and armed thousands against the Xhosa dominated ANC with the support of the apartheid security establishment. During this struggle between the ANC and the IFP, around 15,000 people were killed (Cawthra 2003, 35). In 1949, Africans attacked Indians during a riot in Durban (Horowitz 1973, 6). The 1976 Soweto uprising began with peaceful protests and was directed against the apartheid government.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: YES
Ethnic Riots: YES
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **YES**
Ethnic Parties: IFP, NP, VF/FF
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: [range=34-36%] **35%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Cawthra, Gavin. 2003. "Security Transformation in Post-Apartheid South Africa." In Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham, eds., *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies.* London: Zed Books, Ltd.

"Democratic Party (DP)." 2016. *Encyclopdia Britannica Online.* Retrieved 21 May, 2016, from http://www.britannica.com/topic/Democratic-Party-political-party-South-Africa.

Horowitz, Donald. 1973. "Direct, Displaced, and Cumulative Ethnic Aggression." *Comparative Politics* 6(1): 1-16.

"Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC)." 2016. *Encyclopdia Britannica Online.* Retrieved 21 May, 2016, from http://www.britannica.com/topic/Pan-Africanist-Congress-of-Azania.

Sudan: There were four principal political parties prior to independence: the Umma Party, the National Unionist Party (NUP), the Southern Liberal Party (SLP), and the People's Democratic Party (PDP). The two northern political parties, the Umma Party and the PDP, tried unsuccessfully to court southern votes in the 1950s. The Umma party was closely linked to the religious Mahdists (Keesings 1949) while the PDP was Mirghanist-based (Morrison et al. 1972, 346). The Mirghanists (Khatmiyya order) and Mahdists are competing Sufi brotherhoods of the Sunni branch of Islam. As the Umma/Mahdists allied themselves with urban interests, the PDP/Mirghanis began forming alliances with rural tribal leaders (New York Times 1952). The ethnic exclusionism of the northern parties, combined with an attempt by the SLP to ally with a northern party, led to the formation of another southern party, the Federal Party (Horowitz 1985, 358-359). Although occasional alliances were attempted across the north-south divide, the political parties themselves were regionally and ethnically exclusive. In the 1958 House of Representatives Election, the Umma Party won 63 seats (36.4%), the National Unionist Party (NUP) 44 seats (25.4%), the Southern Liberal Party (SLP) 40 seats (23.1%) and the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) 26 seats (15%) (African Elections Database). In November of 1948, the "internal struggle" grouping of political parties (including the Unionist Party) violently clashed with the "independence front" coalition (including the Umma party) in Atbara, resulting in several deaths. There were also other anti-election demonstrations in Khartoum, Omdurman, and Port Sudan, some of which turned violent when the police opened fire (Keesings 1949). About 4100 people were involved (Manchester Guardian 1948). Further riots between these two factions broke out in March of 1954 (Chicago Daily Tribune 1954). Also in 1954, Umma demonstrators attacked the British Governor-Generals home (Los Angeles Times 1954) and about 30,000 rioters caused the delay of the opening of Parliament while protesting General Naguibs visit (Washington Post 1954). In 1955, armed cotton workers attacked the cotton mill offices in Nzara, looting and killing four people (New York Times 1955). In 1956, demonstrations by farmers refusing to bring their cotton to the Goda Farm Combine led to a clash with police in which 190 tenant farmers were arrested. They all died from extreme negligence while in police custody, leading to mass student rioting in Khartoum against the colonial regime (Washington Post

1956). No evidence was found that any of these riots involved ethnic targeting or that the clashes between political parties had a tribal or ethnic basis. Intra-Sufi divides may have been important, but those are not considered an ethnic division. The main North/South division which fell along racial and ethnic cleavages, became important immediately after independence. Prior to decolonization, the North and South were governed separately.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: NUP, PDP, SLP, Umma Party
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **100%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Chicago Daily Tribune, The. 1954. "Naguib Blames British Agents for Sudan Riot" (March 3).

Horowitz, Donald. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Keesings Archive of World Events. 1949. "Elections for Legislative Assembly" Volume 7 (March).

Los Angeles Times. 1954. "31 in Sudan Killed in Riot Over Naguib" (March 2).

Manchester Guardian, The. 1948. "Election Riots in Sudan" (November 16).

Morrison, Donald George, Robert Cameron Mitchell, John Naber Paden and Hugh Michael Stevenson, eds. 1972. *Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook*. New York: The Free Press.

New York Times, The. 1952. "Split Inside Sudan May Halt Solution" (November 23).

—. 1955. "4 Killed in Sudan Riot" (July 29).

Washington Post, The. 1954. "31 Killed in Sudan Rioting" (March 2).

—. 1956. "Sudan Students Riot Over Deaths" (February 24).

Swaziland: The country is nearly ethnically homogeneous with the Swazi constituting at least 87% of the resident population (Minority Rights Group 2010). There is also a small European population (about 8000), largely of South African/Afrikaaner descent who owned 44% of the land in 1963 (British National Archives, Colonial Office 1048/456, Document 9). The Imbokodvo National Movement, or the Kings Party, formed to "ensure the perpetuation of the monarchy, Swazi customs, mineral and land rights, and the prerogative

of the Ngwenyama (the King) (Daniel and Vilane 1986, 56)." The party was also supported by the South African government and the white settler population. Several other small parties formed in opposition, but none gained even a single seat in pre-independence and independence elections (Ibid, 56). The Swaziland Progressive Party was founded in 1960 and promoted non-racialism and the end of racial discrimination (Stevens 1963, 334). The Swaziland Democratic Party was formed in 1962, was financed by white liberals, also claimed to be non-racial, and advocated for one Swazi nation and identity open to all (Ibid, 339-340). The Mbandzeni National convention (MNC) was also founded in 1962. The MNC advocated for the supremacy of the Swazi nation and the preservation of traditional authority (with some modernization) (Ibid, 342.) Finally, the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC) promoted equal rights and opportunity, the eradication of all forms of discrimination, and national unity (Stuart 2009, 473-474). Given the ethnic homogeneity of the non-European population, the Swazi parties are considered national rather than ethnic. In the 1967 Legislative Council Elections, the Imbokodvo won 79.3% of the vote, the NNLC 20.23%, the SUF 0.28%, and the SPP 0.15% (African Elections Database). There is no mention of ethnic violence or riots in any of the consulted sources. Indeed, given the ethnic homogeneity of Swaziland, the only real possibility for such violence would be against Europeans, which would not count by the coding guidelines anyway.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: none
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **0%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Daniel, John and Johnson Vilane. 1986. "Swaziland: Political Crisis, Regional Dilemma." *Review of African Political Economy* 13(35): 54-67.

Minority Rights Group. 2010. "Country Overviews." World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. At http://www.minorityrights.org/directory, accessed December 1, 2010.

Stevens, R.P. 1963. "Swaziland Political Development." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 1(3): 327-350.

Stuart, Deane. 2009. "Swaziland." In Denis Kadima and Susan Booysen, eds., *Compendium of Elections in Southern Africa 1989-2009: 20 Years of Multiparty Democracy*. Johannesburg: EISA.

Tanzania: The Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) evolved from the Tanganyika African Association, an urban and non-ethnic organization established in the 1930s that peacefully campaigned for the rights and welfare of Africans within the colonial system. "The TAA had provided Tanganyika with a non-ethnic and countrywide movement; with a mass movement composed not only of an elite and sub-elite of civil servants, traders

and clerks but also of peasants and workers; and with a political tradition of non-violence (Mazrui and Tidy 1984, 99)." TANU was avowedly non-racial as well: open to Europeans and Asians as well as Africans (Ibid, 100). No African opposition party emerged, either in the 1958-59 or August 1960 elections (Ibid, 101). All British intelligence reports from 1960-61 indicate a politically harmonious atmosphere under the leadership of TANU and Neyere (British National Archives Colonial Office 822/2061-2062). In August of 1960, the first general election was held. TANU won 12/13 contested seats giving them 70/71 seats in the Legislative Council. The single independent who won a seat was pro-TANU but objected to the official candidate. Neither the ANC nor the All-Muslim Union won a single seat (British National Archives CO 822/2061, document 10). No reports of ethnic violence or riots in any of the consulted sources.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: none
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **0%**

Sources:

Mazrui, Ali A. and Michael Tidy. 1984. *Nationalism and New States in Africa*. London: Heinemann.

Togo: Both the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT) and the Parti Togolais du Progres (PTP) began as Ewe controlled political parties (Lasisi 1993, 8). Universal suffrage, however, changed CUTs strategy as they sought to compete on the national level and they became a mass political party that claimed to represent all of the people (Schachter 1961, 295). Indeed, in the 1958 elections, CUT received over 1/3 of its votes from the Kabre-dominated north (Brown 1983, 445). The Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord (UCPN), on the other hand, was an exclusively northern party organized around the (mostly Kabre) tribal chiefs (De Haan 2003, 230). In the 1958 legislative elections, the Comit de lUnit Togolaise won 29 seats (63%), the Union of Chiefs and Populations of the North 10 seats (21.7%), the Togolese Progress Party 3 seats (6.5%), and independents 4 seats (8.7%) out of a total of 46 seats (African Elections Database). The PTP could not be coded so the vote share captured by ethnic parties ranges from 21.7% (UCPN) to 28.2% (UCPN+PTP). There were anti-colonial riots by the Ewe prior to WWI as they tried to resist being split between British and French administrations (MAR). No reports of ethnic riots or political party violence between WWII and independence in Minorities at Risk Project 2009, *Keesings*, Minority Rights Group 2010, or any of the other cited sources.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: UCPN
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: [range=22-28%] **25%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Brown, David. 1983. "Sieges and Scapegoats: The Politics of Pluralism in Ghana and Togo." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 21(3): 431-460.

De Haan, L.J. 2003. "Historical Perspectives on Changing Livelihoods in Northern Togo." In W. van Binsbergen and R. Pelgrim, eds., *The Dynamics of Power and the Rule of Law: Essays on Africa and Beyond.* Leiden: African Studies Centre.

Lasisi, Rashid Oladoja. 1993. "Language, Culture, Ethnicity and National Integration: The Togo Experience since 1900." *African Study Monographs* 14(1): 1-12.

Minorities at Risk Project. 2009. "Minorities at Risk Dataset." College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. At http://www.cidcm. umd.edu/ mar, accessed December 1, 2010.

Minority Rights Group. 2010. "Country Overviews." World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. At http://www.minorityrights.org/directory, accessed December 1, 2010.

Schachter, Ruth. 1961. "Single-Party Systems in West Africa." *American Political Science Review* 55(2): 294-307.

Tunisia: General elections were not held in Tunisia until immediately after independence, in 1956, and these are used for coding purposes. The Neo-Destour party, which had led the armed struggle for independence, unsurprisingly won 98.8% of the vote with the Tunisian Communist party winning 1.2% (Nohlen, Krennerich, and Thibaut 1999, 918). Under Bourguiba, both during the national movement for independence in the the 30 years of his subsequent rule, the Neo-Destour party constructed a largely nationalist unification of Tunisia, affirming a role for Tunisian national identity within an Arab ethnic identity. This identity was anti-colonial (while simultaneously Francophone) and strictly secular. This dynamic made the primary sociopolitical division secularism versus Islamism as no ethnic or sectarian cleavages split the state (Alexander 2016). A guerilla insurgency for independence was waged from 1953-56, spearheaded by the Destour Socialists Party or Neo-Destour Party. A string of riots between Tunisian nationalists and French colonial police broke out in January of 1952, including in Bizerete, Nabeul, and Sousse. At least 28 were killed and hundreds injured (Washington Post 1952(a)&1952(b); New York Times 1952(a)). Some reporters indicate that so far "there have been no manifestations of racial or religious hatred or attacks on European civilians by Moslem Arab crowds (New York Times 1952(a))." Others claim that in some places rioters were targeting European living quarters (Washington Post 1952(b)). Leaders of the Neo-Destour party claimed to have control over the riots/disorders, with the capacity to stop and start them (Daily Boston Globe 1952). More riots broke out in Tunis in May of 1952 in which a French woman was killed (New York Times 1952(b)). In June, there was rioting between Jews and Muslims in Tunis. Rumors posited that Jews were behind an attempt to poison the family of the Bey. About 100 Muslims then entered the Jewish quarter, ransacking stores and homes (New York Times 1952(c)). In December, a demonstration over the murder

of a Tunisian labor leader turned violent when police tried to break it up (Chicago Daily Tribune 1952). In April and May of 1955, there was violence against members of the Movement for Franco-Tunisian Cooperation followed by a no-fatality settler riot against General Boyer de la Tours residence. There were also violent clashes between the supporters of the Neo-Destour and Old-Destour parties (Keesings 1955). In 1956, an anti-US demonstration turned to rioting in front of the US Consulate (Chicago Daily Tribune 1956). Only the Jewish-Muslim riots could be considered ethnic of all of these incidents. No other reports of ethnic violence in Minority Rights Group 2010, *Keesings*, Proquest Historical Newspaper searches, or any other sources cited.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: YES
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **YES**
Ethnic Parties: none
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **0%**

Sources:

Alexander, Christopher. 2016. *Tunisia: From Stability to Revolution in the Maghreb.* London: Routledge.

Chicago Daily Tribune, The. 1952. "Riot in Tunis" (December 8).

—. 1956. "Tunisians Charge French Let Anti-U.S. Riot Rage" (March 11).

Daily Boston Globe, The. 1952. "Tunisia Disorder Simmers Down" (January 28).

Keesings Archive of World Events. 1955. "General Convention" Volume 10 (June).

Minority Rights Group. 2010. "Country Overviews." World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. At http://www.minorityrights.org/directory, accessed December 1, 2010.

New York Times, The. 1952(a). "Tunisia Outbursts Checked by French" (January 21).

—. 1952(b). "New Riots in Tunis Bring More Curbs" (May 13).

—. 1952(c). "Moslems and Jews Clash in Tunis Riots" (June 15).

Nohlen, Dieter, Michael Krennerich, and Bernhard Thibaut. 1999. *Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Washington Post, The. 1952(a). "13 Hurt in Tunisia Riot" (January 17).

—. 1952(b). "Tunisians Slay French Leader; Faure Backed" (January 23).

Uganda: Three political parties participated in the pre-independence elections in February 1962: the Democratic Party (DP), the Ugandan Peoples Congress (UPC), and the

Kabaka Yekka or 'King alone' (KY). Weinstein notes that all of Uganda's "political parties were organized around ethnic identities": the UPC united northern ethnic groups and sought to rectify their relative disadvantage during colonial times through pro-northern policies and the Kabaka Yekka was a Baganda party (Weinstein 2007, 66). According to Mazrui and Tidy, what held the disparate elements of the UPC together was the common bond of anti-[Ba]Ganda feeling (1984, 102). The DP was founded in 1954 and was mainly comprised of highly-educated, Catholic Ganda elites. It had tried, but failed, to become a national party. The KY was formed by the Kabaka (King of Baganda) in reaction to the DP's electoral success in 1961, which was seen to fundamentally threaten the political power of the King. It was a Baganda party whose main goal was to preserve the Bagandas special position within the Ugandan political system as independence approached (Ibid, 102-103). The DP's original executive committee was entirely Catholic and Baganda (Mutibwa 1992, 15). In the 1962 National Assembly Elections, just prior to independence, the UPC/KY won 51.81% of the vote, the DP 46.07%, independents 1.64%, and a couple small parties under 1% of the vote (African Elections Database). British intelligence reports cite tension between Baganda and the Banyoro over several counties of contested territory but make no reference of any actual violence, organized or otherwise, between ethnic communities in 1960-62 (British National Archives, Colonial Office 822/2064 and 2065; also War Office 32/18516). The only riots reported were in 1945 and 1949. The 1945 disturbances began with a series of various small strikes in Buganda that evolved into a week of strikes, with accompanying violence. which spread beyond Buganda and particularly to Kampala. Both government services and the private sector basically shut down (even some police units were on strike) and the violent acts were committed both against the colonial government (including sabotage of communications and transportation infrastructure) and the Indian population, may of whom were assaulted and there was widespread looting of their businesses (Thompson 2003, 246-250). The riots of 1949 were on an even greater scale than those of 1945 but were largely contained to Buganda. They involved "strikes, intimidation, riots, looting, hijacking of vehicles, violence against persons and property, and illegal gatherings of crowds of up to 8000 people There were over 400 cases of arson There were just 8 fatal casualties, but the number of arrests reached 2000 (Ibid, 306)." The protests and strikes were, once again, largely directed at the colonial government and the officials it had installed in Buganda after the 1945 riots. Political demands were made for the local election of chiefs and the dismissal of the current Buganda government (Ibid, 307). The riots were also directed against "the Asian and European monopoly of crop-marketing and processing (Mutibwa 1992, 13)." As the Asian and European communities were immigrants who played little role in post-Ugandan society (especially after Idi Amin expelled the Indians), the riots against them are not counted as ethnic violence.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: DP, KY, UPC
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **98%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Mazrui, Ali A. and Michael Tidy. 1984. *Nationalism and New States in Africa*. London: Heinemann.

Mutibwa, Phares. 1992. *Uganda since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes*. London: Hurst & Company.

Thompson, Gardner. 2003. *Governing Uganda: British Colonial Rule and Its Legacy*. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.

Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2007. *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zambia: Three major political parties competed in the pre-independence 1962 and 1964 elections: the United National Independence Party (UNIP), the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress (ANC), and the white settlers United Federal Party (UFP) (later renamed the National Progress Party or NPP). There were also various small, regional and local parties (Burnell 2001). The ANC was founded in 195, built up membership by reaching out to local welfare societies, and drew its primary support from the Tonga speaking people of the Southern Province (Ibid, 249). UNIP was formed in 1959 and led by Kenneth Kuanda. It had local branches in the 24 regions of the territory, then called Northern Rhodesia. Kuanda, as leader of UNIP, had a nationalist, unitary vision for the country and feared that ethnic rivalries within UNIP could tear it apart and that other political parties, including the ANC, would politicize ethnic identity (Ibid). Throughout 1963, fighting occurred in the Copperbelt between UNIP and ANC supporters, with intimidation and violence employed by UNIP youth brigades (Mazrui and Tidy 1984, 113). In the 1964 elections, UNIP struggled to find support in the Southern Province where there was widespread fear of "Bemba domination" (Ibid). The ANC, on the other hand, only found support in the South and in a few neighboring districts of the Central Province (Baylies and Szeftel 1992, 78). The National Progress Party (formerly UFP) won all of the seats reserved for Europeans (Ibid). The ANC was originally represented nationally, seems to have tried to compete in all regions prior to independence, and there are no reports that it excluded any ethnic groups or targeted its opposition on an ethnic basis. The 1964 Legislative Council Elections were split between two roles: the main role was to elect Africans and the reserved role for white Europeans. On the main role, the UNIP won 69.06% of the vote, the ANC 30.5%, and independents 0.44%. On the reserved role, UNIP won 35.23%, the ANC 0.94%, and the NPP 63.63%. Overall, the UNIP won 576,789 votes (68.4%), ANC 252,128 (29.9%), the NPP 11,157 (1.3%), and independents 3697 (0.4%) (African Elections Database). In 1963-1964, fighting between UNIP and the Lumpa Church killed an estimated 700 people and led to the eradication of the church. Both UNIP and the Lumpa church recruited members from across ethnic groups (Mazrui and Tidy 1984, 113-115). No other reports of pre-independence ethnic violence in Mazrui and Tidy, Minorities at Risk Project 2009, Minority Rights Group 2010, or the other sources cited.

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: NO
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **NO**
Ethnic Parties: UFP/NPP

Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: **1%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Baylies, Carolyn and Morris Szeftel. 1992. "The Fall and Rise of Multi-Party Politics in Zambia." *Review of African Political Economy* 19(54): 75-91.

Burnell, Peter. 2001. "The Party System and Party Politics in Zambia: Continuities Past, Present and Future." *African Affairs* 100(399): 239-263.

Mazrui, Ali A. and Michael Tidy. 1984. *Nationalism and New States in Africa*. London: Heinemann.

Minorities at Risk Project. 2009. "Minorities at Risk Dataset." College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. At http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/ mar, accessed December 1, 2010.

Minority Rights Group. 2010. "Country Overviews." World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. At http://www.minorityrights.org/directory, accessed December 1, 2010.

Zimbabwe: Zimbabwe is analyzed in the period prior to majority rule, from 1965-1980, during which a white apartheid regime had declared unilateral independence from Britain and ruled over the African population. During this time, the Rhodesia Front (RF) won every parliamentary seat in every election, thoroughly dominating the white apartheid regime (Sithole 1988, 220). The African nationalist movement was united until 1963, when it split into ZAPU and ZANU, which in 1970 degenerated into an ethnic split between the Shona (ZANU) and Ndebele (ZAPU) ethnic groups. Both used violent tactics against one another in efforts to either eliminate the other group or merely survive (Ibid, 223-224). Beginning in 1972, there was an effort to form a unified national movement, called the African National Council (ANC), which was founded by Bishop Abel Muzorewa (Ibid, 224). The first vote with universal suffrage occurred prior to the transition to majority rule in 1979. Five political parties contested legislative seats in these elections: the United National African Council (UANC, formerly ANC), ZANU, the United National Federal Party (UNFP), the Zimbabwe United Peoples Organization (ZUPO), and the National Democratic Union (NDU). The 1980 House of Assembly elections (the "independence elections"), which were held separately for white and black representatives, were contested by even more parties. The only ones to win more than 2% of the vote were: ZANU(PF), ZAPU, RF, UANC, and ZANU-Ndonga (a breakaway sect of ZANU). Overall, ZANU won 1,668,992 votes (63%), ZAPU 638,879 votes (24.1%), the RF 13,621 votes (0.5%), the UANC 219,307 votes (8.3%), ZANU-Ndonga 53,343 votes (2%), ZDP 28,181 votes (1.1%), NFZ 18,794 votes (0.7%), UNFP 5,796 votes (0.2%), UPAM 1,181 votes (0%) and white independents 2,781 votes (0.1%) (African Elections Database). Voting largely followed ethnic lines with the Shona voting for ZANU(PF) and the Ndebele voting for ZAPU (Minority Rights Group 2010). Ian Smiths RF won all of the reserved

white seats (Sithole 1988, 231). This places the range of ethnic parties vote share between 89.6% (RF, ZANU, ZANU-Ndonga, ZAPU) and 100% (the rest not codable). ZANU(PF) was accused of violence and intimidation in the areas that its guerrillas had controlled during the war for independence (Sithole 1988, 229). Also, in urban areas, there were several violent clashes between political parties and their followers which led to several fatalities (Ibid). There were also major riots in the capital city, Salisbury, as well as in Gwelo and Gatooma, in October of 1960 in which Europeans were targeted for violence and their property for destruction (Keesings 1960).

Party-Backed Ethnic Violence: YES
Ethnic Riots: NO
Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence: **YES**
Ethnic Parties: RF, ZANU, ZANU-Ndonga, ZAPU
Ethnic Parties Share of Vote: [range=90-100%] **95%**

Sources:

African Elections Database. 2012. At http://africanelections.tripod.com/ [accessed June 14, 2012].

Keesings Archive of World Events. 1960. "Riots in Salisbury, Gatooma, and Gwela—The Vagrance, Emergency Powers, and Law and Order (Maintenance Bills). Resignation of Sir Robert Tredgold—Ban on 'Rhodesia Republican Army'" Volume 6 (December).

Minority Rights Group. 2010. "Country Overviews." World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. At http://www.minorityrights.org/directory, accessed December 1, 2010.

Sithole, Masipula. 1988. "Zimbabwe: In search of a Stable Democracy." In Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries (Volume Two): Africa.* Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

A.3   Data Tables

Table A.1 – Preindependence Ethnic Violence Data

Country	Party-Backed Ethnic Violence	Ethnic Riots	Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence
Algeria	0	0	0
Angola	1	0	1
Benin	0	0	0
Botswana	0	0	0
Burkina Faso	na	na	na
Burundi	1	0	1
Cameroon	0	0	0
Cape Verde	0	0	0
Central African Republic	0	0	0

Country	Party-Backed Ethnic Violence	Ethnic Riots	Pre-Independence Ethnic Violence
Chad	0	0	0
Comoros	na	na	na
Congo-Brazzaville	1	1	1
Cõte d'Ivoire	0	0	0
DRC	0	0	0
Djibouti	1	1	1
Egypt	0	0	0
Equatorial Guinea	0	0	0
Eritrea	1	na	1
Ethiopia	0	0	0
Gabon	0	0	0
Gambia	0	0	0
Ghana	1	0	1
Guinea	1	1	1
Guinea-Bissau	1	0	1
Kenya	0	0	0
Lesotho	0	0	0
Liberia	0	0	0
Libya	0	0	0
Madagascar	0	0	0
Malawi	0	0	0
Mali	0	0	0
Mauritania	0	0	0
Mauritius	na	1	1
Morocco	0	0	0
Mozambique	0	0	0
Namibia	0	0	0
Niger	0	0	0
Nigeria	1	1	1
Rwanda	1	1	1
São Tomé and Príncipe	0	0	0
Senegal	0	0	0
Seychelles	0	0	0
Sierra Leone	1	0	1
Somalia	0	0	0
South Africa	1	1	1
Sudan	0	0	0
Swaziland	0	0	0
Tanzania	0	0	0
Togo	0	0	0
Tunisia	0	1	1
Uganda	0	0	0
Zambia	0	0	0
Zimbabwe	1	0	1

Table A.2 – Preindependence Ethnic Politicization Data

Country	Existence of Ethnic Parties	Ethnic Parties Share of Vote
Algeria	0	na
Angola	1	na
Benin	1	100
Botswana	1	5
Burkina Faso	1	56
Burundi	0	0
Cameroon	0	0
Cape Verde	0	na
Central African Republic	0	0
Chad	1	100
Comoros	?	?
Congo-Brazzaville	1	41
Cõte d'Ivoire	1	5
DRC	1	29
Djibouti	1	na
Egypt	?	?
Equatorial Guinea	1	5
Eritrea	0	na
Ethiopia	0	na
Gabon	1	8
Gambia	1	38
Ghana	1	36
Guinea	1	6
Guinea-Bissau	0	na
Kenya	1	33
Lesotho	0	0
Liberia	1	100
Libya	1	13
Madagascar	1	38
Malawi	0	0
Mali	0	0
Mauritania	0	0
Mauritius	1	100
Morocco	0	na
Mozambique	0	na
Namibia	1	40
Niger	0	0
Nigeria	1	96
Rwanda	1	95
São Tomé and Príncipe	0	0
Senegal	0	0
Seychelles	0	0
Sierra Leone	1	52

Country	Existence of Ethnic Parties	Ethnic Parties Share of Vote
Somalia	1	27
South Africa	1	35
Sudan	1	100
Swaziland	0	0
Tanzania	0	0
Togo	1	25
Tunisia	0	0
Uganda	1	98
Zambia	1	1
Zimbabwe	1	95

Appendix B

Military Coup Data

Military coup data was derived by cross-referencing three large datasets of coups and irregular transfers of power: McGowan's database of sub-Saharan African military coups, the Archigos dataset of political leaders and irregular exits from office, and Powell and Thyne's global data on successful and failed coup attempts (July 2016 version). This process produced a large number of discrepancies, with some coups included in one or more datasets while being excluded from others. There were also discrepancies over the timing of coup attempts and whether they succeeded. Moreover, not all of these sources distinguished between military coups and coups conducted by other insider political factions. Discrepancies were resolved by examining existing dataset narratives and by consulting newspaper and secondary sources. McGowan's coding procedures for military coups were followed (2003): a faction of the current government's military forces had to be involved in an attempt to overthrow the national government; evidence must exist of actual military force, whether in the form of violence or the occupation of important government buildings or transportation or communication centers; and, to count as a success, the coup leaders (or their appointed head-of-state) had to hold power for at least one week. This appendix documents the process of reconciling these various accounts and of narrowing the coup data exclusively to military coups.

B.1 Disputed Coups: Coding Decisions with Brief Narratives

The following potential coup attempts were in dispute between the three source datasets, were disputed by other sources, or were potentially not conducted by part of the state's military. A brief narrative of each alleged attempt is provided along with the final coding decision.

Algeria 1964: [Not Included] Failed coup listed in Powell and Thyne but North Africa is not part of McGowan's data. While Boumedienne began planning his later coup in 1963, or perhaps earlier, he spent 1964 methodically strengthening the army, quelling internal pockets of resistance, and winning over former adversaries within the military as allies. The army did not make a move against Ben Bella until 1965, when they successfully overthrew him (Quandt 1972, 11-13).

Algeria 1967: [Included] Failed coup listed in Powell and Thyne but North Africa is not part of McGowan's data. Newspaper accounts support a failed coup having taken

place. According to the Guardian, dissident elements of the army had tried to overthrow President Boumedienne but had been crushed by loyalist elements, with many civilians killed in the cross-fire (*The Guardian*, December 16, 1967).

Algeria 1992: [Included] Successful coup listed in Powell and Thyne but North Africa is not part of McGowan's data. After Islamist parties had won an electoral majority, the military annulled the elections and assumed power (Tahi 1992).

Benin 1992: [Included] Listed in McGowan but not included in Powell and Thyne. According to McGowan's narratives, a group of soldiers and policemen fired weapons at the President's residence (see also Clark 2007, 149-150; Lindberg & Clark 2007, 97).

Burkina Faso 1983: [Both Included] One successful and one failed coup in McGowan, but only the successful coup appears in Powell and Thyne. McGowan's narrative indicates that a counter-coup took place about one week after Sankara successfully seized power. Attacks on Sankara's residence and the radio station were conducted by factions of the army. The attempt was stopped by loyal troops. The narrative is well sourced and there is no reason to doubt its validity and so the failed coup is kept in the database.

Burundi 1992: [Included] Failed coup listed by McGowan but not Powell and Thyne. According to McGowan's narratives, rebellious soldiers attempted to win support for a coup attempt from other military camps and barracks in the capital. They failed and ultimately surrendered. They did, however, initiate the coup attempt.

Burundi 1994: [Included] Failed coup listed by McGowan but not Powell and Thyne. According to McGowan's narratives, a faction of the army tried to storm the residences of several high ranking government officials, including the President.

Central African Republic 1974: [Included] Failed coup listed by McGowan but not Powell and Thyne. According to McGowan's narratives, in December, officers and soldiers from the Gendarmerie attempted to overthrow the government.

Central African Republic 1976: [Included] Failed coup listed by McGowan but not Powell and Thyne. According to McGowan's narratives, there was a grenade attack against President Bokassa at the airport by a faction of the army. Three people lost their lives in the attack.

Central African Republic 1982: [Included for 1982] Discrepancy in date between datasets, with all listing a failed coup in either 1982 or 1983. A report from *The Guardian* confirms that the coup attempt took place in early March of 1982 (March 11, 1982).

Central African Republic 1996: [Included] Failed coup listed by McGowan but not Powell and Thyne. According to McGowan's narratives, soldiers attempted to detail prominent figures in government and launched a rocket at the radio station. French troops helped to put down the coup attempt.

Chad 1976: [Not Included] Failed coup listed by Powell and Thyne but not in other datasets. No narrative, even for a coup plot, in McGowan and no results in Proquest Historical Newspapers. Neither is the attempt mentioned in detailed secondary studies

such as Decalo (1980). As I could find no evidence or details of the alleged coup attempt, it has been excluded from the dataset.

Chad 1993: [Included] Failed coup listed by Powell and Thyne but not other datasets. Minorities at risk reports that there was a coup attempt in January of 1993, while President Deby was out of the country, and was led by supporters of former President Habré (Minorities at Risk 2009). Other sources indicate that troops loyal to Habré were behind the coup attempt (*The Europa World Yearbook* 2004, 1062). News reports also indicate that there was an attempted coup or coup plot in October of 1993. A curfew was imposed in its aftermath. The government also extracted a confession from one of the plotters, indicating that the army was involved in the plot (*The Guardian*, October 25, 1993; *The Observer*, October 24, 1993). The January coup attempt is included in the dataset.

Comoros 1975: [Not Included] Coded as a successful coup in both McGowan and Powell and Thyne. However, domestic military forces were not involved. Rather, France provided both mercenaries and arms (Mukonoweshuro 1990, 559-560). Thus, while still a non-constitutional transfer of power, it is not a military coup. Removed from data set.

Comoros 1978: [Not included] Also coded as a successful coup in McGowan and Powell and Thyne. As in 1975, domestic military forces seemed to have played no role in the coup attempt. Rather, infamous French mercenary Bob Denard led a group of 50 European mercenaries to seize power (Mukonoweshuro 1990, 563). Removed from data set.

Comoros 1991: [Not Included] Failed coup listed by Powell and Thyne but not other datasets. In August 1991, Comoros chief Supreme Court Judge, Boni, declared himself ruler and attempted to depose the president on the basis of a constitutional clause allowing the justice to replace him in the event of poor health. The bid failed and the security forces were not involved (*UPI*, August 3, 1991). The incident is thus not considered a military coup.

Comoros 1995: [Not Included] Failed coup listed by McGowan but not Powell and Thyne. According to McGowan's narratives, this coup attempt was led by Bob Denard along with his mercenaries and some support members of the paramilitary unit of the police. Since the military was not involved, it is not coded as a military coup attempt.

Comoros 2001: [Not Included] Failed coup listed by McGowan but not Powell and Thyne. McGowan's narrative indicates that the coup attempt was conducted entirely by mercenaries, who had links to government ministers and former army officers but there is no indication that current members of the armed forces were involved. Thus the event is not coded as a military coup attempt.

Congo-Brazzaville 1968: [Two Failed Coups and One Successful Coup Included] One failed and one successful coup listed by McGowan while Powell and Thyne have two successful coups. McGowan lists an attempted coup by the Presidential Guard in July 31, 1968 and a successful coup a few days later on August 3. However, the coup leaders reinstalled the President only 24 hours later, making this presumably a failed coup. Fighting within the army broke out again at the end of August and the President was removed on September 4. This extended instability is thus counted as two failed coups and one successful.

Congo-Brazzaville 1969: [Not Included] Failed coup listed by Powell and Thyne but not other datasets. In his narratives, McGowan lists this as a coup plot. No attempt to seize power was made, but the army, police, and gendarmerie were extensively purged on suspicion of "counter-revolutionary" plotting.

Congo-Brazzaville 1977: [Included] Failed coup listed by McGowan but not Powell and Thyne. According to McGowan's narratives, the President was assassinated by soldiers from the army. Power then passed into the hands of the military, but not to the leader of the coup, who was arrested. Archigos also notes an irregular exit from office by the former leader. Coded as a failed coup attempt.

Congo-Brazzaville 1992: [Included] Failed coup listed by McGowan but not Powell and Thyne. Soldiers seized the airport and radio and television stations after the Prime Minister appointed new military commanders. The soldiers also opened fire on civilians marching in support of the government (*The Guardian*, January 21, 1992).

Democratic Republic of the Congo 1963: [Included] Failed coup listed by McGowan but not Powell and Thyne. According to McGowan's narrative, soldiers were involved in an attempt to overthrow the government in which they managed to kidnap two generals, who later managed to escape.

Djibouti 1991: [Included] Failed coup listed by McGowan but not Powell and Thyne. According to McGowan's narratives, soldiers (including nine army officers) attacked a military camp in order to get armaments. The attempt was put down and the coupists arrested.

Djibouti 2000: [Not Included] Failed coup listed by Powell and Thyne but not other datasets. Not even a plot mentioned by McGowan in that year. In December, there was a rebellion by police officers against the firing of their Chief. They took over the radio and television station and attempted to surround the presidential palace. The uprising was put down by the security forces, who remained loyal to the government (IRIN 2000). Because this was exclusively a police action and did not involve members of the military, except as defenders of the regime, it is not coded as a military coup attempt.

Equatorial Guinea 1969: [Not Included] Failed coup listed by Powell and Thyne but not other datasets. In March, President Macias Nguema accused Spain of attempting to assassinate him and overthrow his government. The coup attempt was led by the Foreign Minister and the country's Ambassador to the UN, as well as other high-ranking civilians. Spanish citizens were also accused of participating in the plot. There is no mention of military involvement in any of the sources and thus it is not coded as a military coup (Baynham 1980, 67; *The Guardian*, March 10, 1969; *Keesings*, April 1969).

Equatorial Guinea 1981: [Included] Failed coup listed by McGowan but not Powell and Thyne. According to McGowan's narratives, military and civilian insurrectionists attempted to overthrow the regime, resulting in many deaths. They were defeated by loyal units of the security forces.

Equatorial Guinea 1983: [Included] Failed coup listed by McGowan but not Powell and

Thyne. According to McGowan's narratives, army officers attempted to assassinate the president in May. The attackers were foiled by the Presidential Guard, however, resulting in dozens of arrests.

Equatorial Guinea 1986: [Included] Failed coup listed by McGowan but not Powell and Thyne. According to McGowan's narratives, military and civilian conspirators attempted to occupy the Presidential palace during the 18-19 of July. They were eventually arrested and mass purges followed.

Equatorial Guinea 2004: [Not Included] Failed coup in dataset but not in Powell and Thyne. Also known as the Wonga coup, mercenaries financed by British citizens attempted to overthrow the government. They were arrested in Zimbabwe en route to Equatorial Guinea. Additional mercenaries and a few local men are also arrested in Equatorial Guinea, accused of being an advance team for the plot (Roberts 2009). As this was a mercenary plot, which never came to action on the ground in Equatorial Guinea, and appears not to have involved elements of the local security forces, it is not coded as a military coup.

Ethiopia 1961: [Not Included] Failed coup listed by Powell and Thyne but not McGowan. Not even mention of a plot in McGowan. In the Powell and Thyne dataset, they list a failed coup on December 14, 1960 and a failed coup on December 14, 1961. It is assumed that the 1961 entry is an error as the 1960 failed coup attempt is well established (see, for example, *The Guardian*, December 19, 1960; *The Guardian*, March 29, 1961.

Ethiopia 1977: [One Successful Coup Included] Two successful coups listed by McGowan but Powell and Thyne have only one success. According to McGowan's narratives, the second "coup" was really a purge by Mengitsu, who already ruled the country, against his primary rival. Thus only one successful coup is included in the data.

Gambia 1981: [Not Included] Included in all datasets but Gambia did not have a military until 1984. Rather, this was a coup attempted by the police forces.

Guinea 1970: [Not included] Failed coup listed by McGowan but not Powell and Thyne. According to McGowan's narratives, the attempt to seize power was led by either mercenaries or exiled former military officers. It is thus not coded as a military coup attempt since no current military personnel were involved.

Guinea-Bissau 1993: [Included] Failed coup listed by McGowan but not Powell and Thyne. According to McGowan's narratives, firefighting broke out between loyalist and rebellious factions of the military, killing at least one. The plotters had also drawn up a list of future government members. Included as a coup attempt.

Lesotho 1991: [One Successful and One Failed Coup Included] One failed and one successful coup listed by McGowan, only the successful coup listed in Powell and Thyne. McGowan's narratives note that 18 senior officers were involved in an attempt to arrest a number of loyalist officers and reinstate General Lekhanya, who had been ousted in a previous coup.

Libya 1975: [Not Included] Failed coup listed by Powell and Thyne. McGowan's

dataset does not include North Africa. There was no coup attempt. Rather, a meeting was held in which the Planning Minister expressed criticism of how the government was managing its finances. Gadafy overreacted and promulgated new laws instituting the death penalty for anyone caught attempting to change the government by force, leading the minister to flee the country. This led to the proliferation of coup attempt rumors. Fairly quickly, Gadafy and the Planning Minister attempted to reconcile (*The Guardian*, August 23, 1975).

Madagascar 1972: [Included] Successful coup listed by McGowan but not Powell and Thyne. According to McGowan's narratives, the government handed power over to the army chief of staff who then appointed a military junta.

Madagascar 1975: [Included] Failed coup listed by McGowan but not Powell and Thyne. According to McGowan's narratives, the head-of-state was shot and killed by members of the paramilitary police commando unit, who then took refuge in a mutinous army camp. Loyal troops then attacked the camp and put down the rebellion, such that the coupists could not take power themselves or install a leader of their choosing.

Madagascar 1992: [Not Included] Failed coup listed by Powell and Thyne but not other datasets. Not even a plot narrative included in McGowan. In July, an opposition group seized the capital's radio station for about three hours. No indication that any members of the security forces were involved with the rebels (*The New York Times*, July 30, 1992).

Madagascar 2002: [Not included] Not included in any dataset but there were some media claims of a coup. Military officers publicly supported the parallel government of the opposition after charges of electoral fraud. Their actions were preceded by mass demonstrations. No sign of the military using any force, just shows of support for one of two contesting alternative governments. Not coded as a military coup.

Mali 1978: [Not Included] Failed coup listed by Powell and Thyne but not other datasets. McGowan's narratives list a plot in which three government ministers were arrested for high treason. Further arrests included 30 military officers. This too was a plot to kill the president which never came to fruition (Imperato & Imperato 2008, 72).

Mali 1991: [Not Included] A successful coup is listed by all sources but Powell and Thyne also note a failed coup in the same year. According to McGowan's narratives, after the successful coup, a counter-coup plot was foiled by the new government. Nine army officers were arrested (See also *The Guardian*, July 16, 1991). The plotters were never able to take action and so the incident is not coded as a coup attempt.

Mauritania 1979: [Included] Nothing listed in either McGowan or Powell and Thyne. Coded by Archigos as an irregular exit. Pazzanita reports that a military faction forced the current junta leader out and organized a reshuffling. The next junta leader held power for more than a week (Pazzanita 2008, 309). Fits McGowans codings for a military coup and thus coded as a coup.

Mauritania 1981-1982: [Failed Coup Attempt Included for 1981] Potential date discrepancy. Powell and Thyne indicate a failed coup in 1982 but McGowan only has a plot that year. McGowan's narratives list a plot to abduct the President as he arrived at the

airport. The plot was allegedly discovered in advance, the President's plane redirected, and the plotters arrested. No actual attempt took place. However, McGowan describes an actual coup attempt in 1981 that is not included in Powell and Thyne. It is assumed that a mix-up took place in the Powell and Thyne dataset.

Niger 2002: [Not Included] Not included in Powell and Thyne and beyond the end date of McGowan's data set. There is a potential controversy over whether the incident was a coup attempt or a mutiny. News reports indicate that rank-and-file soldiers engaged in a 10 day mutiny, including soldiers garrisoned in or near the capital, which was successfully put down. They were protesting pay and living conditions (*BBC*, August 9, 2002; IRIN 2004). Not coded as failed coup attempt.

Rwanda 1994: [Included] Successful coup listed by Powell and Thyne but not McGowan. This is the year of the Rwandan civil war and genocide. Powell and Thyne could be counting either the assassination of Rwanda's president in early April, the subsequent assassination of the Prime Minister, or the ultimate victory of the RPF as a successful coup. The last involved the victory of a rebel group that militarily defeated the government, not a coup staged by insiders to the regime. The first is questionable at best. The President's plane was shot down but it has never been clearly established who did the shooting. Extremists within the Presidential Guard—known for strongly opposing any accommodation with the Tutsi rebels—were suspected. Not only would the Presidential Guard not let the crash site be inspected by anyone, including UN observers, but, citing anonymous sources within the French military, the newspaper Le Figaro reported that the serial numbers on the weapons matched those of a batch of SAM-16 missiles seized from Iraq and sold to Rwanda. Others contend that the RPF shot the plane down. The evidence is contradictory and the case is circumstantial. Also, Presidential Guards have easy access to the President, and most Presidential Guard coups are carried out as quick arrests or assassinations with small arms. So why kill their own members, who would have been on the plane, and risk missing the aircraft altogether with surface to air missiles? The assassination of the Prime Minister and seizure of the government by Hutu extremists within the military, however, clearly counts as a coup (Dorn & Matloff 2000; Kuperman 2001; Plaut 1994, 151).

Senegal 1962: [Not Included] Included in most cross-national datasets as a coup, including McGowan and Powell and Thyne. The military did become involved in a constitutional crisis. The constitution had divided control of military forces between the President and the Prime Minister. A confrontation came to heads when both called in their units. The dispute was solved peacefully in the end (on the side of the President). There is no evidence that any of the military units or commanders involved had any intention of seizing power or thought they were doing anything outside of their constitutional duties to protect civilian leaders (Fatton 1986; Fink 2007; Loimeier 1996; Nelson 1974). Removed from dataset as a coup attempt.

Seychelles 1977: [Not Included] Included in most cross-national datasets, including Powell and Thyne. A group of 60 trained militants, ostensibly with the help of some police officers, seized a police arsenal and then seized government power. The ringleaders of the coup were not part of the current government and had been trained in Tanzania. At this time, the police were the only armed security force in the country. Since there was no military and only the police were involved in the power seizure, it is not counted as a

military coup (*The Guardian*, June 8, 1977; *The Observer*, June 12, 1977).

Sierra Leone 1996: [One Failed Coup Attempt and One Successful Coup Included] All sources have one successful coup attempt. McGowan also notes a failed coup. According to McGowan's narratives, in December, soldiers opened fire on the President's residence in a bid to overthrow him. The attempt was quickly put down.

Sierra Leone 2000: [Included] Not listed in Powell and Thyne but in McGowan. According to McGowan's narratives, loyal troops stopped a group of soldiers, loyal to the former military junta, who had attacked the residence of the President. Five soldiers were killed in the counter-coup attempt.

Sierra Leone 2003: [Included] Nothing listed in either Powell and Thyne or McGowan. However, news reports indicate that there was shooting at the Wellington barracks, which houses a large stockpile of weapons and ammunition. The incident was quickly brought under control by the army with the support of UN Peacekeepers. Both serving soldiers and former combatants were arrested for the incident. (*BBC*, January 14, 2003; *The Guardian*, January 20, 2003) Coded as coup attempt.

Sudan 1955: [Not Included] Powell and Thyne list a failed coup. Nothing in McGowan. There was a mutiny of the Equatoria Corps which resulted in its disbanding. But this happened prior to independence, when Britain still controlled the colony, and the soldiers were not trying to seize power (Metz 1992).

Sudan 1959: [Three Failed Coups Included] Three failed coups listed by McGowan but only two by Powell and Thyne. McGowan's narratives show that all three attempts involved, at the very least, actual movement of troops and the motivation in each case was to overthrow the current government.

Sudan 1966: [One Failed Coup Included] Two failed coups listed by Powell and Thyne and only one by McGowan. On December 18, 1966, a small group of communists with help from a small army unit, attempted to seize power but failed. There were large purges afterward (Fadlalla 2004, 43; Metz 1992; Roessler 2016, Table A3.2). I could find no evidence of a second coup attempt 10 days later, as listed by Powell and Thyne.

Sudan 1978: [Included] One failed coup listed by McGowan but not Powell and Thyne. According to McGowan's narratives, the attempt took place in July with army units capturing strongholds throughout Khartoum and attempting to assassinate the president as he flew into the airport. They failed and the incident resulted in hundreds of casualties. Coded as a failed coup attempt.

Sudan 1983: [Included] One failed coup listed by McGowan but not Powell and Thyne. According to McGowan's narratives, the 105th Battalion of the army attempted to overthrow the government. They were stopped by loyal units with around 70 fatalities.

Sudan 1990: [Included] Failed coup noted by McGowan but not in Powell and Thyne. According to McGowan's narratives, gunfire was exchanged around the capital city, the airport, and the radio station as around 30 army and police officers attempted to seize power. They were quickly defeated.

Swaziland 1973: [Not Included] Successful coup listed by McGowan, not in Powell and Thyne. According to McGowan, with the assistance of the army, the King disbanded the elected government and suspended the constitution. However, the King was already the head of state so this is more an event of consolidating his power with the assistance of security forces than an instance of the military attempting to seize power. Not coded as a coup or coup attempt.

Swaziland 1983-1984: [Failed Coup Attempt Included for 1984] Potential date discrepancy. Powell and Thyne list a failed coup in 1983 while McGowan lists a failed coup in 1984. However, they list different months for the coup attempts. In 1983, there was a palace coup wherein the Queen Regent replaced the Prime Minister after her husband's death (Sparks 1983). In 1984, according to McGowan's narratives, the deputy head-of-state with collusion from the army attempted to seize power. The 1983 incident is not counted as a coup attempt while the 1984 incident is.

Tanzania 1964: [Excluded] Listed as a failed coup in McGowan but not Powell and Thyne. This was a mutiny across East Africa by rank-and-file soldiers over declining standards of living and slow Africanization of the officer corps. In Tanzania, according to McGowan's narratives, it appears that all British officers and President Nyerere were at one point arrested. He was released quickly, however, and the mutineers never attempted to seize power or form their own government (see also Lupogo 2001; Parsons 1999). Excluded from dataset.

Togo 1970: [Not Included] Failed coup listed by McGowan but not Powell and Thyne. According to McGowan's own narratives, no military officers were involved in the plot, which was organized by former soldiers, currently in exile, and a single police officer. This is thus not considered a military coup attempt.

Togo 1991: [Five Failed Coup Attempts Included] Four failed coups listed by Powell and Thyne and five failed coups by McGowan. According to McGowan's narratives, the attempts occurred on October 1, October 7-8, November 27-30, December 3, and December 15. All involved actual violence as soldiers attempted to seize the radio station, the president, and other strategic points in the capital city. All the incidents also involved active duty soldiers in the army or presidential guard.

Togo 2005: [Included] Successful coup listed by Powell but not in McGowan. After the death of President Eyadema, the army suspended the constitution, which would have given power to the speaker of parliament, and appointed Eyadema's son, Faure, as the new president.

Tunisia 1987: [Not Included] Successful coup included in Powell and Thyne but North Africa is not in McGowan's data. The Prime Minister, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, had a medical team declare President Bourguiba mentally unfit to lead. Bourgiba was 84 at the time. The "palace coup was bloodless, followed constitutional procedures for impeachment, and did not seem to involve the military accept insofar as senior military officers were consulted in advance and they approved the course of action (*Keesings* 1988). This incident is thus not counted as a military coup.

Uganda 1966: [Not Included] Coded in both McGowan's and Powell and Thyne as a successful coup. However, there is no entry or exit of a political leader listed in the Archigos database for that year. According to McGowan's narratives, Prime Minister Obote consolidated his power by suspending the constitution, arresting ministers, and jailing some military officers. This is thus not considered a military coup attempt.

Uganda 1971: [One Successful and One Failed Coup Included] McGowan lists both a successful and failed coup but only a successful coup in Powell and Thyne. The successful coup occurred in January, when President Obote was deposed by the army. According to McGowan's narratives, in October, soldiers at the Moroto barracks attempted a counter-coup, resulting in the deaths of 17 loyalists.

Uganda 1975: [Included] Two failed coups listed by McGowan but none by Powell and Thyne. According to McGowan's narratives, the first attempt occurred in February when army soldiers ambushed the president's motorcade, attempting to kill him. The second attempt occurred in August by army units, including tanks. Details are scarce but it appears that they were stopped by loyal units before they got very far. Both are counted as failed military coup attempts.

Uganda 1976: [Included] Two failed coups listed by McGowan but none by Powell and Thyne. According to McGowan's narratives, the first attempt occurred in June when grenades were thrown at the President's motorcade. Soldiers from the army were suspected although only one was arrested. The second attempt occurred in July when a mutiny at an army barracks in Kampala spiraled into demands by army officers that Amin resign. In response, Amin locked the officers in a hotel and had them assassinated. Both are counted as failed coups.

Uganda 1977: [Included] One failed coup listed by McGowan but none by Powell and Thyne. According to McGowan's narratives, once again the army attempted to assassinate Amin and overthrow his government by ambushing his motorcade. A later confession, for what it is worth, suggested that the plot had been in the works for over a year and had the support of hundreds of soldiers.

Uganda 1988: [Included] One failed coup listed by McGowan but none by Powell and Thyne. According to McGowan's narratives, over 200 soldiers of the 9th Artillery Regiment and the 8th Infantry Battalion were killed after trying to assassinate President Museveni's motorcade outside Kampala. Roughly 900 soldiers were involved in the attempt, including officers.

Zimbabwe 1982: [Included] One failed coup listed by McGowan but not Powell and Thyne. According to McGowan's narratives, soldiers who had previously fought with ZIPRA attacked a military barracks and seized weapons, after which they attacked Mugabe's home.

B.2 Recent Coups (2006-2016): Coding Decisions with Brief Narratives

The following potential coup attempts occurred after the end of both McGowan's dataset and the Archigos data, such that the only systematic source of data was Powell and Thyne. Since they include non-military coups as well as military coups, I cross-referenced this data with both media and scholarly sources to confirm which attempts were conducted and whether they succeeded (according to McGowan's coding criteria). I also investigated other events claimed to be coup attempts that were not included in Powell and Thyne.

Burkina Faso 2014: [Included as a Successful Coup] Successful coup included in Powell and Thyne. Compaoré's bids to subvert the constitution and consolidate executive power led to bitter disagreements with the opposition political parties as well as to widespread protests. On October 30, Burkina Faso's military intervened and dissolved the National Assembly. The next day, Compaoré resigned and fled the country and the military officially took control over the government (Henshaw 2015; Taoko, Cowell & Callimachi 2015; *The Telegraph*, September 17, 2015).

Burkina Faso 2015: [Included as a Failed Coup Attempt] Failed coup included in Powell and Thyne. On September 17, 2015, just three weeks before scheduled elections, General Diendéré and the presidential guard he commanded tried to orchestrate another coup. Having received many privileges under Campaoré's long rule, they feared disbandment from an incoming elected government. Protestors filled the capital city and the army ordered its soldiers to surround the presidential palace. Facing both popular and military resistance, the presidential guard surrendered and returned to their barracks. The counter-coup failed after only a week (Eizenga 2015).

Burundi 2015: [Included as a Failed Coup Attempt] Failed coup included in Powell and Thyne. The military responded to Nkurunziza's bid to extend his time in office, and the resulting disorder, with direct intervention. On May 13, Major General Godefroid Niyombare—a former ally of Nkurunziza who had earlier advised him to abide by the constitution and not run for a third term—led the coup attempt. Loyal elements of the army, however, quickly defeated the attempt (Niyungeko & Bilefsky 2015; Winsor 2015).

Chad 2006: [Not Included] Failed coup listed by Powell and Thyne. According to news reports, Chad's communications minister announced that a coup plot to shoot down the president's plane had been foiled, orchestrated by the president's twin nephews and a general, all of whom had previously defected to the rebels. A column of forces marching toward the capital had been intercepted and neutralized. The rebel coalition disputed the claim of a coup plot, insisting that they had been planning to facilitate mass defections from the military instead (*BBC*, March 15, 2006). As this event does not seem to involve current members of the government armed forces, it is not considered a military coup attempt.

Chad 2008: [Not Included] Human Rights Watch documents that Sudanese backed rebels invaded from bases in Darfur and managed to reach the capital, where they engaged government forces in gun battles. This is a rebel action and not a military coup (Human Rights Watch 2009).

Democratic Republic of the Congo 2011: [Not Included] In February, a group of heavily armed people attacked the Presidential Palace, although they were repelled and the President was not there at the time (*Reuters*, February 27, 2011). The government later began calling the event a terrorist attack rather than a coup attempt and it does not appear that any members of the military were involved except in defense of the government (*BBC*, March 8, 2011). Not coded as a military coup attempt.

Democratic Republic of the Congo 2013: [Not Included] Around 70 armed men attacked the airport, army base, and radio and television network in Kinshasha. There were also clashes in Kinshasha. The government referred to the incident as a terror attack and no members of the security forces appeared to be cooperating with the rebels (*The Telegraph*, December 30, 2013). Not coded as a military coup attempt.

Egypt 2011: [Included as a Successful Coup] Successful coup listed by Powell and Thyne. Facing mass street protests, and encouraged by Egypt's Generals, President Mubarak resigned on February 11. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces then took power, promising to hold free and fair elections. They transferred power to a newly elected President the following year (*BBC*, February 12, 2011).

Egypt 2013: [Included as a Successful Coup] Successful coup listed by Powell and Thyne. On July 3, 2013, the Egyptian military toppled the country's first democratically elected government, arresting President Morsi after he failed to resolve the growing street protests (*CNN* July 4, 2013).

Equatorial Guinea 2009: [Not Included] The attack was apparently carried out by militants from the Niger delta in Nigeria seeking oil money. They were repelled by the armed forces (*The New York Times*, February 19, 2009). Not counted as a military coup attempt.

Gambia 2014: [Not Included] At the end of December, several gunmen attacked the state house, hoping to overpower the Presidential Guard and hoping that disaffected soldiers would join their cause. The military failed to revolt and the gunmen were easily defeated. Since no current soldiers were involved, the incident is not coded as a military coup attempt (*The Guardian*, January 7, 2015).

Guinea 2008: [Included as a Successful Coup] After President Conté died, the military seized power and announced on state radio that they had established a governing counsel. Captain Camara took over as head-of-state and ruled until May of 2009, when he was replaced by Konate (*Africa Research Bulletin* 2008; *BBC*, December 23, 2008; Goemans, Gleditsch, & Chiozza 2009).

Guinea 2011: [Included as a Failed Coup Attempt] Failed coup listed by Powell and Thyne. At least one person died in a gun battle outside the President's home. The attack also involved rocket propelled grenades. The Presidential Guard defeated the coup attempt. Dozens were arrested in the aftermath, including many members of the military, a former army chief, and a current presidential guard member (*Public Radio International*, July 19, 2011; *Public Radio International*, July 21, 2011; *Reuters*, July 20, 2011).

Guinea-Bissau 2008: [Included as a Failed Coup Attempt] One failed coup attempt listed by Powell and Thyne. In August, the Chief of the Navy was accused of plotting

to overthrow the president. He was arrested after allegedly making telephone calls to solicit support (*BBC*, August 8, 2008; *BBC*, April 1, 2010). This never made it past the plotting stage and is thus not considered a coup attempt. Then, in November, President Vieira survived an attack by rebellious soldiers against his residence. The battle lasted for three hours and one soldier of the presidential guard was killed (*BBC*, November 23, 2008).

Guinea-Bissau 2009: [Included as a Successful Coup] Nothing listed by Powell and Thyne. President Vieira was assassinated by renegade soldiers, apparently in revenge for the death of the Army Chief of Staff, who was killed in a bomb blast just hours prior (*BBC*, July 27, 2009). The army did not keep power and handed leadership over, according to constitutional succession procedures to Pereira, a civilian who would govern until elections could be held (*BBC*, March 2, 2009). The coup, however, is counted as a success as the army's chosen leader remained in power for more than a week.

Guinea-Bissau 2010: [Included as a Failed Coup Attempt] Failed coup listed by Powell and Thyne but beyond end of McGowan's dataset. Army officers detained the Prime Minister and the army chief. The President was unharmed and the military did not succesfully take power after street protests compelled them to release the Prime Minister (*BBC*, April 1, 2010).

Guinea-Bissau 2011: [Included as a Failed Coup Attempt] Nothing listed in Powell and thyne. According to news reports, gunfire broke out between the army and the navy, with automatic weapons fire heard at a base near the capital. The Prime Minister sought refuge in a foreign embassy and the President was abroad undergoing medical treatment. The army, in support of the current government, prevailed (*Al Jazeera*, December 29, 2011).

Guinea-Bissau 2012: [One Successful and One Failed Coup Included] Powell and Thyne list one success; beyond the end of McGowan's data. On April 12th, 2012, rebellious soldiers seized power in Guinea-Bissau. They quickly established control over the small capital city, captured the TV and radio stations, and detained both the interim President, Raimundo Pereira, and the frontrunner in the upcoming April 29th Presidential elections, Carlos Gomes. A week later, gun and mortar fire could still be heard in Bissau, although power seemed to rest firmly in the hands of the new military junta (*Al Jazeera*, April 20, 2012; *BBC*, April 12, 2012; *New York Times*, April 13, 2012). In October, gunmen attacked an army base near the airport. The bid was apparently a counter-coup led by Captain N'Thama who had just returned from military training abroad (*Al Jazeera*, October 22, 2012; *BBC*, October 27, 2012). Both the successful coup and the coup attempt are included in the dataset.

Lesotho 2014: [Included as a Failed Coup Attempt] Failed coup attempt listed by Powell and Thyne. After the army chief was fired, soldiers surrounded both government and police buildings, with fire exchanged. At least one soldier died during the attempt and the Prime Minister fled to South Africa. Thabane was able to quickly return to Lesotho and resume power with South African police protection (*Al Jazeera*, August 30, 2014; *BBC*, August 30, 2014; *The Guardian*, September 4, 2014).

Madagascar 2006: [Included as a Failed Coup Attempt] Not listed by Powell and Thyne. General Fidy took over a military base and announced that the army was taking

over the government. Fighting broke out at the military base near the airport, where at least one soldier was killed. After the gun battle, the General fled and was later arrested (*BBC*, November 18, 2006; *BBC*, December 13, 2006)

Madagascar 2009: [Included as a Successful Coup] Listed by Powell and Thyne but beyond the end of McGowan's data. In March, after increasing unrest and street protests, the President was forced by the army to hand over power to them and a transitional military council. The military then decided to quickly hand power over to the opposition leader and a civilian transitional council. As the army took the opposition's side in the domestic struggle for power, intervened, and then gave power to the leader of their choice, the incident is counted as a successful military coup (*Al Jazeera*, March 19, 2009; *BBC*, March 17, 2009)

Madagascar 2010: [Included as a Failed Coup Attempt] Failed coup listed by Powell and Thyne but beyond the end of McGowan's data. In November, soldiers from the army seized the military base near the airport, declaring that they were seizing power and invoking a stand-off with hundreds of loyalist soldiers. The crisis was eventually resolved without bloodshed and at least 16 army officers were arrested (*The Guardian*, November 21, 2010).

Mali 2012: [One Successful Coup and One Failed Coup Attempt Included] One successful and one failed coup listed by Powell and Thyne; beyond the end of McGowan's data. Frustrated with inadequate arms and supplies while fighting a civil war, soldiers successfully seized power on March 22. The coup was then followed by a major thrust by rebel insurgents, who captured the northern part of the country and over two-thirds of Mali's territory. In May, a counter-coup was attempted by members of the former president's presidential guard. They were defeated by the ruling military regime after exchanging fire in Bamako, which resulted in the deaths of at least three people (*Al Jazeera*, May 1, 2012; Bleck and Michelitch 2015).

Mauritania 2008: [Included as a Successful Coup] Successful coup listed by Powell and Thyne. After the President announced the dismissal of four generals, he was deposed in a coup led by the former head of the Presidential Guard. The military then established a junta to rule the country (*The Guardian*, August 6, 2008).

Niger 2010: [Included as a Successful Coup] Successful coup listed by Powell and Thyne. Niger's democratically elected president, Tandja, was overthrown by the military in February 2010. Ten people were killed when soldiers attacked the presidential palace during a cabinet meeting. They then established a junta and promised to hold elections soon. Sanctions were imposed by the African Union (*BBC*, February 20, 2010; *The Globe and Mail*, February 29, 2010).

Niger 2011: [Not Included] Newly elected President Issoufou claimed to have foiled a coup plot in July of 2011, leading to the arrest of at least 10 soldiers. The plot was foiled before any action was taken (emphBBC, August 2, 2011; *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 27, 2011).

Sudan 2012: [Not Included] Failed coup listed by Powell and Thyne. The Sudanese government claimed that there was a coup plot which they disrupted before the plotters could take any action. Thirteen people were arrested over a "plan of sabotage" which

aimed to create chaos (*CNN*, November 23, 2012). Since no action took place, it is not considered a coup attempt.

B.3 Data Tables

Table B.1 – African Military Coups, 1952-2016

Country	Year	Attempts	Successes
Algeria	1965	1	1
Algeria	1967	1	0
Algeria	1992	1	1
Angola	1977	1	0
Benin	1963	1	1
Benin	1965	2	2
Benin	1967	1	1
Benin	1969	1	1
Benin	1972	2	1
Benin	1975	1	0
Benin	1992	1	0
Burkina Faso	1966	1	1
Burkina Faso	1974	1	1
Burkina Faso	1980	1	1
Burkina Faso	1982	1	1
Burkina Faso	1983	2	1
Burkina Faso	1987	1	1
Burkina Faso	2014	1	1
Burkina Faso	2015	1	0
Burundi	1965	1	0
Burundi	1966	2	2
Burundi	1976	1	1
Burundi	1987	1	1
Burundi	1992	1	0
Burundi	1993	2	0
Burundi	1994	1	0
Burundi	1996	1	1
Burundi	2001	2	0
Burundi	2015	1	0
Cameroon	1984	1	0
Central African Republic	1966	1	1
Central African Republic	1974	1	0
Central African Republic	1976	1	0
Central African Republic	1979	1	1
Central African Republic	1981	1	1
Central African Republic	1982	1	0
Central African Republic	1996	1	0
Central African Republic	2001	1	0
Central African Republic	2003	1	1

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Country	Year	Attempts	Successes
Chad	1975	1	1
Chad	1977	1	0
Chad	1989	1	0
Chad	1991	1	0
Chad	1993	1	0
Comoros	1985	1	0
Comoros	1987	1	0
Comoros	1989	1	1
Comoros	1992	1	0
Comoros	1999	1	1
Comoros	2000	1	0
Congo-Brazzaville	1963	1	1
Congo-Brazzaville	1966	1	0
Congo-Brazzaville	1968	3	1
Congo-Brazzaville	1970	1	0
Congo-Brazzaville	1972	1	0
Congo-Brazzaville	1977	1	0
Congo-Brazzaville	1992	1	0
Côte d'Ivoire	1999	1	1
Côte d'Ivoire	2000	1	0
Côte d'Ivoire	2001	1	0
Côte d'Ivoire	2002	1	0
DRC	1960	1	1
DRC	1963	1	0
DRC	1965	1	1
DRC	2004	2	0
Djibouti	1991	1	0
Egypt	1952	1	1
Egypt	1954	1	1
Egypt	2011	1	1
Egypt	2013	1	1
Equatorial Guinea	1979	1	1
Equatorial Guinea	1981	1	0
Equatorial Guinea	1983	1	0
Equatorial Guinea	1986	1	0
Ethiopia	1960	1	0
Ethiopia	1974	2	2
Ethiopia	1977	1	1
Ethiopia	1989	1	0
Gabon	1964	1	0
Gambia	1994	2	1
Ghana	1966	1	1
Ghana	1967	1	0
Ghana	1972	1	1
Ghana	1978	1	1
Ghana	1979	2	1
Ghana	1981	1	1

Country	Year	Attempts	Successes
Ghana	1982	1	0
Ghana	1983	1	0
Ghana	1984	1	0
Guinea	1984	1	1
Guinea	1985	1	0
Guinea	1996	1	0
Guinea	2008	1	1
Guinea	2011	1	0
Guinea-Bissau	1980	1	1
Guinea-Bissau	1993	1	0
Guinea-Bissau	1998	1	0
Guinea-Bissau	1999	1	1
Guinea-Bissau	2000	1	0
Guinea-Bissau	2003	1	1
Guinea-Bissau	2008	1	0
Guinea-Bissau	2009	1	1
Guinea-Bissau	2010	1	0
Guinea-Bissau	2011	1	0
Guinea-Bissau	2012	2	1
Kenya	1982	1	0
Lesotho	1986	1	1
Lesotho	1991	2	1
Lesotho	1994	1	1
Lesotho	2014	1	0
Liberia	1980	1	1
Liberia	1985	2	0
Liberia	1994	1	0
Libya	1969	1	1
Libya	1993	1	0
Madagascar	1972	1	1
Madagascar	1974	1	0
Madagascar	1975	1	0
Madagascar	2006	1	0
Madagascar	2009	1	1
Madagascar	2010	1	0
Mali	1968	1	1
Mali	1991	1	1
Mali	2012	2	1
Mauritania	1978	1	1
Mauritania	1979	1	1
Mauritania	1980	1	1
Mauritania	1981	1	0
Mauritania	1984	1	1
Mauritania	2003	1	0
Mauritania	2005	1	1
Mauritania	2008	1	1
Morocco	1971	1	0

Country	Year	Attempts	Successes
Morocco	1972	1	0
Mozambique	1975	1	0
Niger	1974	1	1
Niger	1976	1	0
Niger	1983	1	0
Niger	1996	1	1
Niger	1999	1	1
Niger	2010	1	1
Nigeria	1966	2	2
Nigeria	1975	1	1
Nigeria	1976	1	0
Nigeria	1983	1	1
Nigeria	1985	1	1
Nigeria	1990	1	0
Nigeria	1993	1	1
Rwanda	1973	1	1
Rwanda	1994	1	1
São Tomé and Príncipe	1995	1	0
São Tomé and Príncipe	2003	1	1
Sierra Leone	1967	2	1
Sierra Leone	1968	1	1
Sierra Leone	1971	1	0
Sierra Leone	1987	1	0
Sierra Leone	1992	2	1
Sierra Leone	1995	1	0
Sierra Leone	1996	2	1
Sierra Leone	1997	1	1
Sierra Leone	2000	1	0
Sierra Leone	2003	1	0
Somalia	1961	1	0
Somalia	1969	1	1
Somalia	1978	1	0
Sudan	1958	1	1
Sudan	1959	3	0
Sudan	1966	1	0
Sudan	1969	1	1
Sudan	1971	1	0
Sudan	1975	1	0
Sudan	1976	1	0
Sudan	1977	1	0
Sudan	1978	1	0
Sudan	1983	1	0
Sudan	1985	1	1
Sudan	1989	1	1
Sudan	1990	1	0
Swaziland	1984	1	0
Togo	1963	1	1

Country	Year	Attempts	Successes
Togo	1967	1	1
Togo	1991	5	0
Togo	2005	1	1
Uganda	1971	2	1
Uganda	1974	2	0
Uganda	1975	2	0
Uganda	1976	2	0
Uganda	1977	1	0
Uganda	1980	1	1
Uganda	1985	1	1
Uganda	1988	1	0
Zambia	1980	1	0
Zambia	1990	1	0
Zambia	1997	1	0
Zimbabwe	1982	1	0
Total		225	98

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Appendix C

Ethnicity and the Military Data

C.1   Loyalty Choice at Decolonization

If the first head of state purposefully recruited officers and/or created a presidential guard from members of his own ethnic group—and, in some cases, their known allies—then loyalty choice was coded as *Ethnic*. On the other hand, if the first leader recruited officers from a diverse cross-section of society, then I coded loyalty choice as non-ethnic or *Inclusive*. If the initial leader left the military in foreign hands, as was occasionally the case, then loyalty choice is coded according to the decisions of the first leader who did control the military and its recruitment practices. In two cases, the first leader changed practices several years after independence: Mwambutsa of Burundi began stacking the military with fellow Tutsi after a failed coup attempt less than three years after independence and Nkrumah of Ghana began ethnically manipulating the military after two assassination attempts against his life in 1963. Both are coded according to their initial loyalty choice.

Algeria: The first leader after independence, Ben Khedda, only lasted six months. He was then replaced by Ben Bella, who ruled for another three years. Both leaders identified as Arab and under both leaders Berbers were excluded from the national army. The FLN, which has controlled the government since independence, has virtually excluded Berbers from high ranking positions within both the party and government (Metz 1994a; Minoritites at Risk 2009; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009).

    Ethnic Stacking: yes
    Regional Stacking: no

Angola: The first leader after independence, Neto, was of Mestiço descent. His MPLA government recruited military personal from across all ethnic groups (Minority Rights Group 2010).

    Ethnic Stacking: no
    Regional Stacking: no

Benin: Benin's first leader, Maga, was of mixed Bariba/Mossi ethnicity and regionally from the north of the country. The majority of the officers in the colonial military he inherited were northern Fon. Maga increased this recruitment of Northern officers and packed the paramilitary gendarmerie with coethnic northern Bariba (Decalo 1973, 458;

<div align="center">84</div>

Horowitz 1985, 451 & 456).

Ethnic Stacking: yes
Regional Stacking: yes

Botswana: Seretse Khama was from the Tswana ethnic group. No attempts were made by him or any other leader to manipulate the Botswana police or defense forces and their leadership hierarchies on the basis of kin, tribe, or ethnicity (N'Diaye 2006).

Ethnic Stacking: no
Regional Stacking: no

Burkina Faso: No evidence was found that Burkina Faso's first leader, Yameogo, engaged in ethnic stacking or excluded ethnic groups from the officer corps. The Mossi formed an overall majority but that was reflective of their majority in the population writ large (Brittain 1985; Williamson 2013).

Ethnic Stacking: no
Regional Stacking: no

Burundi: Before departing, the Belgian colonizers began diversifying the army, allowing Hutus to enlist in the rank-and-file and training a non-insignificant number of Hutu officers and incorporating them into the military hierarchy. This did not change under Mwambutsa, even though he was Tutsi. Only after Hutu military officers staged the 1965 failed coup attempt, did ethnic stacking begin. This led to the mass execution of Hutu political and military leaders. By 1966 the army was predominantly but not yet wholly Tutsi (Keegan 1983, 90; Keesings 1965; Loft and Loft 1988, 91; Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000, 375).

Ethnic Stacking: no
Regional Stacking: no

Cameroon: During and immediately following decolonization, Ahidjo disproportionately recruited fellow northern, Muslim Fulani and Peuhl into both the army and an elite paramilitary republican guard (Delancey 1987, 17; Minorities at Risk 2009.).

Ethnic Stacking: yes
Regional Stacking: yes

Cape Verde: The population of Cape Verde is homogeneously creole/mestiço after a long history of intermixing as was their first president, Pires. There was thus no possibility of ethnic stacking (Meyns 2002, 159).

Ethnic Stacking: no
Regional Stacking: no

Central African Republic: Suspicious of the army, Dacko established both a 120-man presidential guard and a 500-man paramilitary gendarmerie independent of its command structure (Rupiya 2015, 123).

Ethnic Stacking: ?
Regional Stacking: ?

Chad: Under Tombalbaye, the Security forces were primarily recruited from the south, especially from the Sara (Keegan 1983, 102-104).

Ethnic Stacking: yes
Regional Stacking: yes

Comoros:

Ethnic Stacking: ?
Regional Stacking: ?

Congo-Brazzaville: Although the first president, Youlou hailed from the Lari ethnic group, the M'Boshi dominated the army during his three years of rule. He thus did not stack the army (Minority Rights Group 2010).

Ethnic Stacking: no
Regional Stacking: no

Côte d'Ivoire: Houphouet-Boigny was of Baoule ethnicity and, under his rule, the Presidential Guard as well as the government in general were dominated by Baoule. As the Baoule are regionally concentrated, ethnic stacking here entails regional stacking as well (N'Diaye 2001).

Ethnic Stacking: yes
Regional Stacking: yes

DRC: The DRC's first leader, Lumumba, was of the Tetela ethnic group but only lasted three months in office. The second leader, Mobutu, was of the Ngbandi and only lasted six days in office. During this time, the miltiary was left under Belgian control and there were indeed no African officers yet, which sparked the mutinies of August 1960 which disintegrated the national army (Young 1965).

Ethnic Stacking: no
Regional Stacking: no

Djibouti: Gouled Aptidon, an Issa, forced many Afar out of the army in the 70s and his government was generally dominated by Issa. None of the various peace agreements with the Afar rebels have ever included military integration (Bollee 2003; Metelits and Matti 2013, footnote 4; Minority Rights Group 2010).

Ethnic Stacking: yes
Regional Stacking: ?

Egypt: Officer recruitment operated on a class rather than ethnic basis with admission to the Egyptian Military Academy limited to the aristocracy until 1936, when the sons of

middle-class families were allowed to enter (Keegan 1983, 162-173).

Ethnic Stacking: no
Regional Stacking: no

Equatorial Guinea: The first president, Macias Nguema, eventually replaced all military officers with kinsmen from his own Esangui clan of the Fang. He installed Fang and family members in most key political positions as well (Keesings 1979; Minority Rights Group 2010).

Ethnic Stacking: yes
Regional Stacking: ?

Eritrea: Tigrinya are dominant in the population and political, economic, and military power, as the capital Asmara is firmly planted in Tigrinya territory. President Afwerki (and commander-in-chief of the ELF) is Tigrinya (since 1993), as well as Minister of Defense Sephat Ephrem (since 1995). There is little space between civil society and military apparatuses. Tigrinya and Tigre both come from similar Semitic linguistic origins and share many features of commonality, so they often share aspects of power. Nonetheless, Edmond Keller suggests that all nine ethnic groups are represented in the leadership and rank-and-file of the EPLF and thus likely its ELF successor, affirming a central Eritrean identity in opposition to Ethiopians rather than each other. The Kunama were not always drafted in the EPLF resistance due to alleged pro-Ethiopian standpoints, but they represent a small minority group spanned across the new border and have been drafted into the militarys multi-ethnic scheme since. The self-reliance of Eritrean nationalists pre-independence lent to a militarization of Eritrean society. A constitutional demand of conscription followed, requiring 18 month minimum service from young people which often expands far beyond those limits to an average of 6.5 years and expanding into forced labor or even slavery disrupting the 80% agrarian economy. The military and the state were organized to minimize ethnic separation and ensure that multiethnic troops would cohabitate and cooperate peacefully. No evidence of deliberate ethnic stacking in any of the sources (Keller 1993; Maphunye 2015; Ottaway 1998; Tronvoll 1999; Warner 2011).

Ethnic Stacking: no
Regional Stacking: no

Ethiopia: In Haile Selasies time, officers were recruited from volunteers amongst the landowning class, without regard for ethnic or regional origins. Nonetheless, Amharas constituted a disproportionate percentage of the officer corps (Keegan 1983, 175-180).

Ethnic Stacking: no
Regional Stacking: no

Gabon: At the end of Mba's four year reign, the officer corps was still primarily French as he did not pursue Africanization. But Mba favored the Gendarmerie with its Estuary Fang and Myene members over the Army and its heavy Moleu Ntem Fang composition (Decalo 1998, 133).

Ethnic Stacking: yes

Regional Stacking: ?

Gambia: Jawara's rule has been described as a 'sembocracy,' highlighting the favoritism toward the Mandinka ethnic group. Gambia did not build an army when it first gained independence but later did after an attempted police coup in 1981. Without military forces, for over a decade after independence, neither ethnic stacking nor inclusive recruitment could occur (Loum 2002, 169; Perfect 2008, 429; Saine 2008, 60-61).

Ethnic Stacking: na
Regional Stacking: na

Ghana: Nkrumah believed that a military organization was not truly national if it was plagued by ethnic divisions and sought to reduce the significant ethnic imbalances in the composition of the forces inherited from the British. Yet, after two assassination attempts, beginning in 1963, he also ethnically manipulated the army: appointing 2 or more officers of different ethnicities to command positions with overlapping responsibilities; placing northern rank-and-file units under the control of southern officers and vice versa; filling different branches and organizations of the security sector with different ethnic groups and setting them against each other. He also stacked the counter-intelligence unit with coethnics at the very end of his rule. As these manipulations began 6-7 years after independence, the initial loyalty chocie is coded as inclusive (Adekson 1976, 251-266; Boahen 1988, 209; Hutchful 2003, 80).

Ethnic Stacking: no
Regional Stacking: no

Guinea: Touré's political party refused to publicly acknowledge ethnic identity, promoted ethnic inclusiveness, and drew support broadly across ethnic lines. No evidence of ethnic stacking in any of the sources (Adekson 1979; Horowitz 1985; Kaba 1988, 239; Keegan 1983, 241-242; Schmidt 2005, 10 & 167; Minority Rights Groups 2010.).

Ethnic Stacking: no
Regional Stacking: no

Guinea-Bissau: The military has been Balanta dominated from before independence and seems to remain so regardless of the leader, even when they try to impose some diversity. The first President, Luis Cabral, was of Mestiço descent, born to parents originally from Cape Verde(*The Guardian* 2009; Minority Rights Group 2010).

Ethnic Stacking: no
Regional Stacking: no

Kenya: Jomo Kenyatta, from the Kikuyu ethnic group, turned the General Service Unit into an all-Kikuyu force and then purged non-Kikuyu military officers. Kenyatta also made sure Kikuyu were well represented in the army officer corps, beginning in the 70s;, and that the majority of air force personnel were Kikuyu and Luo. The Kikuyu are regionally concentrated in central province and thus ethnic stacking also entails regional stacking (Keegan 1983, 336-337; N'Diaye 2001, 123).

Ethnic Stacking: yes
Regional Stacking: yes

Lesotho: Lesotho is an ethnically homogenous country and there was thus no possibility of ethnic stacking.

Ethnic Stacking: no
Regional Stacking: no

Liberia: Under Tubman, who ruled as President from 1944-1971, the officer corps was almost entirely coethnic Americo-Liberians. In the True Whig Party era, officers were Americo-Liberians or, rarely, hinterland elites cooperating with the political system (Ellis 1995, 176; Keegan 1983, 364-365; Okolo 1981, 152).

Ethnic Stacking: yes
Regional Stacking: ?

Libya: King Idris, who ruled from 1951-1969, kept often ill-qualified fellow Cyrenaican officers owing him personal loyalty in all important command positions and organized the force along regional and tribal lines with Cyrenaican Bedouin forces deployed in politically important areas, including Tripoli. The Cyrenaican Defense Force was recruited exclusively from those tribes ruled by the Sanusi clan (Keegan 1983, 366-375).

Ethnic Stacking: yes
Regional Stacking: yes

Madagascar: Madagascar's first president, Tsiranana (of Tsimihety/Côtier descent), tried to offset historic Merina domination of the armed forces by sending promising côtiers to France for officer training and then assigning them to important positions. He never succeeding in ending Merina superior numbers (Metz 1994b).

Ethnic Stacking: no
Regional Stacking: no

Malawi: President Banda, an ethnic Chewa, often placed Lomwe in senior positions in the security forces because they were widely viewed as a neutral group due to their "immigrant" status. During his rule, the commanding officer hierarchy was largely Chewa/Lomwe and Yao and muslim recruits were actively discouraged. Few northerners attained senior rank in either the army or the police. Operational command of the troops was kept in Chewa and Lomwe hands. Regional divisions are important in Malawi and northerners were discriminated against (Decalo 1998, 55, 79-88).

Ethnic Stacking: yes
Regional Stacking: yes

Mali: No mention of ethnically-based military recruitment practices in any of the sources for post-independence Mali. The first leader, Keita, was from the Malinké (Bennett 1975; Clark 2000; Dickovick 2008; Imperato 1996; Keegan 1983, 386-387; Minority Rights Group 2010; Minorities at Risk 2009).

Ethnic Stacking: no
Regional Stacking: no

Mauritania: Under Daddah, who was ethnically Maure, enlisted men were recruited across all ethnic groups, but officers were still recruited primarily from the northern Maures. Indeed, the Maures dominated the officer corps (Handloff 1990; Keegan 1983, 389-392; Minority rights Group 2010).

Ethnic Stacking: yes
Regional Stacking: yes

Mauritius: Mauritius has never had a standing army. Recruitment into the police under the first president, Ramgoolam (Hindu), as well as later leaders was by voluntary enlistment across all ethnic groups. Police officers serve rotations through the SMF/GSU paramilitary unit (Keegan 1983, 393; Metz 1994c).

Ethnic Stacking: no
Regional Stacking: no

Morocco: The restored monarchy of Mohammed V, of the Arab/Alawite dynasty, continued historic military recruitment patterns, drawing most of its members from the Berbers of Saharan Morocco (the Tafilalet) in the far South and repaying their loyalty by giving their tribal leadership access to high office and almost exclusive control over the military hierarchy. While this is an ethnically based recruitment policy, it does not focus on members of the leader's own ethnic group and is thus a different practice than coethnic stacking (Horowitz 1985, 449; Keegan 1983, 399-406).

Ethnic Stacking: no
Regional Stacking: no

Mozambique: Machel (Shangaan), the first President, was motivated by a non-tribal and non-racial nationalism. At independence, no structural changes were proposed for the guerrilla army, which had been recruited heavily from both the exile community in Tanzania and from the northern tribes of Mozambique, especially the Makonde (Chabal and Birmingham 2002, 207; Seegers 1986, 59).

Ethnic Stacking: no
Regional Stacking: no

Namibia: The national army under Nujoma, who was ethnically Ovambo, was created by integrating SWAPO forces, who were largely Ovambo, with the ethnic battalions of the SWATF, which included many non-Ovambo (Leys and Saul 1995, 58; Preston 1997).

Ethnic Stacking: no
Regional Stacking: no

Niger: The core of the army had always been dominated by Djerma (a subgroup of Songhai), at least prior to Mainassara's coup in 1996. Under Diori, also ethnically Djerma, the

army was comprised mainly of Djerma/Songhai, including in the officer coups (at least 70%). Dioris Presidential guard was composed of Tauregs (Decalo 1989, 563; Horowitz 1985, 546; Ibrahim 1994, 24-25; Vogt 2007, 26).

Ethnic Stacking: yes
Regional Stacking: ?

Nigeria: The first president, Balewa, who ruled from 1960-66, came from the north and was of mixed Gere and Fulani descent. At the time of decolonization, over 60% of the officer corps was southern and less than 20% northern, with the remainder coming from the highly diverse middle belt region. Nigeria adopted an ethnic quota system of military recruitment upon independence. The colonial officer corps had been dominated by Ibo and, in 1965, half of the officer corps was still Ibo (Adeakin 2015, 57; Adekson 1976, 254; Amadife 1999, 623; Dunmar 2002, 19; Horowitz 1985, 451).

Ethnic Stacking: no
Regional Stacking: no

Rwanda: The first president, Kayibanda, was ethnically Hutu. The departing Belgian colonial officials chose to recruit 100% Hutus into both the new officer corps and the existing rank-and-file. Kayibanda's regime, under a radical anti-Tutsi political party, was widely viewed as pro-Hutu and Kayibanda favored his own region of Gitarama (Léfevre and Léfevre 2006, 11-12; Newbury 1998, 9 & 16; Plaut 1994, 150).

Ethnic Stacking: yes
Regional Stacking: yes

São Tomé and Príncipe: No evidence found of ethnic preference in the military. Largely a Creole/Mestiço society without significant ethnic divisions (Chabal and Birmingham 2002; Keegan 1983, 501; Pham 2016; Porto 2003).

Ethnic Stacking: no
Regional Stacking: no

Senegal: Senegal's independence leader and long-serving first president, Léopold Senghor (Serer), believed wholeheartedly that inclusion and protection of the country's diverse ethnic and tribal communities was central to building strong institutions and a sense of nationalism. He thus recruited soldiers and officers broadly across ethnic communities, a tradition that was upheld by subsequent leaders. No evidence found of ethnic stacking under any leader (Cissé 2015; Diop and Paye 1998, 319; Keegan 1983, 514-515; Markowitz 1969, 111-113; Minority Rights Group 2010; Minorities at Risk 2009; Nelson 1974, 340).

Ethnic Stacking: no
Regional Stacking: no

Seychelles: The army was first organized in 1977; before that there was only a police force. Seychelles is a nearly homogenous creole/mestiço society and thus there is no possibility of ethnic stacking (Keegan 1983, 516; Minority Rights Group 2010).

Ethnic Stacking: no
Regional Stacking: no

Sierra Leone: Sierra Leone's first president, Milton Margai (Mende), left the military in British hands and did not make decisions over military loyalty nor did he Africanize the officer corps. Thus a loyalty decision was not made at this time. Upon his death in 1964, after three years of rule, Sir Albert Margai (Mende) took over the presidency and immediately began restructuring the military. Albert doubled Mende representation in the officer corps to over 50%. In 1965, a Mende force commander was appointed (Lansana) and a local training academy established, opening the door to full ethnic stacking. Albert also stacked the civilian side of the government with Mende. Additionally, Lansana selected a group of junior officers and NCOs, all of Mende identity and trained by Israeli security experts, to serve as a personal guard for himself and Prime Minister Margai (British National Archives, FCO 38/29, Document 66; British National Archives, FCO 38/34, Document 42; Cox 1976, 74-75; Minority Rights Group 2010).

Ethnic Stacking: yes
Regional Stacking: ?

Somalia: After independence, under Osman Daar (Hawiye), fellow Hawiye dominated the top ranks of the army. As clans are regionally concentrated in Somalia, ethnic stacking also entails regional stacking (Lewis, 2008, 33; Minority Rights Group 2010).

Ethnic Stacking: yes
Regional Stacking: yes

South Africa: South Africa is coded during the transition to majority rule in the mid-1990s. There was a major military integration program in the run-up to the transition which built a new, racially integrated national army out of the old South African Defense Forces as well as the military wings of the ANC (largely Xhosa) and Inkatha Freedom Party (Zulu) and some of the home guard forces in the tribal reserves. There is no evidence that Mandela or subsequent leaders have attempted to push either whites or zulus or anyone else out of the military (Cawthra 2003; Minority Rights Group 2010).

Ethnic Stacking: no
Regional Stacking: no

Sudan: General Abboud (Arabic/Jellaba) continues the British tradition of recruiting a Jellaba officer corps. After the Equatoria Corps mutiny in 1955, southern recruitment is temporarily suspended. It resumes in 1956, but southerners then serve under northern officers only in the north (Flint and de Waal 2008; Metz 1992; Kok 1996).

Ethnic Stacking: yes
Regional Stacking: yes

Swaziland: Swaziland is an ethnically homogenous country and there was thus no possibility of ethnic stacking (Keegan 1983, 547).

Ethnic Stacking: no

Regional Stacking: no

Tanzania: Nyerere (Zanaki) believed in the harmony of all tribes and recruited officers and rank-and-file diversely, both across tribes and across socio-economic classes. No preference was given to any group and a merit-based recruitment and promotion system was established (Lupogo 2001; Minority Rights Group 2010; and Minorities at Risk 2009).

Ethnic Stacking: no
Regional Stacking: no

Togo: At independence, the single company of the army was dominated by Kabré and other northerners. While this northern majority characterized the rank-and-file, the majority of officers were of Ewe or Mina decent from the South (at least until 1963). When Olympio refused to integrate a group of French trained northern soldiers into the army, he was overthrown in a coup (Keegan 1983, 581-582; Michel 1988, 318; Minorities at Risk 2009).

Ethnic Stacking: yes
Regional Stacking: yes

Tunisia: The core of the army is made up of 6000 long-service regulars, including the majority of the officer corps and NCOs, who are recruited by voluntary enlistment. No evidence of ethnic stacking in any of the sources under Bourgiba or subsequent leaders (Keegan 1983, 584-588; Minority Rights Group 2010).

Ethnic Stacking: no
Regional Stacking: no

Uganda: After ousting President Mutesa (Baganda), Prime Minister Obote (Langi) dismissed 25 Baganda officers and increased recruitment from the North. After the two assassination attempts on his life, and with growing suspicion of his protégé Idi Amin, Obote then begins recruiting more Acholi and Langi into the military in order to counter the larger number of troops from Amin's home district (West Nile). Obote also recruited the General Service Unit from his own Akororo district. Amin claimed that, prior to his coup, a secret meeting was held between the Minister of the Interior, the Army Chief-of-Staff, the Inspector-General of the Police, and other senior officers in which it was decided that the army would be taken over by troops from the Langi and Acholi tribes (who already constituted 75% of the army). These troops would be used to disarm all other officers and enlisted men (Byrnes 1992; Horowitz 1985, 455 & 466; Keesings 1971; Minorities at Risk 2009).

Ethnic Stacking: yes
Regional Stacking: yes

Zambia: Under President Kuanda (Bemba), who governed from 1964-1991, no particular ethnic group predominated within the security forces and the Bemba may even have been under-represented. The post-independence government also abolished all racial and ethnic discrimination in recruitment practices, including into the officer corps (Haantobolo 2008, 136-137; Keegan 1983, 679-680; Minority Rights Group 2010; and Minorities at Risk 2009).

Ethnic Stacking: no
Regional Stacking: no

Zimbabwe: Zimbabwe is coded at the transition to majority rule, which occurred in 1980. On transition to majority rule, the apartheid era army and the two rebel groups, ZANLA drawn mainly from the Shona and ZIPRA drawn mainly from the Ndebele, were integrated. In 1980, however, President Mugabe (Shona) created an almost entirely Shona specialist brigade (the 5th Brigade) which was then sent to Matabeleland in 1982-83 to "deal" with Ndebele dissidents and was accused of massive human rights violations. Subsequently, in 1982, several hundred former ZIPRA members deserted the new national army and their former leader, Nkomo, was dismissed and then General Lookout Masuku and several other senior ZIPRA officers serving in the national army were arrested (Keegan 1983, 681-684; Keesings 1982; Minorities at Risk 2009; Snyder 1986, 134).

Ethnic Stacking: yes
Regional Stacking: ?

C.2 Ethnic Matching and the Diversity of the Late Colonial Officer Corps

The variables *Ethnically unmatched* and *Regionally unmatched* build on codings of both the ethnic/regional heterogeneity of the late colonial officer corps and the ethnic/regional identity of the independence era leader. If, at the time of decolonization, the military was diverse or it was dominated by a particular group (or groups) that did not match the ethnicity/region of the new leader, then the variable is coded as 1, and 0 otherwise. If there was no pre-existing officer corps, then there was no one to rebel against its restructuring along ethnic lines. Since this situation entails the same theoretical prediction (i.e., no rebellion), it is also coded as 0. The narratives below establish the diversity or ethnic dominance of the late colonial officer corps as well as the ethnicity of the independence leader. A comparison of these leads to a final coding decision on the *Ethnically matched* and *Regionally matched* variables.

Algeria: As the new Algerian national army grew out of the anti-colonial resistance organization, this organization is coded rather than the colonial army. In 1957, a brutal French counter-insurgency campaign broke down the organization of the Armeé de Liberation Nationale (ALN). While the leadership fled to Tunisia, autonomous guerrilla units were left operating under local commanders inside Algeria. These units had a strong Berber component. Regular ALN units were also formed in exile in Tunisia and Morocco. The military units inherited at independence combined units from the internal and external armies as well as the French colonial army. The first leader after independence, Ben Khedda, only lasted six months. He was then replaced by Ben Bella, who ruled for another three years. Both leaders identified as Arab (Metz 1994a; Minorities at Risk 2009).

Diversity of late colonial officer corps: mixed Arab and Berber
Ethnicity of independence leader: Arab

Ethnically unmatched: yes
Regionally unmatched: ?

Angola: The MPLA took over governance with the withdrawal of the Portuguese, after emerging victorious from a three sided civil war. Since they had waged a guerrilla campaign for independence, the new national army grew out of their organization and thus the MPLA anti-colonial army is taken as the basis for coding. The MPLA leadership structure was largely mestizo and assimilado, with strong Mbundu support and also support from smaller ethnic groups in the east and the south. Because of their guerrilla structure, the political and military leadership largely overlapped. The first President, Neto, was of Mestiço descent (Minority Rights Group 2010).

Diversity of late colonial officer corps: Mestiço/Assimilado
Ethnicity of independence leader: Mestiço
Ethnically unmatched: no
Regionally unmatched: no

Benin: Northerners were favored in colonial military recruitment and the majority of officers were Fon as they were considered both martial and had educational advantages Benin's first leader, Maga, was of mixed Bariba/Mossi ethnicity and regionally from the north of the country (Horowitz 1985, 449 & 451).

Diversity of late colonial officer corps: northern and Fon dominated
Ethnicity of independence leader: Bariba/Mossi (Northern)
Ethnically unmatched: yes
Regionally unmatched: no

Botswana: Botswana did not have any colonial military units. The first class of officers, consisted of 17 men, were trained at Sandhurst in the mid-1970s. Seretse Khama, the first President, was Tswana (N'Diaye 2001; N'Diaye 2006).

Diversity of late colonial officer corps: no African officers
Ethnicity of independence leader: Tswana
Ethnically unmatched: no
Regionally unmatched: no

Burkina Faso: The Mossi were singled out for colonial military service and came to dominate the colonial army. The first president, Yameogo was Mossi (Adekson 1979, 160; Keegan 1983, 641-642).

Diversity of late colonial officer corps: Mossi dominated
Ethnicity of independence leader: Mossi
Ethnically unmatched: no
Regionally unmatched: no

Burundi: Before departing, the Belgian colonizers began diversifying the army, allowing Hutus to enlist in the rank-and-file and training a non-insignificant number of Hutu officers and incorporating them into the military hierarchy. The first president, Mwambutsa was Tutsi (Keegan 1983, 90; Loft and Loft 1988, 91; Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000, 375).

Diversity of late colonial officer corps: included both Hutu and Tutsi
Ethnicity of independence leader: Tutsi
***Ethnically unmatched*: yes**
Regionally unmatched: yes

Cameroon: In 1958, the French High Commissioner installed Ahmadou Ahidjo and his northern Fulani/Peuhl-based political party in power. In the same year, France also devolved significant powers to native governments across Africa, including the construction of national armies. Although Cameroonian troops had previously long served within the regional French Equatorial Africa force, prior to this time no territorial army had existed. Moreover, the first cohort of native officers did not graduate from the newly established Yaounde cadet school until 1960-61. Ahidjo thus inherited a blank canvas from which to construct an officer corps while also benefitting from continued French protection. He chose to recruit these new officers extensively from the north, particularly from his own ethnic Peuhl group as well as from the allied Fulani (Atangana 2010, 74; British National Archives WO 208/4386 71A & 80A; Minorities at Risk 2009; Minority Rights Group 2010).

Diversity of late colonial officer corps: northern Fulani/Peuhl dominated
Ethnicity of independence leader: northern Fulani
***Ethnically unmatched*: no**
Regionally unmatched: no

Cape Verde: The population of Cape Verde is homogeneously creole/mestiço after a long history of intermixing as was their first president, Pires. There is thus no possibility of ethnic unmatching between the military and the leadership which gives the same theoretical prediction of no rebellion, hence a coding of not being ethnically unmatched (Meyns 2002, 159).

Diversity of late colonial officer corps: all Mestiço
Ethnicity of independence leader: Mestiço
***Ethnically unmatched*: no**
Regionally unmatched: no

Central African Republic: The Central African Republic inherited a very small army of only 500 men. The only commissioned officer in 1958, just two years prior to independence, was Bokassa (M'backa). He remained the only indigenous officer upon independence, when he returned to the CAR to help the French Commander build the new national army. As of the beginning of 1960, there was also still only one officer in the entire Gendarmerie, Captain Izamo. The first President, Dacko, was also from the M'Baka ethnic group (Ammi-Oz 1977, 90; Decalo 1985, 219; Titley 1997, 23).

Diversity of late colonial officer corps: only one African officer who was M'Baka
Ethnicity of independence leader: M'Baka
***Ethnically unmatched*: no**
Regionally unmatched: no

Chad: Southerners and particularly the Sara were targeted for colonial military recruitment and were also commissioned as officers prior to independence. The first leader,

Tombalbaye was from the southern Sarah ethnic group (Adekson 1979, 160; Collelo 1990).

> *Diversity of late colonial officer corps*: Sara (southern) dominated
> *Ethnicity of independence leader*: Sara (southern)
> **Ethnically unmatched: no**
> *Regionally unmatched*: no

Comoros: The first leader, Abdallah, hailed from the island of Anjouan.

> *Diversity of late colonial officer corps*: ?
> *Ethnicity of independence leader*: Anjouan
> **Ethnically unmatched: ?**
> *Regionally unmatched*: ?

Congo-Brazzaville: The colonial military targeted northern M'Boshi, Kouyuou, and other interior ethnic groups for recruitment. The M'Boshi were over-represented in both the colonial army and the police The first leader, Youlou, was ethnically Lari from the central region. In the run-up to decolonization, France opened officer training to all candidates regardless of race or ethnicity. These cadets were drawn either from the existing NCO ranks or from a series of "boys schools" established locally in Africa to prepare the sons of veterans for military service, with preference given to the sons of those who had died in combat. Late colonial officer training would thus have likely reflected the existing M'Boshi and northern dominance of the colonial military or been more diverse. Neither case matches the ethnicity of the first leader (Crocker 1972, 477-478 & 505-507; Horowitz 1985, 449; Minority Rights Group 2010).

> *Diversity of late colonial officer corps*: northern M'Boshi dominated or diverse
> *Ethnicity of independence leader*: central Lari
> **Ethnically unmatched: yes**
> *Regionally unmatched*: yes

Côte d'Ivoire: The army was still controlled by the French at independence and only transferred to the new government a year later. It consisted of one undermanned brigade of African soldiers of the French colonial marines and command and staff positions remained in the hands of French officers. Houphouet-Boigny was ethnically Baoule (Keegan 1983, 320-321).

> *Diversity of late colonial officer corps*: little to no native officers
> *Ethnicity of independence leader*: Baoule
> **Ethnically unmatched: no**
> *Regionally unmatched*: no

DRC: No African officers were commissioned prior to independence. At the rank-and-file level, the Belgians had a deliberate policy of ethnic mixing and integration within the colonial security forces. Lumumba was ethnically Tetela (Keegan 1983, 676-678; Meditz & Merrill 1993).

> *Diversity of late colonial officer corps*: no African officers
> *Ethnicity of independence leader*: Tetela

***Ethnically unmatched*: no**
Regionally unmatched: no

Djibouti: Unwritten power sharing agreements prior to independence divided executive and legislative power between the Issas, Afars, and Arabs. Nonetheless, the first President, Gouled, forced Afar officers out of key positions in the army and security forces within a few months of independence and replaced them with Issas. Afars therefore must have had an important presence in the officer corps prior to decolonization, as did Issas. The first leader, Gouled Aptidon, was ethnically southern Issa (Minority Rights Group 2010; Schraeder 1993, 208; Shehim & Searing 1980, 221).

Diversity of late colonial officer corps: mix of Issa and Afar
Ethnicity of independence leader: southern Issa
***Ethnically unmatched*: yes**
Regionally unmatched: yes

Egypt: The British began commissioning native Egyptian officers and placing them in command and staff positions in 1918. Entrance to the military academies was restricted to the upper class until 1936, when the sons of middle-class families were permitted entry. Recruitment operated on a class rather than ethnic bases (Keegan 1983, 162-173). Nasser was Arab.

Diversity of late colonial officer corps: likely ethnically and religiously diverse
Ethnicity of independence leader: Arab
***Ethnically unmatched*: yes**
Regionally unmatched: ?

Equatorial Guinea: In 1960, the colonial military was only comprised of one battalion, which was officered mostly by Spaniards. Independence was in 1968. Even in 1969, the Guardia territorial still consisted mainly of Fang soldiers but with Spanish officers seconded to it. Macias Nguema was from the Esangui clan of the Fang (British National Archives WO 208/4386 document 2A; Minority Rights Group 2010; Steinberg & Paxton 1969, 882-884).

Diversity of late colonial officer corps: no African officers
Ethnicity of independence leader: Esangui Fang
***Ethnically unmatched*: no**
Regionally unmatched: no

Eritrea: The military forces of Eritrea developed from the rebellion forces. The original ELF drew its leadership from the Tigre and Arabic speaking clans of the coastal plain and its cities. Later, the EPLF attempted to include both Muslims and Christians and opted for a secular, Marxist-Leninist ideology. From its founding, through the large increases in membership in the 1970s, through the various purges and factional infighting, up until independence was achieved in 1991, the EPLF remained a highly heterogenous organization whose ranks and leadership drew across both Muslim and Christian communities as well as across Eritrea's various tribes and ethnic groups. Afwerki is from the Biher-Tigrinya (Minority Rights Group 2010; Woldemariam 2011, 173-211 & 221-222).

Diversity of late colonial officer corps: ethnically and religiously mixed
Ethnicity of independence leader: Biher-Tigrinya
Ethnically unmatched: yes
Regionally unmatched: yes

Ethiopia: The Ethiopian military prior to its brief colonization by Italy was run by a provincial levy system similar to European feudalism, with vertical bonds of loyalty and service centered around the king. Nobles formed the officer corps and they brought their own soldiers to the battlefield, men who personally owed them service and loyalty. In Haile Selasie's time, officers were recruited from volunteers amongst the landowning class, without regard for ethnic or regional origins. Nonetheless, the Amhara constituted a disproportionate percentage of the officer corps. Haile Selasie was also Amhara (Keegan 1983, 175-180).

Diversity of late colonial officer corps: ethnically mixed
Ethnicity of independence leader: Amhara
Ethnically unmatched: yes
Regionally unmatched: yes

Gabon: Mba inherited an army that was dominated by the Woleu Ntem Fang with a small number of African officers. Mba hailed from the Estuary Fang (Decalo 1998, 133).

Diversity of late colonial officer corps: dominated by Woleu Ntem Fang
Ethnicity of independence leader: Estuary Fang
Ethnically unmatched: yes
Regionally unmatched: yes

Gambia: Gambia contributed one company to the Royal West African Frontier Force, which was expanded to two battalions. These units were disbanded several years before independence when the entire RWAFF was disbanded and its constituent units transferred to their territories. However, Gambia chose not to retain the units. Jawara was Mandinka. (Keegan 1983, 198)

Diversity of late colonial officer corps: no African officers
Ethnicity of independence leader: Mandinka
Ethnically unmatched: no
Regionally unmatched: no

Ghana: At the end of colonialism, the Ghanaian army had 29 African officers out of 238. Only four of them were northerners. Most of the indigenous officer corps, on the other hand, were drawn from the Ga (34.6%), the Ewe (23.1%), and the Fante (15%), who collectively made up around 73% of the emergent officer corps. Nkrumah was from the small Nzima ethnic group (Adekson 1976, 253 & 258; Clayton 1989, 160).

Diversity of late colonial officer corps: predominantly Ewe, Ga, and Fante
Ethnicity of independence leader: Nzima (southwest)
Ethnically unmatched: yes
Regionally unmatched: no

Guinea: The Malinké and Peuhl were favored by the French in colonial rank-and-file recruitment. After Guinea voted for independence in the French referendum, France abruptly withdrew all of its civilian and military personnel and forces, leaving Guinea with only a couple hundred Republican Guards and what veteran officers returned to the territory from the wars in Algeria and Indochina and WWII. These officers, including Numandian Kéita, Kaman Diaby, Toya Condé, Soma Kurumah, Diara Traoré (Malinké), and Lansana Conté (Soussou). They basically trained a new national army from scratch. Touré himself was Malinké. While the ethnic identities of many of these officers could not be ascertained, there were also no reports of this group being dominated by any ethnic group. Diversity is thus assumed (Adekson 1979, 160; Camara 2000, 315; Horowitz 1985, 449; *New York Times*, July 7, 1985; Schmidt 2005, 166).

> *Diversity of late colonial officer corps*: mixed
> *Ethnicity of independence leader*: Malinké
> **Ethnically unmatched**: yes
> *Regionally unmatched*: ?

Guinea-Bissau: The struggle for independence had split Guinea-Bissau's ethnic groups into opposing camps, with the rebel army recruiting primarily from the Balanta, while the Fula and Mandinga joined the Portuguese colonial army. This led to a Balanta dominated military upon independence, as it was drawn from the rebel forces. The first President, Cabral, was Mestiço (Keegan 1983, 239-240; Minority Rights Group 2010).

> *Diversity of late colonial officer corps*: Balanta
> *Ethnicity of independence leader*: Mestiço
> **Ethnically unmatched**: yes
> *Regionally unmatched*: ?

Kenya: The British belief in martial races led to recruitment according to ethnic quotas, mostly from the Kamba and Kalenjin/Nandi. During WWII, necessity broadened recruitment to include even the Kikuyu who had historically been believed to be too politically unreliable, educated, and non-martial to serve. After the war, however, only the Kamba veterans reenlisted in the peacetime KAR in large numbers. Just prior to independence, the Maasai lobbied for greater enlistment into the police and security forces and then joined in significant numbers for the first time. The 1959 ethnic breakdown of the colonial military was 36.3% Kamba, 25.8% Kalenjin, 11.6%, Somali & other northern pastoralists, 9.7& Luo, 5.3% Luhya, 3.6% Samburu, 3.3% Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru, and 4.4% other groups. The British commissioned officers from the rank-and-file, leading to an ethnic congruence between the officer corps and the rank-and-file. And in 1956, because of the Mau Mau uprising, the Kikuyu were barred wholesale from officer training. Kenyatta was Kikuyu (Horowitz 1985, 451; Keegan 1983, 336-337; Parsons 1999, 58, 91-92 & 96).

> *Diversity of late colonial officer corps*: ethnically mixed with disproportionate representation from Kamba and Kalenjin and exclusion of Kikuyu
> *Ethnicity of independence leader*: Kikuyu
> **Ethnically unmatched**: yes
> *Regionally unmatched*: ?

Lesotho: At least prior to April 1960, Lesotho had no military and no General Service

Unit. Also, the population of Lesotho is ethnically homogeneously and there is thus no possibility of ethnic unmatching between the military and the leadership. This gives the same theoretical prediction of no rebellion, hence a coding of not being ethnically unmatched. Jonathan was Basotho (British National Archives CO 1048/457, documents 5 & 6).

Diversity of late colonial officer corps: no African officers or Basotho
Ethnicity of independence leader: Basotho
Ethnically unmatched: no
Regionally unmatched: no

Liberia: Liberia is coded from the decolonization era with the diversity of the military coded from prior to the Tubman administration. The military was created in 1822 to protect newly arrived American settlers. Indigenous ethnic groups comprised the bulk of the rank-and-file but officers were drawn mainly from the coastal aristocracy of the Americo-Liberians, with some places for tribal elites and also U.S. black officers. Tubman was Americo-Liberian (Keegan 1983, 364-365; Minority Rights Group 2010).

Diversity of late colonial officer corps: dominated by Americo-Liberians
Ethnicity of independence leader: Americo-Liberian
Ethnically unmatched: no
Regionally unmatched: no

Libya: The Libyan Arab Forces (LAF), also known as the Sanusi Army, was formed in Egypt with Cyrenaican refugees at the beginning of WWII. After the war, the majority of its members were transferred to the local police force in Cyrenaica, under British Military administration. The nucleus of the new royal Libyan Army were formed from these veterans of the WWII Sanusi Army, retransferred from the police force. King Idris was Sanusi/Crenaican (Keegan 1983, 366-375; Metz 1989).

Diversity of late colonial officer corps: no African officers or Sanusi/Cyrenaican
Ethnicity of independence leader: Sanusi/Cyrenaican
Ethnically unmatched: no
Regionally unmatched: no

Madagascar: Prior to independence, some African officers were trained and commissioned. They were drawn from the Merina. Tsiranana was Tsimihety/Côtier. (Keegan 1983, 377-378).

Diversity of late colonial officer corps: Merina dominated
Ethnicity of independence leader: Tsimihety/Côtier
Ethnically unmatched: yes
Regionally unmatched: yes

Malawi: Most colonial rank-and-file military recruits were from the south, even though recruiters attempted to maintain a balance between north and south. In 1943, the ethnic breakdown was 26.7% Lomwe/Nguru, 20% Yao, 17.8% Nyanja, 15.7% Ngoni, 11.8% Chewa, 2.9% Tumbuka, 2% Tonga, 1.2% Chikunda, 0.3% Nkonde, 0.2% Wemba, and 2.3% other ethnic groups. After WWII, ethnic preferences in military recruitment were aban-

doned and recruitment drives brought in more soldiers from the north and center of the territory. Prior to independence, Malawi had belonged to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, under which its officers were primarily recruited from predominantly Rhodesian recruited Staff Corps. Upon independence, Malawi inherited one battalion, former 1 KAR. As late as the early 1960s, as independence approached, it was still being debated in the federation whether African officers should be commissioned and the lack of indigenous Malawian officers was a point of grievance in the ranks. Banda was Chewa (Decalo 1998, 88; Lovering 2002, 77, 40-43 & 155-156; Parsons 1999, 60-61 & 91).

> *Diversity of late colonial officer corps*: no African officers
> *Ethnicity of independence leader*: Chewa
> **Ethnically unmatched: no**
> *Regionally unmatched*: no

Mali: The French considered the Bambara "warlike" and thus preferentially trained them as NCOs. During Africanization of the officer corps, in the late 1950s, the French drew most candidates for officer training from the NCO ranks or from the boys' military schools, which mainly educated the sons of existing soldiers and thus were predominantly Bamabara. At least 24 such officers were trained from Mali between 1958-1961. Keita, on the other hand, was Malinké (Echenberg 1991, 63 &123).

> *Diversity of late colonial officer corps*: mostly Bambara
> *Ethnicity of independence leader*: Malinké
> **Ethnically unmatched: yes**
> *Regionally unmatched*: ?

Mauritania: Upon independence, there was a small core of native officers in the colonial military. The traditional recruiting pattern of the colonial military was to draw officers from leading families of the northern Arab-Berber (Maure) tribes and enlisted men from black peasants of the southern Rosso area near Senegal. Daddah was from the northern Maure (Handloff 1990; Keegan 1983, 389-392).

> *Diversity of late colonial officer corps*: northern Maure dominated
> *Ethnicity of independence leader*: northern Maure
> **Ethnically unmatched: no**
> *Regionally unmatched*: no

Mauritius: No military existed at independence. In the 1950s, battalions from the King's African Rifles, recruited in Tanganyka and Kenya had been providing security. Ramgoolam was Hindu (British National Archives CO 968/552, document 21; Parsons 1999, 42).

> *Diversity of late colonial officer corps*: no African officers
> *Ethnicity of independence leader*: Hindu
> **Ethnically unmatched: no**
> *Regionally unmatched*: no

Morocco: The new national army was built through the integration of the colonial military and the guerrilla forces of the Armée de Liberation Nationale. The ALN had about 10,000 members and was formed around a core of Berber tribesman who had fought in

the French Army in WWII and in Vietnam. There were 50,000 Moroccans serving with the French and Spanish colonial armies at independence. The loyalty of the army to the ruling dynasty (the Alawi Sharifs) was ensured by drawing most of its members from the Berbers of Saharan Morocco (the Tafilalet) in the far South and repaying their loyalty by giving their tribal leadership access to high office and almost exclusive control over the military hierarchy. The colonial authorities reinforced this historic pattern of recruitment and Berbers were favored heavily. King Mohammed V was from the Arab Alawite dynasty (Horowitz 1985, 449; Keegan 1983, 399-406).

> *Diversity of late colonial officer corps*: Berber dominated
> *Ethnicity of independence leader*: Arab/Alawite
> **Ethnically unmatched: yes**
> *Regionally unmatched*: yes

Mozambique: Like most former Portuguese African colonies, a guerrilla movement fought for independence and the new national army was based in that movement. Indeed, FRELIMO refused to integrate into the military the black soldiers of the Portuguese Army, who outnumbered the guerrillas by about 3-to-1. The rank-and-file of the guerrilla army had been dominated by the northern Makonde. This army had had no formal rank structure and it took until 1980 to establish a training school for officers. The chain of command during the guerrilla insurgency was very informal: the guerrilla leaders of the military regions and the local and provincial councils had considerable autonomy, which led to the development of guerrilla fiefdoms. The first leader, Machel, was Shangaan (Seegers 1986, 62-69 & 73).

> *Diversity of late colonial officer corps*: no African officers
> *Ethnicity of independence leader*: Shangaan
> **Ethnically unmatched: no**
> *Regionally unmatched*: no

Namibia: On independence, the new national army was formed by integrating the armed wing of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) with the colonial South West African Territorial Force (SWATF). The SWATF was officered by South African whites over black Namibian "ethnic battalions." SWAPO's military forces, or PLAN, were drawn from both the south and the north and yet there was still numerical preponderance of the Ovambo. Nujoma was from the Ovambo. Depending on the command structure of the PLAN forces, there was thus either no officer corps on independence or Ovambo dominance. Either way, the variables are coded as unmatched (Leys and Saul 1995, 13, 28 & 58).

> *Diversity of late colonial officer corps*: no African officers or Ovambo dominated
> *Ethnicity of independence leader*: Ovambo
> **Ethnically unmatched: no**
> *Regionally unmatched*: no

Niger: Traditionally, the colonial army recruited in the west, leading to the dominance of the Djerma-Songhai in the ranks. The army was officially transferred to the new independent government in 1961. At that time, there were only 9 African Nigerien officers: Demba Mainassara (Niamey), Bala Arabé (Maradi), Seyni Kountché (Niamey), Garba Karimou (Niamey), Idrissa Arouna (Niamey), Sory Mamadou Diallo (?), Diallo Yéro (?), Diallo

Amadou (Niamey), and Badié Garba (Dosso). The majority of these officers (at least 5 of 9) originated from the cercle, or French administrative unit, of Niamey, which is in the heart of Djerma-Songhai territory. Diori was Djerma (Idrissa and Decalo 2012, 218-219; Idrissa 2008, 63-69).

>*Diversity of late colonial officer corps*: western Djerma dominated
>*Ethnicity of independence leader*: western Djerma
>**Ethnically unmatched: no**
>*Regionally unmatched*: no

Nigeria: The first African officers were commissioned in 1948 and, in the 1950s, new Nigerian officers came mainly from the South, largely from the Igbo. Many new Igbo officers were pushed through Sandhurst just in time for independence. Moreover, only 7 of 36 officers commissioned prior to 1960 came from the north, while half were Ibo. The first leader, on the other hand, Balewa, was from the northern Gere/Fulani (Clayton 1989, 160-161; Horowitz 1985, 451).

>*Diversity of late colonial officer corps*: southern and Igbo dominated
>*Ethnicity of independence leader*: northern Gere/Fulani
>**Ethnically unmatched: yes**
>*Regionally unmatched*: yes

Rwanda: The departing Belgian colonial officials chose to recruit 100% Hutus into both the new officer corps and the existing rank-and-file. Kayibanda was Hutu (Léfevre and Léfevre 2006, 11-12; Newbury 1998, 9 & 16; Plaut 1994, 150).

>*Diversity of late colonial officer corps*: exclusively Hutu
>*Ethnicity of independence leader*: Hutu
>**Ethnically unmatched: no**
>*Regionally unmatched*: no

São Tomé and Príncipe: A Creole/Mestiço society without significant ethnic divisions, there is no possibility of an ethnically mismatch between civilian leadership and the military officer corps.

>*Diversity of late colonial officer corps*: no African officers or Creole/Mestiço
>*Ethnicity of independence leader*: Creole/Mestiço
>**Ethnically unmatched: no**
>*Regionally unmatched*: no

Senegal: The French trained some African officers from Senegal as early as the 1880s. The backbone of the French West African colonial army came from Senegal, including most of the NCOs and a few commissioned officers. Archival documents, including extensive military recruitment lists, indicate that soldiers were being drawn from across the entire territory. Officer promotion and transfer also contain a diversity of ethnic names. Echenbergs study does not reveal ethnic recruitment bias within the territory of Senegal itself. Senghor was Serer (Echenberg 1991, 19-20; Fonds Sênêgal Colonial 11D1 various military recruitment lists; Fonds Sênêgal Colonial 11D1/0213, Garde Républicaine Personnel, 1959-1963; Snyder 1986, 128).

Diversity of late colonial officer corps: officers drawn across groups
Ethnicity of independence leader: Serer
Ethnically unmatched: yes
Regionally unmatched: ?

Seychelles: Seychelles is a nearly homogenous creole/mestiço society and thus there is no possibility of an ethnic mismatch between the civilian and military leadership. Prior to independence, there was also no military, just a small police force. Mancham was Creole/Mestiço (Metz 1994d).

Diversity of late colonial officer corps: no African officers
Ethnicity of independence leader: Creole/Mestiço
Ethnically unmatched: no
Regionally unmatched: no

Sierra Leone: There had long been an official policy of tribal balance amongst the rank-and-file in the colonial military, although recruitment difficulties outside the south had led to some concern about Mende overrepresentation. This meant that there was an ethnically diverse pool of NCOs from which to draw potential officers as Africanization of the officer corps began. Such Africanization had progressed extremely slowly, mostly due to Sir Milton Margai's fervent gradualism. At the time of independence, there were only six African officers out of 60. In April of 1964, the closest point of available data prior to the start of Albert Margai's military restructuring, there were still only a total of 34 African officers: 26% of whom were Mende, 12% Temne, and the remaining 64% were drawn from other tribes, mostly from the Muslim north. Both Milton and Albert Margai were Mende (Cole 2013, 159 & 165; Cox 1976, 54).

Diversity of late colonial officer corps: mix of tribes but mostly northern Muslim
Ethnicity of independence leader: Mende
Ethnically unmatched: yes
Regionally unmatched: yes

Somalia: The colonial forces produced the senior officers and commanders who led the police and army after independence. Both the Italians and the British favored the Darood clan in their colonial military recruitment. Osman Daar, the first president, was from the Hawiye clan (Horowitz 1985, 448; Metz 1993; Minority Rights Group 2010).

Diversity of late colonial officer corps: Darood favored
Ethnicity of independence leader: Hawiye
Ethnically unmatched: yes
Regionally unmatched: yes

South Africa: Prior to the transition to majority rule, under apartheid rule, the South African Defense Forces were entirely officered by whites. However, in the run-up to the transition, there was a major military integration program that built a new national army out of the SADF as well as the military wings of the ANC (largely Xhosa) and Inkatha Freedom Party (Zulu) and some of the home guard forces in the tribal reserves. When Mandela (Xhosa) took power, therefore, diversity had already been structured into the

armed forces (Cawthra 2003; Minority Rights Group 2010).

> *Diversity of late colonial officer corps*: racially and ethnically diverse
> *Ethnicity of independence leader*: Xhosa
> **Ethnically unmatched: yes**
> *Regionally unmatched*: yes

Sudan: Of the Sudanese Arabs, the northern ruling elite have come predominantly from three Arab tribes who live along the Nile north of the capital Khartoum—the Shaygia, Jaaliyeen and Danagla—collectively known in the modern Sudanese political discourse as the Jellaba. Despite representing only between 5-6% of the population, the vast majority of government positions have been held by these three groups since independence. Before World War II, the British developed an officer class among the educated Sudanese, primarily from influential northern (predominantly Jellaba) families. Leading up to independence in 1956, the northern Sudanese gradually assumed more control over the Sudan Defence Force (SDF). The SDF Equatoria Corps—Sudan's southern, predominantly 'African'/non-Muslim military division—remained almost entirely made up of southern enlisted men, but commanded by the British and Arabic Sudanese. In 1955, the Equatoria Corps mutinies and begins fighting for an autonomous South Sudan. Recruitment in the south is halted as a result. General Abboud was northern Muslim Jellaba (Abdel-Rahim 1978; Metz 1992; Sharkey 2008).

> *Diversity of late colonial officer corps*: northern Muslim Jellaba dominated
> *Ethnicity of independence leader*: northern Muslim Jellaba
> **Ethnically unmatched: no**
> *Regionally unmatched*: no

Swaziland: Swaziland is an ethnically homogenous country and there was thus no possibility of an ethnic mismatch between military officers and the civilian leadership. King Sobhuza II was Swazi.

> *Diversity of late colonial officer corps*: Swazi
> *Ethnicity of independence leader*: Swazi
> **Ethnically unmatched: no**
> *Regionally unmatched*: no

Tanzania: On independence, Tanzania inherited two small battalions of the King's African Rifles that were mostly still officered by the British. Indeed, no Tanzanian officers, of which there were few, held any command position. After the 1964 mutiny, the army was completely disbanded and recruitment began from scratch. Nyerere was Zanaki. (Lupogo 2001, 78; Parsons 1999, 45).

> *Diversity of late colonial officer corps*: practically no African officers
> *Ethnicity of independence leader*: Zanaki
> **Ethnically unmatched: no**
> *Regionally unmatched*: no

Togo: At independence, the single company of the army was dominated by Kabré and other northerners, whp had been favored in French colonial military recruitment practices.

While this northern majority characterized the rank-and-file, the majority of officers were of Ewe or Mina decent from the South. The first president, Olympio, was ethnically Ewe (Horowitz 1985, 449-451; Keegan 1983, 581-582; Michel 1988, 318; Minorities at Risk 2009; Minority Rights Group 2010).

Diversity of late colonial officer corps: Ewe and Mina dominated
Ethnicity of independence leader: Ewe
***Ethnically unmatched*: no**
Regionally unmatched: no

Tunisia: Tunisia is nearly ethnically and religiously homogenous (Muslim Arab) and thus there is no possibility of an ethnic mismatch between the civilian and military leadership. The first leader, Bourgiba, was Arab.

Diversity of late colonial officer corps: Arab dominated
Ethnicity of independence leader: Arab
***Ethnically unmatched*: no**
Regionally unmatched: no

Uganda: At independence, only 9 of 50 officers were African. Under the British, early officers were usually commissioned from the ranks leading to a ethnic congruence between the officer corps and the rank-and-file. This led to commissions being given to northwesterners and then, later, northerners more generally. Yet, there was also significant Baganda representation in the colonial officer corps, with the first three Baganda officers commissioned during WWII. The first leader of Uganda, Obote, was a northern Langi (Adekson 1979, 162; Horowitz 1985, 451; Keegan 1983, 598-600; Parsons 1999, 24).

Diversity of late colonial officer corps: ethnically and regionally diverse
Ethnicity of independence leader: northern Langi
***Ethnically unmatched*: yes**
Regionally unmatched: yes

Zambia: The new national army was created from the Northern Rhodesia Regiment (NRR) and the 2nd battalion of the King's African Rifles, although the latter was immediately disbanded as it had not recruited from Zambia. Prior to independence, from 1953-1963, both had been commanded by the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The NRR during this time was commanded by white federal officers while 2 KAR was recruited from Nyasaland (Haantobolo 2008, 121-125; Parsons 1999, 45).

Diversity of late colonial officer corps: no African officers
Ethnicity of independence leader: Bemba
***Ethnically unmatched*: no**
Regionally unmatched: no

Zimbabwe: During the transition to majority rule, the apartheid era army and the two rebel groups, ZANLA drawn mainly from the Shona and ZIPRA drawn mainly from the Ndebele, were integrated. This meant that the first post-transition leader, Mugaba, inherited an ethnically diverse military and officer corps. Mugaba was from the Shona (Keegan 1983, 681-684; Snyder 1986, 134).

Diversity of late colonial officer corps: ethnically mixed
Ethnicity of independence leader: Shona
Ethnically unmatched: yes
Regionally unmatched: yes

C.3   Constitutional/Electoral Transfers of Power

For each constitutional or elector transfer of power, two variables are coded. First, it is determined whether an *ethnic change in leadership* took place by comparing the ethnicity of each leader, before and after the power transfer. The variable is coded at the highest level of ethnic aggregation, unless a compelling reason emerged to consider sub-groups such as clan in Somalia. If the ethnic identity of the leader prior to the transition was different from that of the leader assuming power, *Ethnic change* is coded 1, and 0 otherwise. Transitional leaders or committees overseeing constitutional processes of change require special consideration. Here, the "old leader" is coded as the leader who preceded the transitional government. For example, where the violent removal of a leader led directly to a transitional government that then quickly held elections within two years, the ethnicity of the deposed leader and the ethnicity of the newly elected leader are used to determine whether a change in ethnic leadership took place. Second, I code whether the pre-transition leader had engaged in ethnic stacking. This variable is coded the same as the previosuly discussed loyalty choice at independence: if the leader prior to the constitutional transfer of power had stacked the military officer corps or created a presidential guard with their coethnics then the variable is coded as 1, and 0 otherwise. Ethnically homogenous countries deserve special consideration as such militaries are perfectly stacked, but that means very little in such circumstances. I code them as ethnically stacked to be conservative: since there cannot be an ethnic change in leadership then all power transitions are coded as no ethnic change with prior ethnic stacking, which predicts stability. Any recorded coups in these countries thus count against the theory. A robustness check is also conducted in which these countries are excluded. The narratives below focus on the ethnic stacking practice of the pre-transition leader with other relevant information briefly noted in the codings.

Algeria 1978: Under Boumedienne, Berbers were disproportionately excluded from the national army after independence was won. Berbers are also coded as powerless by EPR. The FLN, which has controlled the government since independence, has virtually excluded Berbers from high ranking positions within both the party and government (Metz 1994a; Minorities at Risk 2009; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009).

Reason for power transfer: natural death
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Boumedienne (Arab)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Chadli Bendjedid (Arab)
Ethnic Change?: no
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: yes

Algeria 1999:

Reason for power transfer: elections

Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Zeroual (Arab)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Bouteflika (Arab)
Ethnic Change?: no
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: ?

Angola 1979: The MPLA government under Neto recruited military personnel from across all ethnic groups (Minority Rights Group 2010).

Reason for power transfer: natural death
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Neto (Mestiço)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): dos Santos (Mbundu)
Ethnic Change?: yes
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: no

Benin 1964: Soglo disproportionately recruited and promoted fellow southern Fon until they dominated the middle and upper ranks of the army to the exclusion of northerners, who now only held 14 of 90 positions in the officer corps (Decalo 1973, 462; Horowitz 1985, 451).

Reason for power transfer: coup then elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Soglo (southern Fon)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Apithy (southern Yoruba)
Ethnic Change?: yes
Regional Change?: yes
Prior ethnic stacking: yes

Benin 1991: Instead of supplanting the existing ethnic factions in the military, Kerekou tried to unify them and de-ethnicise the chain of command. He prioritized ethnic balance within the military and created a regional and ethnic quota-based recruitment system that assured diversity across all ranks, even and perhaps especially in the officer corps (Akindes 2015, 52 & 56; Dickovick 2008, 1124; Morency-Laflamme 2015, 465).

Reason for power transfer: democratization with elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Kerekou (northern Somba)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Soglo (southern Fon)
Ethnic Change?: yes
Regional Change?: yes
Prior ethnic stacking: no

Benin 1996: Progress made by Soglo towards further reducing northern dominance. He was recognized for reform and ending imbalance by other military leaders at the regional conference on Democratization in Africa (Foltz and McDonald 1995; Minority Rights Group 2010).

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Soglo (southern Fon)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Kerekou (northern Somba)

Ethnic Change?: **yes**
Regional Change?: yes
Prior ethnic stacking: **no**

Benin 2006: The representative quota system of officer recruitment was continued by Kerekou and Yayi Boni (Akindes 2015, 52 & 56-58; Foltz and McDonald 1995; and Minority Rights Group 2010).

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Kerekou (northern Somba)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Boni (northern Nagot/Bariba)
Ethnic Change?: **yes**
Regional Change?: no
Prior ethnic stacking: **no**

Botswana 1980: No attempts have ever been made to manipulate the BDF and its leadership hierarchy on the basis of kin, tribe, or ethnicity (N'Diaye 2001).

Reason for power transfer: natural death of leader
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Seretse Khama (Tswana)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Masire (Tswana)
Ethnic Change?: **no**
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: **no**

Botswana 1998: No attempts have ever been made to manipulate the BDF and its leadership hierarchy on the basis of kin, tribe, or ethnicity (N'Diaye 2001).

Reason for power transfer: retirement of leader
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Masire (Tswana)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Mogae (Tswana)
Ethnic Change?: **no**
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: **no**

Botswana 2008: No attempts have ever been made to manipulate the BDF and its leadership hierarchy on the basis of kin, tribe, or ethnicity (N'Diaye 2001). No evidence was found of any change in practices.

Reason for power transfer: resignation of leader
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Mogae (Tswana)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Ian Khama (Tswana)
Ethnic Change?: **no**
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: **no**

Burundi 1993: The army was overwhelmingly Tutsi under Buyoya's first reign. By In the late 1980s, fully 99.5% of the officer corps and 99.7% of non-commissioned officers and troops were Tutsi (Lemarchand 1989, 23; Minority Rights Group 2010).

Reason for power transfer: democratization with elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Buyoya (Tutsi)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Ndadaye (Hutu)
Ethnic Change?: yes
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: yes

Burundi 2003: The military remained Tutsi-dominated throughout the civil war, from 1993 until military integration was finally agreed upon in 2003 and began in earnest in 2004 (Boshoff and Gasana 2003, 2-3; Samii 2013).

Reason for power transfer: terms of power sharing peace agreement
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Buyoya (Tutsi)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Ndayizeye (Hutu)
Ethnic Change?: yes
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: yes

Burundi 2005: Prior to the 2005 elections, under the peace accords, the military officer corps was integrated and brought into a 50-50 balance between Hutus and Tutsis (Samii 2013).

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Ndayizeye (Hutu)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Nkurunziza (Hutu)
Ethnic Change?: no
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: no

Cameroon 1982: After taking office, Biya announced his intentions to restructure Ahidjo's ethnic army, prompting the republican guard to attempt a coup. Capitalizing on their failure, Biya dissolved the republican guard, purged northerners from the ranks, and then employed discriminatory recruitment and promotion practices of his own. Southerners, and particularly the Bulu clans and larger Beti ethnic group, came to dominate the military and hold critical command positions within the officer corps (Gros 1995, 122; Konings 251; Minorities at Risk 2009).

Reason for power transfer: retirement of leader followed by elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Ahidjo (northern Fulani)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Nkurunziza (southern Beti)
Ethnic Change?: yes
Regional Change?: yes
Prior ethnic stacking: yes

Cape Verde 1991: Population highly intermixed and homogenously creole/mestiço thus the military is perfectly ethnically stacked, although that means little in this context (Meyns 2002, 159).

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Pereira (mestiço)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Montiero (mestiço)
Ethnic Change?: no
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: yes

Cape Verde 2001: Population highly intermixed and homogenously creole/mestiço thus the military is perfectly ethnically stacked, although that means little in this context (Meyns 2002, 159).

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Montiero (mestiço)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Pires (mestiço)
Ethnic Change?: no
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: yes

Cape Verde 2011: Population highly intermixed and homogenously creole/mestiço thus the military is perfectly ethnically stacked, although that means little in this context (Meyns 2002, 159).

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Pires (mestiço)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Fonseca (mestiço)
Ethnic Change?: no
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: yes

Central African Republic 1993: Kolingba installed many of his ethnic group in positions of power and stacked the Presidential Guard with fellow, southern Yacoma (Minority Rights Group 2010).

Reason for power transfer: democratization with elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Kolingba (southern Yacoma)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Patasse (northern Gbaya)
Ethnic Change?: yes
Regional Change?: yes
Prior ethnic stacking: yes

Comoros 1990:

Reason for power transfer: coup then elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Abdallah (Anjouan)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Djohar (Grande Comore)
Ethnic Change?: yes
Regional Change?: yes
Prior ethnic stacking: ?

Comoros 1996:

Reason for power transfer: coup then elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Djohar (Grande Comore)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Taki (Grande Comore)
***Ethnic Change?*: no**
Regional Change?: no
***Prior ethnic stacking*: ?**

Comoros 1998:

Reason for power transfer: natural death of leader
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Taki (Grande Comore)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Massounde (Anjouan)
***Ethnic Change?*: yes**
Regional Change?: yes
***Prior ethnic stacking*: ?**

Comoros 2006:

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Azali (Grande Comore)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Sambi (Anjouan)
***Ethnic Change?*: yes**
Regional Change?: yes
***Prior ethnic stacking*: ?**

Comoros 2011:

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Sambi (Anjouan)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Dhoinine (Moheli)
***Ethnic Change?*: yes**
Regional Change?: yes
***Prior ethnic stacking*: ?**

Congo-Brazzaville 1992: M'Boshi dominated the armed forces under Nguesso (Minority Rights Group 2010).

Reason for power transfer:democratization with elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Sassou-Nguesso (M'Boshi)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Lissouba (Nzabi)
***Ethnic Change?*: yes**
Regional Change?: ?
***Prior ethnic stacking*: yes**

Côte d'Ivoire 1993: Under Houphouet-Boigny, the Presidential Guard was dominated by Baoule, as was his entire government (N'Diaye 2001).

Reason for power transfer: natural death of leader
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Houphouet-Boigny (central Baoule)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Bedie (central Baoule)
Ethnic Change?: **no**
Regional Change?: no
Prior ethnic stacking: **yes**

Côte d'Ivoire 2000: Bedie actually increased reliance on Baoule officers, further weeding out northerners from all parts of the government, including the air force (Badmus 2009, 52; Kirwin 2006, 47).

Reason for power transfer: coup then elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Bedie then Guei (central Baoule then Yacouba)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Gbagbo (southern Bete)
Ethnic Change?: **yes**
Regional Change?: yes
Prior ethnic stacking: **yes**

Côte d'Ivoire 2011: The 2007 peace agreement created a unified military command system that integrated officers from both parties to the civil war into a command unit that would then integrate the rest of the military. Rank harmonization was completed in 2009, allowing 3629 former rebel combatants to be integrated into the new national army. The 2011 elections resulted in violence and the politicization of the police and military between the two sides. On taking office, however, Ouattara was able to resume military integration. Given that the civil war was fought along regional and ethnic lines, largely between north and south, post-conflict military integration ensured diversity prior to the electoral transfer of power, at least within the officer corps (Kroc Institute, "Military Reform: Ouagadougou Political Agreement").

Reason for power transfer: peace treaty then elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Gbagbo (southern Bete)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Ouattara (northern Burkinabe & Mande)
Ethnic Change?: **yes**
Regional Change?: yes
Prior ethnic stacking: **no**

Djibouti 1999: Aptidon forced many Afars out of the army in the 70s and his government was generally dominated by Issa. None of the peace agreements with the Afar rebels have included military integration (Bollee 2003; Metelits and Matti 2013, footnote 4; Minority Rights Group 2010).

Reason for power transfer: democratization with elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Aptidon (Issa)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Gelleh (Issa)
Ethnic Change?: **no**
Regional Change?: no
Prior ethnic stacking: **yes**

Egypt 1970: Coptic Christians are overrepresented in the military at the lower ranks but

underrepresented in the officer corps. given that Copts constitute only 10% of the population, this means that the officer corps is almost exclusively Muslim Arab (Minorities at Risk 2009).

Reason for power transfer: natural death of leader
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Nasser (Muslim)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Sadat (Muslim)
Ethnic Change?: no
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: yes

Egypt 2012: Coptic Christians are overrepresented in the military at the lower ranks but underrepresented in the officer corps. given that Copts constitute only 10% of the population, this means that the officer corps is almost exclusively Muslim Arab (Minorities at Risk 2009).

Reason for power transfer: military coup then elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Mubarak then Tantawi (Muslim then ?)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Morsi (Muslim)
Ethnic Change?: no
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: yes

Ethiopia 2012: Many officers in the military have been recruited from the EPRDF, a collection of various groups who had been opposed to Mengistu (i.e. different ethnicities). However, the TPLF had been the leading force in the uprising, and thus the core of the new military were Tigray (former militia members). Below the highest ranks, the military is largely integrated and is seen as broadly representative of the population as well as the most stable of the country's power structures. The Institution of National Service Corps also recruited from all ethnic backgrounds. Almost no soldiers from the former Derg joined the new army, leading to a lack of Oromo in its highest ranks. No evidence of purposeful ethnic stacking though (Luckham 2002, 253-255; Nelson & Kaplan 1993).

Reason for power transfer: natural death of leader
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Zenawi (Tigray)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Desalegn (Wolayta)
Ethnic Change?: yes
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: no

Gabon 1967: In 1964, the army was mostly Fang. At the end of Mba's rule, the officer corps was still primarily French as he did not pursue Africanization. Yet, Mba favored the Gendarmerie with its Estuary Fang and Myene members over the Army and its heavy Moleu Ntem Fang composition (Decalo 1998, 133).

Reason for power transfer: natural death of leader
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Mba (Estuary Fang)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Omar Bongo (Batéké)
Ethnic Change?: yes

Regional Change?: yes
Prior ethnic stacking: yes

Gabon 2009: Bongo formed an all Batéké Garde Republique in 1970 that was larger than and better armed than the Army itself. Batéké were also over-represented in government ministries and particularly in the security sector (Decalo 1989, 562; Decalo 1998, 139 & 158; Minority Rights Group 2010).

Reason for power transfer: natural death of leader
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Omar Bongo (Batéké)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Ali Bongo (Batéké)
Ethnic Change?: **no**
Regional Change?: no
Prior ethnic stacking: yes

Ghana 1969: By April 1967, not much more than a year after the coup that brought Ankrah to power, five of the top six posts in the police were held by Ewe, seven of 20 army Colonels were Ewe, and Ewe and Ga together held 65% of senior military ranks above Colonel. Moreover, most of the army and police officers on the NLC tended to draw their closest allies and advisers, both civilian and military, from their own ethnic group. The Ewe officers who had seized power thus appeared to be establishing an ethnically exclusive regime backed by an Ewe and Ga dominated army. Most importantly, they were perceived by others within both the civil and military spheres as establishing such dominance (Baynham 1985, 631; Hutchful 1979, 614-615).

Reason for power transfer: resignation then elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Ankrah (Ga)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Busia (Ashanti)
Ethnic Change?: **yes**
Regional Change?: yes
Prior ethnic stacking: yes

Ghana 1979: Under Rawlings, dozens of senior police and military officers were executed and hundreds of other officers and civilians purged and imprisoned. All senior military commands were redistributed to previously junior officers, none of whom held a rank above colonel. The AFRC was also perceived to be stacked with Ewe and Ga officers and to be disproportionately promoting Ewes into important command positions. Because the previous regime had purged senior Ewe officers and replaced them with Akans, the AFRC's decimation of the senior ranks looked suspiciously like an ethnically motivated retributive attack against their traditional rivals (Austin 1985, 94; Baynham 1985, 634-636; Chazan 1982, 475; Hansen & Collins 1980, 3; Harris 1980, 229; Hutchful 1997b, 538; Lumsden 1980, 471; Minority Rights Group 2010).

Reason for power transfer: coup then elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Rawlings (Ewe/Scottish)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Limann (northern Sissala)
Ethnic Change?: **yes**
Regional Change?: yes
Prior ethnic stacking: yes

Ghana 2000: Between 1984-87, Rawlings increased his reliance on Ewe officers and troops. Yet, some diversity was maintained and after this period merit-based promotion policies were created and political interference in the military ended (Hansen 1991, 40; Hutchful 1997a, 256-258; and Hutchful 2003, 86-87).

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Rawlings (eastern Ewe/Scottish)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Kufuor (southern Ashanti)
Ethnic Change?: **yes**
Regional Change?: yes
Prior ethnic stacking: **no**

Ghana 2009: Rawlings had diversified the military in his later years of rule. The Kufour administration disbanded and integrated into the normal military hierarchy all parallel military structures and introduced a policy of regional balance in recruitment. All major ethnic groups were represented in the top of the command hierarchy (Asante & Gyimah-Boadi 2004, 91-92; Hutchful 2003, 86-87).

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Kufuor (southern Ashanti)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Atta Mills (western Fante)
Ethnic Change?: **yes**
Regional Change?: yes
Prior ethnic stacking: **no**

Ghana 2012: No evidence found that Atta Mills changed the merit-based recruitment and promotion practices introduced by Rawlings and Kufuor (Croissant & Kuehn 2017; Minorities at Risk 2009; Minority Rights Group 2010).

Reason for power transfer: natural death of leader
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Atta Mills (western Fante)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Mahama (northern Gonja)
Ethnic Change?: **yes**
Regional Change?: yes
Prior ethnic stacking: **no**

Guinea 2010: A disproportionate number of senior military officers were from Contes Soussou ethnic group (Freedom House 2004).

Reason for power transfer: natural death of leader then coup then elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Lansana Conte then several interim leaders (Soussou)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Alpha Condé (Malinke)
Ethnic Change?: **yes**
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: **yes**

Guinea Bissau 2000: The military has been Balanta dominated from time of indepen-

dence and seems to remain so regardless of leader, even when they try to impose some diversity (Minority Rights Group 2010).

Reason for power transfer: coup then elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Vieira (Papel)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Yala (Balanta)
Ethnic Change?: **yes**
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: **no**

Guinea Bissau 2005: The military has been Balanta dominated from time of independence and seems to remain so regardless of leader, even when they try to impose some diversity. After Yala was elected, he purged 75 non-Balanta officers from military. (Minority Rights Group 2010).

Reason for power transfer: coup then elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Yala then Rosa (Balanta)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Vieira (Papel)
Ethnic Change?: **yes**
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: **yes**

Guinea Bissau 2009: Under Vieira, the newly appointed head of the army explicitly tries to restore diversity to the Balanta-dominated military (Minority Rights Group 2010).

Reason for power transfer: coup then election
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Vieira then Perreira (Papel then ?)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Sanha (Benfoda)
Ethnic Change?: **yes**
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: **no**

Kenya 1978: Kenyatta turned the General Service Unit, a paramilitary guard, into an all-Kikuyu force will all non-Kikuyu officers purged by 1966. Kenyatta also made sure Kikuyu were well represented in the army officer corps beginning in the 70s and that the majority of new air force personnel were Kikuyu and Luo (Keegan 1983, 336-337; N'Diaye 2001, 123).

Reason for power transfer: natural death of leader
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Kenyatta (Kikuyu)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Moi (Kalenjin)
Ethnic Change?: **yes**
Regional Change?: yes
Prior ethnic stacking: **yes**

Kenya 2002: Moi gradually reduced the Kikuyu dominance of top military ranks and replaced them with Kalenjin or other non-Kikuyus when no Kalenjin was available. By the mid 90s, the army was thoroughly Kalenjin—6 of 18 Generals were Kalenjin and the GSU had also become Kalenjin dominated (N'Diaye 2001, 123 & 130-131.).

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Moi (Kalenjin)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Kibaki (Kikuyu)
Ethnic Change?: **yes**
Regional Change?: yes
Prior ethnic stacking: **yes**

Lesotho 1993: Population is highly ethnically homogenous and thus the military is perfectly ethnically stacked, although that means little in this context.

Reason for power transfer: coup then elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Lekhanya (Basotho)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Mokhehle (Basotho)
Ethnic Change?: **no**
Regional Change?: no
Prior ethnic stacking: **yes**

Lesotho 1998: Population is highly ethnically homogenous and thus the military is perfectly ethnically stacked, although that means little in this context.

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Mokhehle (Basotho)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Mosisili (Basotho)
Ethnic Change?: **no**
Regional Change?: no
Prior ethnic stacking: **yes**

Lesotho 2012: Population is highly ethnically homogenous and thus the military is perfectly ethnically stacked, although that means little in this context.

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Mosisili (Basotho)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Thabane (Basotho)
Ethnic Change?: **no**
Regional Change?: no
Prior ethnic stacking: **yes**

Liberia 1971: The officer corps was almost entirely Americo-Liberian under Tubman and his successor Tolbert. In the True Whig Party era, officers were Americo-Liberians or, sometimes, hinterland elites cooperating with the political system (Ellis 1995, 176; Keegan 1983, 364-365; Okolo 1981, 152).

Reason for power transfer: natural death of leader
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Tubman (Americo-Liberian)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Tolbert (Americo-Liberian)
Ethnic Change?: **no**
Regional Change?: no
Prior ethnic stacking: **yes**

Liberia 1997: The Interim government only controlled Monrovia and relied on ECOMOG forces for security (i.e., on foreign troops). Taylor and his insurgent forces controlled most of the country-side (Gershoni 1997, 69).

> *Reason for power transfer*: peace treaty then elections
> *Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity)*: transitional council ending with Perry (mixed; Perry Vai)
> *Post-transition leader (Ethnicity)*: Taylor (Americo-Liberian & Gola)
> **Ethnic Change?**: **yes**
> *Regional Change?*: ?
> **Prior ethnic stacking**: **no**

Liberia 2005: Bryant's transitional government brought together the Taylor, LURD, and MODEL warlord factions and thus was inclusive of Gia/Dan & Mano, Mandingo, and Krahn. UNMIL forces also played a large role in security during the demobilization and military restructuring process, which allowed for integration of forces from former rebel groups (Kroc Institute, "Military Reform: Accra Peace Agreement"; Minority Rights Group 2010).

> *Reason for power transfer*: elections
> *Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity)*: Bryant (Grebo)
> *Post-transition leader (Ethnicity)*: Johnson-Sirleaf (Gola, Kru & German)
> **Ethnic Change?**: **yes**
> *Regional Change?*: ?
> **Prior ethnic stacking**: **no**

Madagascar 1993: Historically, Merina have dominated the military, both the officer corps and non-commissioned ranks. There is no evidence that côtier leaders were ever able to end this dominance despite several attempts (Keegan 1983, 377-378; Metz 1994b; Minority Rights Group 2010).

> *Reason for power transfer*: elections
> *Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity)*: Ratsiraka (Côtier)
> *Post-transition leader (Ethnicity)*: Zafy (Côtier)
> **Ethnic Change?**: **no**
> *Regional Change?*: no
> **Prior ethnic stacking**: **no**

Madagascar 1996: Historically, Merina have dominated the military, both the officer corps and non-commissioned ranks. There is no evidence that côtier leaders were ever able to end this dominance despite several attempts (Keegan 1983, 377-378; Metz 1994b; Minority Rights Group 2010).

> *Reason for power transfer*: impeachment then elections
> *Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity)*: Zafy (Côtier)
> *Post-transition leader (Ethnicity)*: Ratsiraka (Côtier)
> **Ethnic Change?**: **no**
> *Regional Change?*: no

Prior ethnic stacking: **no**

Madagascar 2001-2002: Historically, Merina have dominated the military, both the officer corps and non-commissioned ranks. There is no evidence that côtier leaders were ever able to end this dominance despite several attempts (Keegan 1983, 377-378; Metz 1994b; Minority Rights Group 2010).

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Ratsiraka (Côtier)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Ravalomanana (Merina)
Ethnic Change?: **yes**
Regional Change?: yes
Prior ethnic stacking: **no**

Malawi 1994: Banda placed Lomwe in senior positions in the security forces because they were widely viewed as a neutral group due to their "immigrant" status. The commanding officer hierarchy was largely Chewa/Lomwe and Yao and muslim recruits were discouraged by Banda. Few northerners attained senior rank in either the army or the police. Operational command of the troops was kept in Chewa and Lomwe hands (Decalo 1998, 55 & 79-88).

Reason for power transfer: retirement of leader
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Banda (southern Chewa)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Muluzi (southern Yao)
Ethnic Change?: **yes**
Regional Change?: no
Prior ethnic stacking: **yes**

Malawi 2004: Muluzi continued the policy of promoting southern officers (Decalo 1998, 101).

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Muluzi (southern Yao)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Mutharika (southern Lomwe)
Ethnic Change?: **yes**
Regional Change?: no
Prior ethnic stacking: **yes**

Malawi 2012:

Reason for power transfer: natural death of leader
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Mutharika (southern Lomwe)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Joyce Hilda Banda (southern Yao)
Ethnic Change?: **yes**
Regional Change?: no
Prior ethnic stacking: **?**

Mali 1992: No mention of ethnically-based military recruitment practices in any of the sources for post-independence Mali (Bennett 1975; Clark 2000; Dickovick 2008; Imperato

1996; Keegan 1983, 386-387; Minority Rights Group 2010; Minorities at Risk 2009).

Reason for power transfer: coup then elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Traore then transition committee (Bambara)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Konare (Bambara & Fula)
Ethnic Change?: **no**
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: **no**

Mali 2002: No mention of ethnically-based military recruitment practices in any of the sources for post-independence Mali. In 1996, former Taureg rebels were even integrated into the officer corps (Bennett 1975; Clark 2000; Dickovick 2008; Imperato 1996; Keegan 1983, 386-387; Minority Rights Group 2010; Minorities at Risk 2009; Kroc Institute, "Military Reform: National Pact").

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Konare (Bambara & Fula)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Toure (Fula)
Ethnic Change?: **no**
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: **no**

Mauritania 2007: In the late 1980s, Taya dismissed over 500 Tucoulor (southern black) officers and arrested 51. Harratins and other blacks were excluded from power. By 1990, Maure officers had a monopoly over the military and the security sector was led by ethnic kin of the president (*Africa News* 2003; Bryden, N'Diaye & Olonisakin 2005, 8; Minority Rights Group 2010; N'Diaye 2006, 428-429).

Reason for power transfer: coup then elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Taya then military council (white Maure)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Abdallahi (white Maure)
Ethnic Change?: **no**
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: **yes**

Mauritius 1982: Recruitment into the police was by voluntary enlistment across all ethnic groups. Police officers served rotations through the SMF/GSU paramilitary unit. Mauritius has never had a standing army and thus the paramilitary constitutes its primary security forces. Recruitment practices remained unchanged and the MPF make efforts to appear impartial to ethnic relations (Eriksen 1994; Keegan 1983, 393; Metz 1994c).

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Seesowager Ramgoolam (Hindu)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Jugnauth (Hindu)
Ethnic Change?: **no**
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: **no**

Mauritius 1995: Recruitment into the police was by voluntary enlistment across all

ethnic groups. Police officers served rotations through the SMF/GSU paramilitary unit. Mauritius has never had a standing army and thus the paramilitary constitutes its primary security forces (Keegan 1983, 393; Metz 1994c).

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Jugnauth (Hindu)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Navin Ramgoolam (Hindu)
Ethnic Change?: **no**
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: **no**

Mauritius 2000: Racial tensions rose after claims of police brutality and racial discrimination by the dominant Hindus against a famous Creole singer. There is no indication that recruitment practices changed, however (Boswell 2005; Carroll & Carroll 2000; Eriksen 2004).

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Navin Ramgoolam (Hindu)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Jugnauth (Hindu)
Ethnic Change?: **no**
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: **no**

Mauritius 2003: As of 2002, the MPF comprised 10,576 staff with one officer per every 19 citizens. The ethnic distribution represented the total population, but there were only 531 women serving (Newman 2010).

Reason for power transfer: resignation of leader
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Jugnauth (Hindu)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Berenger (Franco-Mauritian)
Ethnic Change?: **yes**
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: **no**

Mauritius 2005: The sources do not note any change in policy from prior diversity (Boswell 2005; Newman 2010).

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Berenger (Franco-Mauritian)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Navin Ramgoolam (Hindu)
Ethnic Change?: **yes**
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: **no**

Mozambique 1986: Machel, the first President, was motivated by a non-tribal and non-racial nationalism. At independence, no structural changes were proposed for the guerrilla army, which had been recruited heavily from both the exile community in Tanzania and from the northern tribes of Mozambique, especially the Makonde (Chabal & Birmingham 2002, 207; Seegers 1986, 59.).

Reason for power transfer: natural death of leader
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Machel (southern Shangaan)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Chissano (southern Shangaan)
Ethnic Change?: no
Regional Change?: no
Prior ethnic stacking: no

Mozambique 2005: The 1992 peace agreement provided for military integration, drawing equally from Frelimo and Renamo, including officers and the high command. Since Frelimo had drawn its support from the South and the Shangaan, and Renamo from the north and the Shona, this created even greater ethnic diversity in the military and the officer corps. Sources do not report a change to the situation, which would be a violation of the peace treaty (Kroc Institute, "Military Reform: General Peace Agreement for Mozambique"; Minority Rights Group 2010; Vines 2013, 379-380).

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Chissano (southern Shangaan)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Guebuza (northern Ronga & Makua)
Ethnic Change?: yes
Regional Change?: yes
Prior ethnic stacking: no

Namibia 2004: The national army was created by integrating SWAPO, which was largely Ovambo, with the ethnic battalions of the SWATF, including many non-Ovambo. The sources do not note any changes from these practices of diversity (Lamb 2006; Leys & Saul 1995, 58; Preston 1997; Seabra 2016).

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Nujoma (Ovambo)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Pohamba (Ovambo)
Ethnic Change?: no
Regional Change?: no
Prior ethnic stacking: no

Niger 1993: Under Seibou, the Zarma/Djerma and Songhai comprised 70% or more of the officer corps prior to the first democratic elections in 1993. Core of the army had always been Djerma/Songhai at least prior to Mainassara's coup (Ibrahim 1994, 25; Vogt 2007, 26).

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Seibou (western Djerma)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Ousmane (southern Hausa)
Ethnic Change?: yes
Regional Change?: yes
Prior ethnic stacking: yes

Niger 1999: The core of the army had always been Djerma/Songhai, at least prior to Mainassara's coup. From 1997-2003, former Taureg rebels were integrated into the mil-

itary, including into the officer corps and the elite Republican Guard (Kroc Institute, "Military Reform: Agreement between"; Vogt 2007, 26).

Reason for power transfer: coup then elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Ousmane then Mainassara then Wanke (all southern Hausa)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Tandja (eastern Peuhl & Kanuri)
Ethnic Change?: yes
Regional Change?: yes
Prior ethnic stacking: no

Niger 2011: From 1997-2003, former Taureg rebels were integrated into the military, including into the officer corps and the elite Republican Guard. No later violation of the peace treaty is noted by the Kroc database (Kroc Institute, "Military Reform: Agreement between"; Vogt 2007, 26).

Reason for power transfer: coup then elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Tandja then Djibo (eastern Peuhl & Kanuri then ?)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Issoufou (southern Hausa)
Ethnic Change?: yes
Regional Change?: yes
Prior ethnic stacking: no

Nigeria 1979: The perceived Ibo-based coup earlier that year inspired a northern Hausa-Fulani counter-coup. On taking power, the northerners purged the ranks and killed an unprecedented number of Ibo officers. They then broke the army apart, sending soldiers back to their home territories according to their ascriptive identity, inspiring the Ibo region to secede. Further purges combined with the civil war created a Hausa-Fulani dominated military, especially amongst the senior ranks, that persisted until the democratic transition in 1999. Over the decades, southerners were still commissioned as officers and the Middle Belt was even overrepresented in the officer corps compared to its population share. The higher ranks of the army, however, were dominated by northerners and especially the Hausa-Fulani (Adeakin 2015, 60 & 70; Amadife 1999, 625; Bratton & van de Walle 1997, 216; Butts & Metz 1996, 5; Campbell 1994, 181; Luckham 1971; Manea & Ruland 2013, 65; Mustapha 1999, 285).

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Gowon (middle belt Berom or Angas)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Tandja (northern Fulani)
Ethnic Change?: yes
Regional Change?: yes
Prior ethnic stacking: no

Nigeria 1999: Over the decades, southerners were still commissioned as officers and the Middle Belt was even overrepresented in the officer corps compared to its population share. The higher ranks of the army, however, were dominated by northerners and especially the Hausa-Fulani (Adeakin 2015, 70; Bratton & van de Walle 1997, 216; Butts & Metz 1996, 5; Campbell 1994, 181; Manea & Ruland 2013, 65; Mustapha 1999, 285).

Reason for power transfer: natural-ish death of leader then elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Abacha then Abubakar (northern Hausa & Kanuri then Nupe)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Obasanjo (southern Yoruba)
Ethnic Change?: yes
Regional Change?: yes
Prior ethnic stacking: yes

Nigeria 2007: Upon assuming office, Obasanjo retired 93 high-ranking officers, including 26 army generals, all of whom had previously held political positions and benefited from rent seeking. Further undermining the northern dominance of the senior ranks, he filled the now open positions with soldiers from minority ethnic groups of the middle belt region. Further reforms emphasized merit in the recruitment and selection of officers, established a principle of equal representation from each state across all ranks, and improved the welfare of soldiers without reference to ethnic background (Adeakin 2015, 39 & 72-73; Adejumobi 2001, 18; Manea & Ruland 2013, 65; Ojo 2006, 263).

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Obasanjo (southern Yoruba)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Yar 'Adua (northern Fulani)
Ethnic Change?: yes
Regional Change?: yes
Prior ethnic stacking: no

Nigeria 2010: Under prior President Obadanjo, the military had been ethnically diversified with officer recruitment balanced by region. The sources do not note any changes to these policies subsequently (Adeakin 2015, 39 & 72-73; Adejumobi 2001, 18; Manea & Ruland 2013, 65; Ojo 2006, 263).

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Yar 'Adua (northern Fulani)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Goodluck Jonathan (southern Ijaw)
Ethnic Change?: yes
Regional Change?: yes
Prior ethnic stacking: no

Rwanda 2000: After their military victory, the new RPF government flipped the ethnic state on its head, excluding Hutu from political power and creating legal restrictions to bar Hutu recruitment into the military and police—despite temporarily installing a Hutu President and committing to military integration as part of the proclaimed reconciliation program (Minorities at Risk 2009; Minority Rights Group 2010).

Reason for power transfer: resignation of leader
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Bizimungu (Hutu)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Kagame (Tutsi)
Ethnic Change?: yes
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: no

São Tomé and Príncipe 1991: No evidence found of ethnic preference in the military. Yet, it is a largely homogenous Creole/Mestiço society without significant ethnic divisions and thus the military is also perfectly ethnically stacked, although that means little in this context (Chabal and Birmingham 2002; Keegan 1983, 501; Pham 2016; Porto 2003).

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): da Costa (Mestiço)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Trovoada (Mestiço)
***Ethnic Change?*: no**
Regional Change?: ?
***Prior ethnic stacking*: yes**

São Tomé and Príncipe 2001: No evidence found of ethnic preference in the military. Yet, it is a largely homogenous Creole/Mestiço society without significant ethnic divisions and thus the military is also perfectly ethnically stacked, although that means little in this context (Chabal and Birmingham 2002; Keegan 1983, 501; Pham 2016; Porto 2003).

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Trovoada (Mestiço)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): de Menezes (Mestiço)
***Ethnic Change?*: no**
Regional Change?: ?
***Prior ethnic stacking*: yes**

São Tomé and Príncipe 2011: No evidence found of ethnic preference in the military. Yet, it is a largely homogenous Creole/Mestiço society without significant ethnic divisions and thus the military is also perfectly ethnically stacked, although that means little in this context (Chabal and Birmingham 2002; Keegan 1983, 501; Pham 2016; Porto 2003).

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): de Menezes (Mestiço)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): da Costa (Mestiço)
***Ethnic Change?*: no**
Regional Change?: ?
***Prior ethnic stacking*: yes**

Senegal 1981: Senegal's independence leader and long-serving first president, Léopold Senghor, believed wholeheartedly that inclusion and protection of the country's diverse ethnic and tribal communities was central to building strong institutions and a sense of nationalism. He thus recruited soldiers and officers broadly across ethnic communities, a tradition that was upheld by subsequent leaders. No evidence found of ethnic stacking under any leader (Cissé 2015; Diop & Paye 1998, 319; Keegan 1983, 514-515; Markowitz 1969, 111-113; Minority Rights Group 2010; Minorities at Risk 2009; Nelson 1974, 340).

Reason for power transfer: retirement of leader
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Senghor (Serer)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Diouf (Serer & Peuhl)
***Ethnic Change?*: no**
Regional Change?: no

Prior ethnic stacking: **no**

Senegal 2000: Senegal's independence leader and long-serving first president, Léopold Senghor, believed wholeheartedly that inclusion and protection of the country's diverse ethnic and tribal communities was central to building strong institutions and a sense of nationalism. He thus recruited soldiers and officers broadly across ethnic communities, a tradition that was upheld by subsequent leaders. No evidence found of ethnic stacking under any leader (Cissé 2015; Diop & Paye 1998, 319; Keegan 1983, 514-515; Markowitz 1969, 111-113; Minority Rights Group 2010; Minorities at Risk 2009; Nelson 1974, 340).

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Diouf (Serer & Peuhl)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Wade (Wolof)
Ethnic Change?: **yes**
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: **no**

Senegal 2012: Senegal's independence leader and long-serving first president, Léopold Senghor, believed wholeheartedly that inclusion and protection of the country's diverse ethnic and tribal communities was central to building strong institutions and a sense of nationalism. He thus recruited soldiers and officers broadly across ethnic communities, a tradition that was upheld by subsequent leaders. No evidence found of ethnic stacking under any leader (Cissé 2015; Diop & Paye 1998, 319; Keegan 1983, 514-515; Markowitz 1969, 111-113; Minority Rights Group 2010; Minorities at Risk 2009; Nelson 1974, 340).

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Wade (Wolof)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Sall (Fula)
Ethnic Change?: **yes**
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: **no**

Seychelles 2004: Seychelles is a nearly homogenous Creole/Mestiço society without significant ethnic divisions and thus the military is also perfectly ethnically stacked, although that means little in this context (Keegan 1983, 516; Minority Rights Group 2010).

Reason for power transfer: resignation of leader
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Rene (Creole)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Michel (Creole)
Ethnic Change?: **no**
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: **yes**

Sierra Leone 1964: In April of 1964, the officer corps was still highly diverse, comprised of 26% Mende, 12% Temne, and 62% minority tribes, mostly Muslims from the north. During his mere three years of rule, Milton Margai paid little heed to the new national army, leaving the force essentially in the hands of the British. British officers not only continued to command the force, constituting the majority of the officer corps, but they also managed rank-and-file recruitment, trained and commissioned the small but growing

pool of native officers, and stood as the final arbiters over promotions (Cox 1976, 54 & 73).

Reason for power transfer: natural death of leader
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Albert Margai (Mende)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Milton Margai (Mende)
Ethnic Change?: no
Regional Change?: no
Prior ethnic stacking: no

Sierra Leone 1967: Sir Albert doubled Mende representation in the officer corps to over 50%. In 1965, a Mende force commander was appointed (Lansana) and a local training academy established, opening the door to full ethnic stacking. Albert also stacked the civilian side of the government with Mende. Additionally, Lansana selected a group of junior officers and NCOs, all of Mende identity and trained by Israeli security experts, to serve as a personal guard for himself and Prime Minister Margai (British National Archives FCO 38/29, Document 66; British National Archives FCO 38/34, Document 42; Cox 1976, 74-75; Minority Rights Group 2010).

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Milton Margai (southern Mende)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Stevens (northern Limba)
Ethnic Change?: yes
Regional Change?: yes
Prior ethnic stacking: yes

Sierra Leone 1996: Under Strasser's National Provisional Ruling Council, which was taken over by Bio for two months prior to the transition, non-Mende officers in the police and military were forcibly retired or sent on leave and then replaced with Mende (Minorities at Risk 2009).

Reason for power transfer: coup then elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Stresser then Bio (Krio then Mende)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Kabbah (Mandingo)
Ethnic Change?: yes
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: yes

Sierra Leone 2007: Post-conflict restructuring under British tutelage included provisions for fair representation of all ethnic groups in military recruiting and merit-based recruitment and promotions (Gbla 2006, 83).

Reason for power transfer: peace treaty then elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Kabbah (Mandingo)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Koroma (northern Temne & Limba)
Ethnic Change?: yes
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: no

Somalia 1967: After independence, Hawiye dominated the top ranks of the army (Mi-

nority Rights Group 2010).

> *Reason for power transfer*: elections
> *Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity)*: Daar (Hawiye Mudulood)
> *Post-transition leader (Ethnicity)*: Shermarke (Darod Majeerteen)
> **Ethnic Change?**: **yes**
> *Regional Change?*: ?
> **Prior ethnic stacking**: **yes**

Somalia 2012: President Ahmed favored his Hawiye clan and sent them, with a majority being from the Abgale subclan with a few Habir Giir and Hawale, for military training in Burundi, Djibouti, and Uganda. Eventually, other Somalis from all subclans of the Hawiye received this special training. Also, a report from July 2011 found that the third brigade of the Somali National Army was principally a Hawiye/Habar Gidir/Ayr unit (Robinson, 2016, 243; United Nations Security Council, 2013).

> *Reason for power transfer*: elections
> *Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity)*: Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (Hawiye)
> *Post-transition leader (Ethnicity)*: Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (Hawiye)
> **Ethnic Change?**: **no**
> *Regional Change?*: no
> **Prior ethnic stacking**: **yes**

South Africa 1994: While the South African Defense Forces under De Klerk where officered almost entirely by whites, there was a major military integration program in the run-up to the transition to majority rule. This program built a new national army out of the SADF, MK, APLA, and TVBC forces and was racially and ethnically integrated. Thus at the end of his rule, De Klerk handed over a non-ethnically stacked military to Mandela (Cawthra 2003, 32-38; Minority Rights Group 2010).

> *Reason for power transfer*: democratization with elections
> *Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity)*: De Klerk (white)
> *Post-transition leader (Ethnicity)*: Mandela (African Xhosa)
> **Ethnic Change?**: **yes**
> *Regional Change?*: ?
> **Prior ethnic stacking**: **no**

South Africa 1999: There is no evidence that the ANC has attempted to push either whites or Zulus, or anyone else, out of the military officer corps or to ethnically stack (Cawthra 2003, 32-38; Minority Rights Group 2010).

> *Reason for power transfer*: elections
> *Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity)*: Mandela (African Xhosa)
> *Post-transition leader (Ethnicity)*: Mbeki (African Xhosa)
> **Ethnic Change?**: **no**
> *Regional Change?*: ?
> **Prior ethnic stacking**: **no**

South Africa 2008: There is no evidence that the ANC has attempted to push either

whites or Zulus, or anyone else, out of the military officer corps or to ethnically stack (Cawthra 2003, 32-38; Minority Rights Group 2010).

Reason for power transfer: resignation of leader
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Mbeki (African Xhosa)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Motlanthe (African neither Xhosa nor Zulu)
Ethnic Change?: **yes**
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: **no**

South Africa 2009: There is no evidence that the ANC has attempted to push either whites or Zulus, or anyone else, out of the military officer corps or to ethnically stack (Cawthra 2003, 32-38; Minority Rights Group 2010).

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Motlanthe (African neither Xhosa nor Zulu)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Zuma (Zulu)
Ethnic Change?: **yes**
Regional Change?: ?
Prior ethnic stacking: **no**

Sudan 1986: Nimeiri forces the retirement of several senior military officers but does not change the ethnic make-up of the army and its officer corps, which had been Jellaba dominated. In 1985, he begins arming the Baggara, an ethnic coalition of majority Arab and some Arabized indigenous African tribes in western Sudan (Abdel-Rahim 1978; Flint & de Waal 2008; Kok 1996; Metz 1992; Minority Rights Group 2010).

Reason for power transfer: coup then elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Nimeiri then transitional council (Muslim Jellaba)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Sadiq al-Mahdi (Muslim Jellaba)
Ethnic Change?: **no**
Regional Change: no
Prior ethnic stacking: **yes**

Tanzania 1985: Nyerere believed in harmony of all tribes and recruited officers and rank-and-file diversely (both across tribes and across socio-economic classes). No preference was given to any group and a merit-based system was established (Lupogo 2001; Minority Rights Group 2010; Minorities at Risk 2009).

Reason for power transfer: retirement of leader
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Nyerere (northern Zanaki)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Mwinyi (coastal Waswahili)
Ethnic Change?: **yes**
Regional Change: yes
Prior ethnic stacking: **no**

Tanzania 1995: Nyerere believed in harmony of all tribes and recruited officers and rank-and-file diversely (both across tribes and across socio-economic classes). No preference was given to any group and a merit-based system was established. The sources do not report

any changes from these policies (Lupogo 2001; Minority Rights Group 2010; Minorities at Risk 2009).

> *Reason for power transfer*: elections
> *Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity)*: Mwinyi (coastal Waswahili)
> *Post-transition leader (Ethnicity)*: Mkapa (southern Makua)
> **Ethnic Change?**: **yes**
> *Regional Change*: yes
> **Prior ethnic stacking**: **no**

Tanzania 2005: Nyerere believed in harmony of all tribes and recruited officers and rank-and-file diversely (both across tribes and across socio-economic classes). No preference was given to any group and a merit-based system was established. The sources do not report any changes from these policies (Lupogo 2001; Minority Rights Group 2010; Minorities at Risk 2009).

> *Reason for power transfer*: elections
> *Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity)*: Mkapa (southern Makua)
> *Post-transition leader (Ethnicity)*: Kikwete (coastal Muslim from a very small ethnic group)
> **Ethnic Change?**: **yes**
> *Regional Change*: yes
> **Prior ethnic stacking**: **no**

Tunisia 1987: The core of the army is made up of 6000 long-service regulars, including the majority of the officer corps and NCOs, who are recruited by voluntary enlistment. No evidence of ethnic stacking in any of the sources. However, Tunisia is largely an ethnically homogenous society and thus the military is also perfectly ethnically stacked, although that means little in this context (Keegan 1983, 584-588; Minority Rights Group 2010).

> *Reason for power transfer*: retirement of leader
> *Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity)*: Bourgiba (Arab)
> *Post-transition leader (Ethnicity)*: Ben Ali (Arab)
> **Ethnic Change?**: **no**
> *Regional Change*: ?
> **Prior ethnic stacking**: **yes**

Tunisia 2011: Tunisia is largely an ethnically homogenous society and thus the military is also perfectly ethnically stacked, although that means little in this context (Keegan 1983, 584-588; Minority Rights Group 2010).

> *Reason for power transfer*: democratization with elections
> *Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity)*: Ben Ali then Ghannouchi then Mebazaa (all Arab)
> *Post-transition leader (Ethnicity)*: Marzouki (Arab)
> **Ethnic Change?**: **no**
> *Regional Change*: ?
> **Prior ethnic stacking**: **yes**

Zambia 1991: No particular ethnic group predominated in the military under Kaunda

and Bemba may even have been under-represented (Keegan 1983, 679-680; Minority Rights Group 2010; Minorities at Risk 2009).

Reason for power transfer: democratization with elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Kuanda (eastern Bemba)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Chiluba (eastern Bemba)
Ethnic Change?: no
Regional Change: no
Prior ethnic stacking: no

Zambia 2002: No evidence of any change in policy under Chiluba to promote Bemba within the military (Keegan 1983, 679-680; Minority Rights Group 2010; Minorities at Risk 2009).

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Chiluba (eastern Bemba)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Mwanawasa (southern Lamba & Lenje)
Ethnic Change?: yes
Regional Change: yes
Prior ethnic stacking: no

Zambia 2008: No evidence found of any changes to diverse military recruitment policies (Minority Rights Group 2010; Minorities at Risk 2009).

Reason for power transfer: natural death of leader followed by elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Mwanawasa (southern Lamba & Lenje)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Banda (Rhodesian)
Ethnic Change?: yes
Regional Change: yes
Prior ethnic stacking: no

Zambia 2011: No evidence found of any changes to diverse military recruitment policies (Minority Rights Group 2010; Minorities at Risk 2009).

Reason for power transfer: elections
Pre-transition leader (Ethnicity): Banda (Rhodesian)
Post-transition leader (Ethnicity): Sata (eastern Bemba)
Ethnic Change?: yes
Regional Change: yes
Prior ethnic stacking: no

C.4   Data Tables

Table C.1 – Ethnicity and the Military: Decolonization Data

Country	Ethnic Loyalty	Ethnicity of Leader	Officer Corps at Independence	Unmatched Officer Corps
Algeria	yes	Arab	mixed Arab and Berber	yes
Angola	no	Mestiço	Mestiço dominated	no
Benin	yes	Bariba/Mossi	Fon dominated	yes
Botswana	no	Tswana	no African officers	no
Burkina Faso	no	Mossi	Mossi dominated	no
Burundi	no	Tutsi	mixed Hutu and Tutsi	yes
Cameroon	yes	Fulani	Fulani/Peuhl dominated	no
Cape Verde	no	Mestiço	all Mestiço	no
Central African Republic	?	M'Baka	all M'Baka	no
Chad	yes	Sara	Sara dominated	no
Comoros	?	Anjouan	?	?
Congo-Brazzaville	no	Lari	M'Boshi dominated or diverse	yes
Cõte d'Ivoire	yes	Baoule	no African officers	no
DRC	no	Tetela	no African officers	no
Djibouti	yes	Issa	mixed Issa and Afar	yes
Egypt	no	Arab	diverse	yes
Equatorial Guinea	yes	Esangui Fang	no African officers	no
Eritrea	no	Biher-Tigrinya	diverse	yes
Ethiopia	no	Amhara	diverse	yes
Gabon	yes	Estuary Fang	Woleu Ntem Fang dominated	yes
Gambia	na	Mandinka	no African officers	no
Ghana	no	Nzima	Ewe, Ga, and Fante dominated	yes
Guinea	no	Malinké	diverse	yes
Guinea-Bissau	no	Mestiço	Balanta dominated	yes
Kenya	yes	Kikuyu	Kamba and Kalenjin dominated	yes
Lesotho	no	Basotho	no african officers or Basotho	no

Country	Ethnic Loyalty	Ethnicity of Leader	Officer Corps at Independence	Unmatched Officer Corps
Liberia	yes	Americo-Liberian	Americo-Liberian dominated	no
Libya	yes	Sanusi/Cyrenaican	Sanusi/Cyrenaican dominated	no
Madagascar	no	Tsimihety/Côtier	Merina dominated	yes
Malawi	yes	Chewa	no African officers	no
Mali	no	Malinké	Bambara dominated	yes
Mauritania	yes	Maure	Maure dominated	no
Mauritius	no	Hindu	no African officers	no
Morocco	no	Arab/Alawite	Berber dominated	yes
Mozambique	no	Shangaan	no African officers	no
Namibia	no	Ovambo	no African officers or Ovambo dominated	no
Niger	yes	Djerma	Djerma dominated	no
Nigeria	no	Gere/fulani	Igbo dominated	yes
Rwanda	yes	Hutu	all Hutu	no
São Tomé and Príncipe	no	Mestiǫ	no African Officers or all Mestiǫ	no
Senegal	no	Serer	diverse	yes
Seychelles	no	Mestiǫ	no African officers	no
Sierra Leone	yes	southern Mende	preponderance of northern tribes	yes
Somalia	yes	Hawiye	Darood dominant	yes
South Africa	no	diverse	Xhosa	yes
Sudan	yes	Muslim Jellaba	Muslim Jellaba dominated	no
Swaziland	no	Swazi	no African officers or all Swazi	no
Tanzania	no	Zanaki	no African officers	no
Togo	yes	Ewe	Ewe and Mina dominated	no
Tunisia	no	Arab	all Arab	no
Uganda	yes	Langi	diverse	yes
Zambia	no	Bemba	no African officers	no
Zimbabwe	yes	Shona	diverse	yes

Table C.2 – Ethnicity and the Military: Democratization Data

Country	Year	Reason for Power Transfer	Ethnic Change?	Prior Ethnic Army?	Coup Attempt?	Years until Coup
Algeria	1978	Natural Death	no	yes	no	-
Algeria	1999	Elections	no	?	no	-
Angola	1979	Natural Death	yes	no	no	-
Benin	1964	Coup then Elections	yes	yes	1965	1
Benin	1991	Elections	yes	no	1992	1
Benin	1996	Elections	yes	no	no	-
Benin	2006	Elections	yes	no	no	-
Botswana	1980	Natural Death	no	no	no	-
Botswana	1998	Retirement	no	no	no	-
Botswana	2008	Resignation	no	no	no	-
Burundi	1993	Elections	yes	yes	1993	0
Burundi	2003	Peace Agreement	yes	yes	no	-
Burundi	2005	Elections	no	no	no	-
Cameroon	1982	Retirement then Elections	yes	yes	1984	2
Cape Verde	1991	Elections	no	yes	no	-
Cape Verde	2001	Elections	no	yes	no	-
Cape Verde	2011	Elections	no	yes	no	-
Central African Republic	1993	Elections	yes	yes	1996	3
Comoros	1990	Coup then Elections	yes	?	1992	2
Comoros	1996	Coup then Elections	no	?	no	-
Comoros	1998	Natural Death	yes	?	1999	1
Comoros	2006	Elections	yes	?	no	-
Comoros	2011	Elections	yes	?	no	-
Congo-Brazzaville	1992	Elections	yes	yes	no	-
Cõte d'Ivoire	1993	Natural Death	no	yes	no	-
Cõte d'Ivoire	2000	Coup then Elections	yes	yes	2001	1

Country	Year	Reason for Power Transfer	Ethnic Change?	Prior Ethnic Army?	Coup Attempt?	Years until Coup
Cõte d'Ivoire	2011	Coup then Elections	yes	no	no	-
Djibouti	1999	Elections	no	yes	no	-
Egypt	1970	Natural Death	no	yes	no	-
Egypt	2012	Coup then Elections	no	yes	2013	1
Ethiopia	2012	Natural Death	yes	no	no	-
Gabon	1967	Natural Death	yes	yes	no	-
Gabon	2009	Natural Death	no	yes	no	-
Ghana	1969	Resignation then Elections	yes	yes	1972	3
Ghana	1979	Coup then Elections	yes	yes	1981	2
Ghana	2000	Elections	yes	no	no	-
Ghana	2009	Elections	yes	no	no	-
Ghana	2012	Natural Death	yes	no	no	-
Guinea	2010	Natural Death then Elections	yes	yes	2011	1
Guinea Bissau	2000	Coup then Elections	yes	no	2000	0
Guinea Bissau	2005	Coup then Elections	yes	yes	2008	3
Guinea Bissau	2009	Coup then Elections	yes	no	2010	1
Kenya	1978	Natural Death	yes	yes	1982	4
Kenya	2002	Elections	yes	yes	no	-
Lesotho	1993	Coup then Elections	no	yes	1994	1
Lesotho	1998	Elections	no	yes	no	-
Lesotho	2012	Elections	no	yes	2014	2
Liberia	1971	Natural Death	no	yes	no	-
Liberia	1997	Peace Treaty then Elections	yes	no	no	-
Liberia	2005	Elections	yes	no	no	-
Madagascar	1993	Elections	no	no	no	-
Madagascar	1996	Impeachment then Elections	no	no	no	-
Madagascar	2002	Elections	yes	no	2006	4
Malawi	1994	Retirement then Elections	yes	yes	no	-

Country	Year	Reason for Power Transfer	Ethnic Change?	Prior Ethnic Army?	Coup Attempt?	Years until Coup
Malawi	2004	Elections	yes	yes	no	-
Malawi	2012	Natural Death	yes	?	no	-
Mali	1992	Coup then Elections	no	no	no	-
Mali	2002	Elections	no	no	no	-
Mauritania	2007	Coup then Elections	no	yes	2008	1
Mauritius	1982	Elections	no	no	no	-
Mauritius	1995	Elections	no	no	no	-
Mauritius	2000	Elections	no	no	no	-
Mauritius	2003	Resignation	yes	no	no	-
Mauritius	2005	Elections	yes	no	no	-
Mozambique	1986	Natural Death	no	no	no	-
Mozambique	2005	Elections	yes	no	no	-
Namibia	2004	Elections	no	no	no	-
Niger	1993	Elections	yes	yes	1996	3
Niger	1999	Coup then Elections	yes	no	no	-
Niger	2011	Coup then Elections	yes	no	no	-
Nigeria	1979	Elections	yes	no	1983	4
Nigeria	1999	Natural Death then Elections	yes	yes	no	-
Nigeria	2007	Elections	yes	no	no	-
Nigeria	2010	Elections	yes	no	no	-
Rwanda	2000	Resignation	yes	no	no	-
São Tomé and Príncipe	1991	Elections	no	yes	1995	4
São Tomé and Príncipe	2001	Elections	no	yes	2003	2
São Tomé and Príncipe	2011	Elections	no	yes	no	-
Senegal	1981	Retirement	no	no	no	-
Senegal	2000	Elections	yes	no	no	-
Senegal	2012	Elections	yes	no	no	-
Seychelles	2004	Resignation	no	yes	no	-
Sierra Leone	1964	Natural Death	no	no	no	-

Country	Year	Reason for Power Transfer	Ethnic Change?	Prior Ethnic Army?	Coup Attempt?	Years until Coup
Sierra Leone	1967	Elections	yes	yes	1967	0
Sierra Leone	1996	Coup then Elections	yes	yes	1996	0
Sierra Leone	2007	Peace Treaty then Elections	yes	no	no	-
Somalia	1967	Elections	yes	yes	1969	2
Somalia	2012	Elections	no	yes	no	-
South Africa	1994	Elections	yes	no	no	-
South Africa	1999	Elections	no	no	no	-
South Africa	2008	Resignation	yes	no	no	-
South Africa	2009	Elections	yes	no	no	-
Sudan	1986	Coup then Elections	no	yes	1989	3
Tanzania	1985	Retirement	yes	no	no	-
Tanzania	1995	Elections	yes	no	no	-
Tanzania	2005	Elections	yes	no	no	-
Tunisia	1987	Retirement	no	yes	no	-
Tunisia	2011	Elections	no	yes	no	-
Zambia	1991	Elections	no	no	no	-
Zambia	2002	Elections	yes	no	no	-
Zambia	2008	Natural Death then Elections	yes	no	no	-
Zambia	2011	Elections	yes	no	no	-

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Appendix D

Regression Analysis: Supplementary Material

This appendix contains full descriptions of all control variables used in the regression analysis and summary statistics for them. It also provides the complete regression results for all robustness checks conducted.

D.1 Control Variables: Descriptions, Sources, and Summary Statistics

Detailed Descriptions

African Union member (AU.member): Coded 1 if, after the Lomè Declaration of July 2000 that required coups to be condemned and sanctions imposed, the country was a non-suspended member of the African Union in the year of the power transfer or the power transfer was part of a planned return to civilian rule that led to the reinstatement of membership. Morocco was not admitted as a member of the AU until January 2017. Eritrea voluntarily broke with the AU from November 2009 to January 2011. The following countries have been suspended: Burkina Faso (September 2015), Central African Republic (March 2013- April 2016), Côte d'Ivoire (November 2010-April 2011), Egypt (July 2013-June 2014), Guinea (December 2008-December 2010), Guinea-Bissau (April 2012-present), Madagascar (March 2009-January 2014), Mali (March 2012-October 2012), Mauritania (August 2005-March 2007; August 2008-July 2009), Niger (February 2010-March 2011), and Togo (February-May 2005). See Omorogbe 2011; also *The Guardian*, March 23, 2012; *International Business Times*, January 31, 2017; *Reuters*, January 27, 2014; *Voice of Africa*, September 18, 2015. In practice, every transition after 1999 received a coding of 1.

Anticolonial Insurgency: This variable was coded as 1 if any political movement engaged in armed resistance against colonialism, or apartheid in the case of the southern African countries, in the decade prior to independence, regardless of whether they won that struggle. Otherwise, the variable is coded 0. Cases of armed resistance include the ALN in Algeria, UNITA and the MPLA in Angola, the ALNK in Cameroon, the PAIGC in Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, the EPLF in Eritrea, the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, the Malagasy Emergency, the ALN in Morocco, FRELIMO in Mozambique, SWAPO in Namibia,

the ANC in South Africa, the PSD in Tunisia, and ZANU and ZAPU in Zimbabwe.

Change in Expenditures per Soldier (change.exp.per.sold): Percent change in military expenditures per soldier (*exp.per.sold*) in the four years following a power transfer. If a coup or other change in leadership occurred prior to four years, the window of observation was truncated and the variable calculated from the shorter time period. Data drawn from the Correlates of War National Military Capabilities dataset, version 5.0 (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). Available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities, accessed July 12, 2017.

Change in Military Expenditures (change.mil.expend): Percent change in military expenditures (*mil.expend*) in the four years following a power transfer. If a coup or other change in leadership occurred prior to four years, the window of observation was truncated and the variable calculated from the shorter time period. Data drawn from the Correlates of War National Military Capabilities dataset, version 5.0 (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). Available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities, accessed July 12, 2017.

Change in Military Personnel (change.mil.personnel): Percent change in the number of military personnel (*mil.personnel*) in the four years following a power transfer. If a coup or other change in leadership occurred prior to four years, the window of observation was truncated and the variable calculated from the shorter time period. Data drawn from the Correlates of War National Military Capabilities dataset, version 5.0 (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). Available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities, accessed July 12, 2017.

Change in Civil Liberties (change.cl): Coded as the difference in the Freedom House civil liberty score between the year in which the election was held and the end of the four year windows of observation after the power transfer. If a coup or other change in leadership occurred prior to four years, the window of observation was truncated and the variable calculated from the shorter time period. A negative score indicates that civil liberties have improved, for example if the score changed from 2 to 1.

Civil Liberties: The Freedom House civil liberties score for the year of the power transfer. Coded on a scale from 1-7 with 1 being the highest, or most free.

Civil Armed Conflict: Civil wars may generate separate pressures on civil-military relations and inspire coup attempts for reasons outside the scope of the theory articulated here. Thus a control variable is included for whether there is an ongoing civil war. For the decolonization data, the civil war variable is coded 1 if a civil war breaks out within 5 years of independence, and 0 otherwise. For the democratization data, the civil war variable is coded 1 if there is an ongoing civil war in the year of the transition or in any part of the four year observation window following it, and 0 otherwise. Data is drawn from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 17.1 (Gleditsch et al. 2002). UCDP has a conflict threshold of 25 battle deaths in a year to count as an armed conflict. Coups were removed by line-item deleting any observation with a military faction as a participant.

Coup caused transfer: Coded 1 if the constitutional or electoral transfer of power immediately followed a successful coup (within two years), and 0 otherwise. See Table C.3.

Diamond production: Drawn from Macartan Humphrey's data (2005). Yearly production in carats per capita. The data was expanded through 2016 using population data from the World Bank and mineral data from the U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Information for Africa and the Middle East at https://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/africa.html #bc (last accessed July 9, 2017). All diamond data is based on official trade statistics and thus does not include black market or illicit production, which occurs frequently in conflict and post-conflict countries.

Economic shock (≤-1%): Coded 1 if, in any year during the four year period following the leadership transition, the country experienced a negative growth rate of 1% or more, and 0 otherwise. If during the four year period of observation there was a coup attempt or another constitutional change in leadership, the period was truncated so as not to introduce the potential for reverse causality or other threats to inference. Coup attempts themselves have been known to have disastrous effects on economic growth, especially when they descend into widespread violence. Calculated from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (2015).

Economic shock (≤-3%): Coded parallel to *Economic shock (≥-1%)* but for a negative growth rate of 3% or more in the four year period following the leadership transition. Calculated from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (2015).

Economic shock (≤-5%): Coded parallel to *Economic shock (≥-1%)* but for a negative growth rate of 5% or more in the four year period following the leadership transition. Calculated from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (2015).

Economic shock (≤-10%): Coded parallel to *Economic shock (≥-1%)* but for a negative growth rate of 10% or more in the four year period following the leadership transition. Calculated from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (2015). Only one country had a growth rate this low (Nigeria in 1985) and so the variable is not ultimately included in the regression analysis.

Ethnic Diversity: In baseline models, Roeder's ELF score is used (2001). Alternative measures include the ethnic fractionalization scores of Alesina et al. (2003), Fearon (2003), and Posner (2004(a)).

Ethnic parties: Coded in the immediate pre-decolonization elections. See Appendix A for full coding guidelines and narratives.

Ethnic parties vote share: Coded in the immediate pre-decolonization elections. See Appendix A for full coding guidelines and narratives.

Ethnic violence: Coded in the immediate pre-decolonization period. See Appendix A for full coding guidelines and narratives.

Expenditures per Soldier (exp.per.sold): Calculated by dividing military expenditures (*Mil.Expend*) by military personnel for each year, both drawn from the Correlates of War National Military Capabilities dataset, version 5.0 (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). Available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities, ac-

cessed July 12, 2017.

Foreign Military Protection: A country is coded as having foreign military protection if, in the immediate years following independence, a foreign government had garrisoned its own combat troops on the country's soil or maintained a military base. The French, for example, maintained base facilities in Benin, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo through at least 1968 (Crocker 1968, 22). Britain maintained military bases in Egypt (Suez) until 1954, Kenya for only a couple years after base completion in the early 1960s, and Libya until the mid-1970s (British National Archives, WO 32/16259, document 54A; Crocker 1974, 280-282; Keegan 1983, 366-375). The U.S. also maintained a military base in Libya until the mid-1970s (Keegan 1983, 366-375) and Cuba sent combat troops to Angola to support the government in its counterinsurgency efforts after independence (Keegan 1983, 15-17). Arguably, foreign military protection also exists if a significant proportion of the officer corps is comprised of seconded, foreign personnel. However, this was a ubiquitous condition in post-colonial Africa. At the time of independence, the armies of the former Belgian colonies (Burundi, the Congo, and Rwanda) were entirely officered by Belgians—they had zero native officers.[1] Even the British, who had begun preparations for decolonization in the 1950s, had yet to Africanize more than a quarter of the officer corps of the Nigerian and Ghanaian armies (where they had invested the most in Africanization). In 1957, Ghana had 29 African officers out of 238 and, in 1960, Nigeria had 82 African officers out of 325.[2] The only countries that did not rely excessively on foreign officers in the first years of independence were those that fought anti-colonial insurgencies and thus had built military forces of their own. These countries are, however, captured by the *Anticolonial insurgency* variable and thus foreign military protection is constrained to the maintenance of foreign military bases.

Free and fair: Indicates whether an election was considered free and fair (1 if yes; else 0). Drawn from Lindberg's data on African elections (2009).

French colonialism: Coded 1 if the territory was colonized by France, and 0 otherwise. In the rare case where colonial authority switched hands, France is only coded as the colonizer if they controlled the territory immediately prior to independence.

Group over 50% of pop: Drawn from James Fearon's data on ethnic fractionalization (2003). Indicator variable coded 1 if any ethnic group constitutes over 50% of the total population, and 0 otherwise.

Herbst difficult geography (herbst.difficult): Coded 1 if a country fits Herbst's categories of "difficult" or "hinterland" geography, and 0 otherwise. Difficult geography entails either noncontiguous territory or two or more dense population centers separated by wide swaths of poorly inhabited territory. Hinterland geography refers to a single dense population center around the capital with large areas of relatively uninhabited territory extending far away from the capital. Each of these conditions theoretically makes it difficult for countries to consolidate power over their entire territory, increasing the capacity of potential dissenters to mount a challenge. Data drawn from Herbst 2000.

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[1]Lefèvre and Lefèvre 2006, 11; Meditz 1993.
[2]Clayton 1989, 160.

Interstate war: Wars with foreign powers may either generate separate pressures on civil-military relations and inspire coup attempts for reasons outside the scope of the theory articulated here or keep the military busy and thus dampen their propensity to seize power. Thus a control variable is included for whether there is an ongoing interstate war. For the decolonization data, the *Interstate war* variable is coded 1 if a war breaks out with a foreign power within 5 years of independence, and 0 otherwise. For the democratization data, the civil war variable is coded 1 if there is an ongoing interstate war in the year of the transition or in any part of the four year observation window following it (truncated in the event of a coup attempt or additional transfer of power), and 0 otherwise. Data is drawn from both the correlates of war project, Interstate Wars version 4.0 (Sarkees & Wayman 2010), and the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 17.1 (Gleditsch et al. 2002). UCDP has the lower conflict threshold, necessitating 25 battle deaths in a year to count as an armed conflict while to count as a war in COW, the conflict "must involve sustained combat, involving organized armed forces, resulting in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related combatant fatalities within a twelve month period." Moreover, to count as a participant in that war, a state must commit at least 1000 troops or suffer at least 100 battle related fatalities. The lower threshold is used since so few African conflicts met the higher level.

Largest group % of pop: Drawn from James Fearon's data on ethnic fractionalization (2003). Percent share in the total population of the largest ethnic group.

Ln GDP/k: Natural log of GDP per capita from the year of independence (decolonization data) or the year of the power transfer (for democratization data). The decolonization data is calculated from the Maddison Project's historic economic and population data, which is in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars (2014). To include recent observations, the democratization data is calculated from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (2015).

Lowest CAB as % of GDP: An alternative measure to capture economic downturns was constructed using the country's lowest (i.e., worst) current account balance (CAB) as a percentage of GDP in the four year window following the power transfer. Large current account balance deficits tend to cause (or at least reflect) greater financial struggles as well as a government's inability to pay its employees—including the military. Current account balance data was drawn from the World Bank data repository (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BN.CAB.XOKA.CD).

Margin of victory: Drawn from Staffan Lindberg's African elections data (2009). The margin of victory is measured by subtracting the vote share of the second place candidate or party from that of the winner. Updated through 2016 using the African Elections Database and other sources.

Military expenditures (mil.expend): Military expenditures in thousands of 2001 U.S. dollars. From the Correlates of War National Military Capabilities dataset, version 5.0 (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). Available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/datasets/national-material-capabilities, accessed July 12, 2017.

Military Personnel (mil.personnel): Number of military personnel in thousands. Zeros were changed to 0.1 to allow for the calculations of other variables. From the Correlates of War National Military Capabilities dataset, version 5.0 (Singer, Bremer, and

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*Oil Exporter at Independence (*oil.export.ind*)*: Coded 1 if oil was a significant export at the time of independence, and 0 otherwise. Data drawn from a variety of sources included the CIA World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/), Freedom House Reports, Macartan Humphrey's 2005 oil production and reserves data, Minority Rights Group 2010, Keegan 1983, United Nations World Economic Survey 1965, U.S. Department of State Bilateral Relations Fact Sheets (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/), and the U.S. Energy Information Administration (http://www.eia.doe.gov/ipm/supply.html).

Oil or diamonds: Coded 1 if, in the year of the power transfer, the country was an exporter of oil or diamonds, and 0 otherwise. Drawn from Macartan Humphrey's data (2005).

Oil production: Oil production is calculated as the daily per capita barrel production for the year of the power transfer. Drawn from Macartan Humphrey's data (2005). The data was expanded through 2016 using population data from the World Bank and mineral data from the U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Information for Africa and the Middle East at https://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/africa.html#bc (last accessed July 9, 2017).

Polity: Polity score from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016), on a scale from -10 to 10 with -10 being most autocratic and 10 most democratic. Coded for the year of the power transfer or, if for instability reasons that year is uncoded and the regime survives, the following year.

Popular Unrest: This measure is constructed from Banks' data on social unrest (2001) and the Social Conflict Analysis Database for Africa (Saleyhan et al. 2012). Banks indexes assassinations, purges of government officials, guerrilla activity, protests, riots, and strikes from around 1960-1999. SCAD similarly measures various forms of social unrest, from protests to rebellions to government infighting, from 1990-2015. As significant data was missing using either dataset individually, because of their limited temporal ranges, they were combined. The Banks index, which picks up far fewer events than SCAD, was rescaled according to the following procedure: 0=none, 1=low, 2=medium, 3-4=high, 5+= very high. For the SCAD data, I first removed all government infighting events as they capture the same outcome as the military coups dependent variables, and then counted the number of events per country-year. The data was then converted into the index using the following codings: 0=none, 1-4=low, 5-10=medium, 11-20=high, 21+=very high. The index then received a 0-4 numerical coding with none equal to 0 and very high equal to 4. The variable is coded in the year of the power transfer to capture the general environment of instability facing the incoming elected leader.

Prior coups: The count of the total number of coup attempts, both successes and failures, in the 10 years prior to the constitutional or electoral transfer of power. See Appendix B.

Prior successful coups: The count of the total number of successful coups in the 10 years prior to the constitutional or electoral transfer of power. See Appendix B.

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Prior successful constitutional transfer: Coded 1 if at any point in the past—no matter how long ago—constitutional mechanisms led to the transfer of executive power without a successful coup attempt occurring within the subsequent four years, and 0 otherwise. See Appendix C.

Prior successful electoral transfer: Coded 1 if at any point in the past—no matter how long ago—elections led to the transfer of executive power without a successful coup attempt occurring within the subsequent four years, and 0 otherwise. See Appendix C.

Regime continuity: Drawn from Staffan Lindberg's African elections data (2009). Coded 1 if the pre- and post-transition leaders belong to the same political party or if the pre-transition leader held an integral post in the prior administration, such as the vice-president, foreign minister, or secretary of state. Else, coded 0.

Regime type: A dummy variable was constructed for non-autocratic, or presumably liberalizing and democratic regimes (*Democracy.GWF*), from the Geddes, Wright & Frantz (2014) data on autocratic regime types, available at http://sites.psu.edu/dictators/. The variables is coded in the year after the power transfer to capture the nature of the new regime as the GWF codings often still list the old regime type in the transfer year. An exception is when the regime collapsed or was overthrown in the same year as the transfer, in which case it is coded in that year. Alternative measures, *Electoral.Democracy* and *Liberalizing*, were constructed only for the electoral transitions, based on Lindberg and Clark (2008, 91 & 101-103) but coded to allow for overtime variation. An electoral democracy had free and fair elections that led to the power transfer, as coded by Lindberg 2009, and a Freedom House civil liberties score of 3 or higher (i.e., 1, 2, or 3) in the year of the transition. A liberalizing regime does not qualify as an electoral democracy, but holds elections and either has a civil liberties score of 3 or higher or has improved its score compared to two years prior to the election. Coverage was expanded using Freedom House's reports on the quality of elections and its *Civil Liberties* variable.

Years since last coup attempt (yrs.attempt): The number of years prior to the constitutional transfer of power since the last coup attempt. If a country had never experienced a coup attempt, the variable was coded as the time since independence. This is consistent with how Powell 2012 measures prior coup history. Data drawn from Appendices B & C.

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Summary Statistics

Table D.1 – Summary Statistics for Decolonization Control Variables

Variable	Min	Max	% coded 1	Mean	Std Dev	N
Colonial Experience						
Anticolonial war	0	1	26.4			53
Ethnic parties	0	1	58.8			51

Variable	Min	Max	% coded 1	Mean	Std Dev	N
Ethnic parties vote share	0	100		32.786	38.217	42
Ethnic violence	0	1	29.4			51
French colonialism	0	1	37.7			53
Ethnicity						
ELF	0.04	0.93		0.587	0.261	52
EF Alesina	0	0.93		0.631	0.249	52
EF Fearon	0.039	0.953		0.662	0.241	48
CF Fearon	0	0.733		0.404	0.212	48
Posner's PREG	0	0.8		0.368	0.249	43
Largest group % of pop	0.12	0.98		0.476	0.247	50
Group over 50% of pop	0	1	38.0			50
Wealth and Growth						
Ln GDP/k	5.883	8.339		6.896	0.584	53
Oil exporter at independence	0	1	17.0			53
Civil armed conflict	0	1	9.4			53
Foreign military protection	0	1	30.2			53
Herbst difficult geography	0	1	34.0			53
Interstate war	0	1	11.3			53

Table D.2 – Summary Statistics for Democratization Control Variables (All Constitutional Transfers)

Variable	Min	Max	% coded 1	Mean	Std Dev	N
Colonial Experience						
Ethnic parties	0	1	57.9			95
Ethnic violence	0	1	36.1			97
French colonialism	0	1	34.3			102
Ethnicity						
ELF	0.04	0.93		0.584	0.281	99
EF Alesina	0	0.91		0.618	0.256	99
EF Fearon	0.039	0.953		0.685	0.224	90
CF Fearon	0	0.733		0.3954	0.200	91
Posner's PREG	0	0.71		0.385	0.238	84
Largest group % of pop	0.12	0.98		0.451	0.222	96
Group over 50% of pop	0	1	36.5			96
Wealth and Growth						
Ln GDP/k	4.623	9.230		6.617	1.052	97
Economic shock ($\leq$-1%)	0	1	28.6			98
Economic shock ($\leq$-3%)	0	1	14.3			98
Economic shock ($\leq$-5%)	0	1	8.2			98
Economic shock ($\leq$-10%)	0	1	1.0			98
Lowest CAB as % of GDP	-65.029	8.182		-9.745	11.666	80
Natural Resources						
Oil production	0	0.145		0.006	0.019	102
Diamond production	0	16.747		0.396	2.144	102
Oil or diamonds	0	1	52.9			102
Military						
Military personnel	0.1	439		30.713	58.060	93
Ln military personnel	-2.303	6.084		2.385	1.597	93
Military expenditures	2347	4582000		403182.4	931839.3	91
Expenditures per soldier	428.57	130000		13314.79	20128.72	88

Variable	Min	Max	% coded 1	Mean	Std Dev	N
Δ Military personnel	-0.988	9		0.199	1.369	85
Δ Military expenditures	-1	10.538		0.347	1.375	84
Δ Expenditures per soldier	-0.981	15.923		0.379	1.847	81
Legitimacy and Regime Type						
Civil liberties	1	7		3.830	1.388	94
Δ Civil liberties	-2	2		0.149	0.703	94
Polity	-9	10		4.138	5.176	94
Polity^2	1	100		43.628	27.634	94
Prior successful constitutional transfer	0	1	50.0			102
Liberalizing	0	1	23.0			74
Electoral Democracy	0	1	38.7			75
Democracy.GWF	0	1	60.5			81
Prior Coups						
Prior coups	0	6		0.843	1.333	102
Prior successful coups	0	3		0.333	0.603	102
Coup caused transfer	0	1	16.7			102
Years since last attempt	0	55		15.265	13.780	102
Instability						
Civil armed conflict	0	1	21.6			102
Interstate war	0	0	0.0			102
Popular Unrest	0	4		1.641	1.379	92
Herbst difficult geography	0	1	27.5			102
AU member	0	1	50.0			102

Table D.3 – Summary Statistics for Democratization Control Variables (Electoral Transfers)

Variable	Min	Max	% coded 1	Mean	Std Dev	N
Colonial Experience						
Ethnic parties	0	1	56.9			72
Ethnic violence	0	1	37.0			73
French colonialism	0	1	36.4			77
Ethnicity						
ELF	0.04	0.93		0.591	0.283	74
EF Alesina	0	0.91		0.641	0.249	74
EF Fearon	0.039	0.953		0.707	0.197	67
CF Fearon	0	0.733		0.417	0.195	67
Posner's PREG	0	0.71		0.393	0.240	63
Largest group % of pop	0.12	0.98		0.425	0.197	71
Group over 50% of pop	0	1	33.8			71
Wealth and Growth						
Ln GDP/k	4.623	8.669		6.495	0.922	74
Economic shock ($\leq$-1%)	0	1	24.3			74
Economic shock ($\leq$-3%)	0	1	13.5			74
Economic shock ($\leq$-5%)	0	1	8.1			74
Economic shock ($\leq$-10%)	0	1	1.4			74
Lowest CAB as % of GDP	-65.029	8.182		-9.725	12.284	64
Natural Resources						
Oil production	0	0.067		0.003	0.010	77
Diamond production	0	0.997		0.049	0.148	77
Oil or diamonds	0	1	50.6			77
Military						
Military personnel	0.1	439		27.36	58.180	70
Ln military personnel	-2.303	6.084		2.280	1.536	70
Military expenditures	2347	4582000		421971.8	1006780	67
Expenditures per soldier	428.57	100000		12081.41	16610.59	65

Variable	Min	Max	% coded 1	Mean	Std Dev	N
Δ Military personnel	-0.988	9.0		0.231	1.563	65
Δ Military expenditures	-1	10.538		0.409	1.545	63
Δ Expenditures per soldier	-0.981	15.923		0.497	2.104	61
Legitimacy and Regime Type						
Civil liberties	1	7		3.699	1.266	73
Δ Civil liberties	-2	2		0.137	0.751	73
Polity	-7	10		5.557	3.553	70
Polity^2	1	100		43.329	28.698	70
Prior successful constitutional transfer	0	1	55.8			77
Prior successful electoral transfer	0	1	39.0			77
Liberalizing	0	1	23.3			73
Electoral Democracy	0	1	37.8			74
Democracy.GWF	0	1	73.3			59
Prior Coups						
Prior coups	0	5		0.987	1.332	77
Prior successful coups	0	3		0.416	0.656	77
Coup caused transfer	0	1	22.1			77
Years since attempt	0	55		13.390	13.384	77
Instability						
Civil armed conflict	0	1	22.1			77
Interstate war	0	0	0.0			77
Popular unrest	0	4		1.913	1.337	69
Herbst difficult geography	0	1	27.3			77
AU member	0	1	53.2			77
Election Characteristics						
Free and fair	0	1	73.3			75
Margin of victory	0.46	100		27.520	24.314	76
Regime continuity	0	1	39.7			58

D.2   Robustness Checks

This section documents the various robustness checks that were run on both the decolonization and democratization data. Table D.4 shows the results when the democratization analysis is conducted on the most homogeneous subset of the electoral transfers of power data: only those transfers that resulted from regularly scheduled elections or a planned democratization not preceded by a coup attempt. Tables D.5-D.6 show the results when nearly ethnically homogeneous countries are removed from the datasets and the baseline models rerun (Cape Verde, Lesotho, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, Swaziland, and Tunisia). Table D.7 provides on overview of the alternative measures and new variables that were included in the remaining robustness checks and indicate in which tables their results may be found. The remaining tables contain these results.

Table D.4 – Most Homogeneous Subset of Elections Data: Regularly Scheduled or Planned Democratization

	coup attempt after power transfer (logit)	
Ethnic Change	3.3767	3.9318†
	(2.1719)	(2.2546)
Prior Ethnic Stacking	0.5902	2.0667†
	(1.7399)	(1.1328)
Ethnic Parties	-0.9330	0.2034
	(1.9583)	(1.2695)
Ethnic Diversity	-6.5190*	-4.8017
	(3.2627)	(3.1226)
Ln GDP/k	-0.7422	-0.6247
	(0.8478)	(0.7775)
Economic Shock	-1.0893	1.1445
	(2.0937)	(1.3143)
Prior Coups	-0.2311	0.3950
	(0.8686)	(0.6351)
Δ Civil Liberties	-1.9390	
	(1.3456)	
Intercept	4.7531	4.7531
	(6.1599)	(4.7531)
N	41	42

$***p \leq 0.001, **p \leq 0.01, *p \leq 0.05, ^{\dagger}p \leq 0.10$

Table D.5 – Excluding Ethnically Homogeneous Countries: Decolonization

	coup attempts in 15 years following independence
	(negative binomial)
Ethnic Loyalty	0.3339
	(0.3892)
Unmatched Officer Corps	0.9712*
	(0.3825)
Ethnic Parties	1.3220**
	(0.4874)
Ethnic Diversity	-0.4329
	(0.7311)
Foreign Protection	-0.1191
	(0.4070)
Ln GDP/k	-0.5683
	(0.3463)
Intercept	2.9536
	(2.2961)
N	43

$* * *p \leq 0.001, * * p \leq 0.01, *p \leq 0.05, ^{\dagger}p \leq 0.10$

Table D.6 – Excluding Ethnically Homogeneous Countries: Democratization

| | coup attempt after power transfer (logit) | |
	all constitutional	electoral only
Ethnic Change	1.9666	4.9126*
	(1.2522)	(2.3951)
Prior Ethnic Stacking	1.8088*	2.5049*
	(0.7649)	(1.0855)
Ethnic Parties	-0.3271	-1.0841
	(0.7863)	(1.0518)
Ethnic Diversity	-0.4778	-6.6007*
	(2.1038)	(3.1458)
Ln GDPk	-0.1618	0.6991
	(0.5425)	(0.7913)
Economic Shock	0.7796	0.5710
	(0.9834)	(1.1718)
Prior Coups	0.5500*	1.3624**
	(0.2783)	(0.5076)
Δ Civil Liberties	-0.4488	0.2960
	(0.5035)	(0.6135)
Intercept	-2.7632	-7.2236
	(3.5677)	(5.1109)
N	71	56

$***p \leq 0.001, **p \leq 0.01, *p \leq 0.05, ^{\dagger}p \leq 0.10$

Table D.7 – Summary of Alternative Measures and Additional Variables for Robustness Checks

Concept	Measures	Tables
ethnic politicization (ethnic parties)	ethnic parties vote share ethnic violence	D.9 D.9, D.16, D.22
ethnic diversity (ELF)	EF Alesina EF Fearon CF Fearon Posner's PREG largest group % of pop any group over 50% of pop	D.8, D.11
economic shock (≥1%)	≥ 3% ≥ 5% lowest CAB as % of GDP	D.12, D.18
natural resources	oil exporter at independence oil production diamond production oil or diamonds	D.10 D.12, D.18 D.12, D.18 D.12, D.18
prior coups (prior attempts)	prior successful coups coup caused transfer years since last attempt	D.15, D.21
instability	civil armed conflict interstate war popular unrest	D.10, D.15, D.21 D.10 D.15, D.21

Concept	Measures	Tables
legitimacy (Δ civil liberties)	civil liberties polity polity^2 liberalizing electoral democracy democracy (GWF)	D.14, D.20
military organization	military personnel military expenditures expenditures per soldier Δ military personnel Δ military expenditures Δ military expenditures per soldier	D.13, D.19
other colonial experience	french colonialism anticolonial war	D.9, D.16, D.22 D.9
Herbst difficult geography		D.10, D.16, D.22
IO deterrence	AU member	D.16, D.22

Table D.8 – Decolonization Robustness Checks: Ethnic Diversity and Dominance

	baseline	robustness checks					
		coup attempts in 15 years following independence (negative binomial)					
Ethnic Loyalty	0.3959	0.3873	0.3526	0.2694	0.3576	0.3956	0.3548
	(0.3956)	(0.3971)	(0.4085)	(0.4045)	(0.4115)	(0.3977)	(0.4012)
Unmatched Officer Corps	1.10173**	1.1389*	1.1428**	1.1868**	0.9591*	1.0707**	1.0892**
	(0.3778)	(0.3970)	(0.3989)	(0.3946)	(0.3920)	(0.3865)	(0.3807)
Ethnic Parties	1.4893**	1.5173*	1.2684*	1.2615**	1.7503**	1.3712**	1.4612**
	(0.4844)	(0.5360)	(0.4943)	(0.4835)	(0.5664)	(0.4868)	(0.4908)
Ethnic Diversity	-0.3050						
	(0.7321)						
Foreign Protection	-0.0929	-0.0490	-0.0462	-0.0088	-0.0616	-0.1017	-0.0760
	(0.4141)	(0.4496)	(0.4297)	(0.4223)	(0.4246)	(0.4202)	(0.4217)
Ln GDP/k	-0.6336†	-0.6546†	-0.6741†	-0.6582†	-0.8614*	-0.6256†	-0.6501†
	(0.3444)	(0.3558)	(0.3554)	(0.3561)	(0.3838)	(0.3429)	(0.3473)
EF Alesina		-0.2992					
		(1.1759)					
EF Fearon			0.5196				
			(0.9654)				
CF Fearon				0.8807			
				(0.9899)			
PREG					-0.8263		
					(0.8486)		
Largest Group over 50%						-0.1563	
						(0.8797)	
Any Group over 50%							0.1499
							(0.4112)
Intercept	3.0374	3.1505	2.8852	2.7620	4.6410†	2.9836	2.9655
	(2.3089)	(2.5467)	(2.4227)	(2.4245)	(2.5635)	(2.2711)	(2.2687)
N	48	48	45	45	41	47	47

$* * * p \leq 0.001, * * p \leq 0.01, * p \leq 0.05, {}^\dagger p \leq 0.10$

Table D.9 – Decolonization Robustness Checks: Colonial Experience

	baseline	robustness checks			
		coup attempts in 15 years following independence (negative binomial)			
Ethnic Loyalty	0.39587 (0.39564)	0.145312 (0.465275)	0.9092* (0.4375)	0.3814 (0.3864)	0.33911 (0.38742)
Unmatched Officer Corps	1.10173** (0.37781)	1.078580** (0.409593)	1.0925* (0.4460)	1.0782** (0.3789)	1.12685** (0.37230)
Ethnic Parties	1.48931** (0.48438)			1.4887** (0.4803)	1.30330** (0.48379)
Ethnic Diversity	-0.30497 (0.73211)	-0.392955 (0.761759)	0.3995 ()0.8031	-0.2987 (0.7315)	-0.34892 (0.70861)
Foreign Protection	-0.09293 (0.41408)	0.086872 (0.457024)	0.0336 (0.4720)		-0.06016 (0.40401)
Ln GDP/k	-0.63355† (0.34442)	-0.459618 (0.356639)	-0.2233 (0.3531)	-0.6604† (0.3446)	-0.48545 (0.33995)
Ethnic Parties Vote Share		0.016526** (0.005702)			
Ethnic Violence			0.2487 (0.4952)		
French Colonialism				0.1070 (0.3776)	
Anticolonial War					-0.54844 (0.47580)
Intercept	3.03740 (2.478628)	2.420703 (2.30887)	0.4559 (2.4452)	3.1672 (2.3108)	2.30003 (2.24541)
N	48	39	48	48	48

$***p \leq 0.001, **p \leq 0.01, *p \leq 0.05, ^\dagger p \leq 0.10$

Table D.10 – Decolonization Robustness Checks: Other

	baseline	robustness checks			
		coup attempts in 15 years following independence (negative binomial)			
Ethnic Loyalty	0.39587 (0.39564)	0.39433 (0.39786)	0.48379 (0.36584)	0.39859 (0.39679)	0.3946 (0.3990)
Unmatched Officer Corps	1.10173** (0.37781)	1.24859** (0.39135)	1.72182*** (0.43489)	1.10417** (0.38054)	1.1047** (0.3807)
Ethnic Parties	1.48931** (0.48438)	1.67215*** (0.50489)	1.44480** (0.44952)	1.47582** (0.50005)	1.4773** (0.4985)
Ethnic Diversity	-0.30497 (0.73211)	-0.53760 (0.73696)	-0.83846 (0.69121)	-0.31512 (0.76010)	-0.2944 (0.7456)
Foreign Protection	-0.09293 (0.41408)	-0.06529 (0.41378)	0.02688 (0.37542)	-0.09603 (0.41554)	-0.0931 (0.4148)
Ln GDP/k	-0.63355† (0.34442)	-0.65753† (0.34949)	-0.65298† (0.33561)	-0.62458† (0.34963)	-0.6197 (0.3862)
Herbst Difficult Geography		0.52053 (0.41100)			
Civil Armed Conflict			1.82431** (0.61957)		
Interstate War				-0.05793 (0.65462)	
Oil Exporter					-0.0441 (0.6179)
Intercept	3.03740 (2.478628)	2.93462 (2.36423)	2.81720 (2.23574)	2.99624 (2.31005)	2.9503 (2.5663)
N	48	48	48	48	48

$***p \leq 0.001, **p \leq 0.01, *p \leq 0.05, ^\dagger p \leq 0.10$

Table D.11 – Constitutional Power Transfers Robustness Checks: Ethnic Diversity and Dominance

	coup attempt after power transfer (logit)						
	baseline	robustness checks					
Ethnic Change	1.5718	0.5188	0.8840	0.8145	2.3529*	0.8566	0.9830
	(1.1417)	(1.0130)	(1.0524)	(1.0453)	(1.1857)	(1.0394)	(0.9733)
Prior Ethnic Stacking	1.8459*	2.0530**	1.9623**	1.9801**	2.3804**	1.9484**	1.9100**
	(0.7331)	(0.7474)	(0.7224)	(0.7287)	(0.8480)	(0.7240)	(0.7213)
Ethnic Parties	-0.3232	-1.0688	-0.6019	-0.5764	0.3444	-0.5344	-0.5392
	(0.7608)	(0.8998)	(0.7980)	(0.7752)	(0.8488)	(0.7751)	(0.7817)
Ethnic Diversity	-0.8835						
	(1.8804)						
Ln GDP/k	-0.2652	-0.1739	-0.1649	-0.2182	-0.4742	-0.2285	-0.2360
	(0.4684)	(0.4964)	(0.4812)	(0.4858)	(0.4986)	(0.4632)	(0.4661)
Economic Shock	0.4074	0.2588	0.2695	0.2443	0.6488	0.2438	0.2463
	(0.8569)	(0.8264)	(0.8302)	(0.8224)	(0.9605)	(0.8368)	(0.8427)
Prior Coups	0.5571*	0.6378*	0.5584*	0.5273*	0.3625	0.5585*	0.5462*
	(0.2569)	(0.2682)	(0.2587)	(0.2523)	(0.2654)	(0.2573)	(0.2538)
Δ Civil Liberties	-0.6485	-0.5166	-0.5757	-0.5255	-1.0342	-0.5607	-0.5822
	(0.4971)	(0.4930)	(0.4922)	(0.4964)	(0.6427)	(0.4947)	(0.4903)
EF Alesina		4.0854					
		(2.6602)					
EF Fearon			1.1900				
			(2.2056)				
CF Fearon				1.5580			
				(2.1300)			
PREG					-5.6517*		
					(2.4554)		
Largest Group over 50%						-1.3029	
						(2.0901)	
Any Group over 50%							-0.5401
							(0.9003)
Intercept	-1.4299	-4.4253	-2.7840	-2.2217	0.3704	-1.0162	-1.4299
	(3.2612)	(3.8818)	(3.6512)	(3.4176)	(3.4616)	(3.3628)	(3.2633)
N	80	80	76	76	73	77	77

$* * * p \leq 0.001,\ * * p \leq 0.01,\ * p \leq 0.05,\ ^{\dagger} p \leq 0.10$

Table D.12 – Constitutional Power Transfers Robustness Checks: Growth and Natural Resources

	coup attempt after power transfer (logit)						
	baseline	robustness checks					
Ethnic Change	1.5718	1.4818	1.3497	1.1519	2.1483†	1.5509	1.6635
	(1.1417)	(1.1338)	(1.1288)	(1.2847)	(1.2841)	(1.1411)	(1.2155)
Prior Ethnic Stacking	1.8459*	1.8897**	1.8628*	1.7650*	2.0167**	1.8303*	1.7826*
	(0.7331)	(0.7277)	(0.7286)	(0.7877)	(0.7528)	(0.7363)	(0.7578)
Ethnic Parties	-0.3232	-0.2646	-0.3288	0.1790	-0.3337	-0.3102	-0.5587
	(0.7608)	(0.7579)	(0.7585)	(0.8158)	(0.7962)	(0.7619)	(0.8175)
Ethnic Diversity	-0.8835	-0.8353	-0.6777	-1.0559	-1.7510	-0.8794	-0.9104
	(1.8804)	(1.8856)	(1.8958)	(2.0183)	(2.1354)	(1.8693)	(1.9653)
Ln GDP/k	-0.2652	-0.2154	-0.2875	-0.5269	-0.0532	-0.2597	-0.3452
	(0.4684)	(0.4676)	(0.4789)	(0.5787)	(0.4343)	(0.4681)	(0.5031)
Economic Shock	0.4074				1.2106	0.4087	0.3535
	(0.8569)				(1.0020)	(0.8557)	(0.8728)
Prior Coups	0.5571*	0.5904*	0.5526	0.4273†	0.5267†	0.5549*	0.5390*
	(0.2569)	(0.2526)	(0.2522)	(0.2589)	(0.2700)	(0.2565)	(0.2582)
Δ Civil Liberties	-0.6485	-0.6622	-0.5438	-0.9445†	-1.4199*	-0.6483	-0.6253
	(0.4971)	(0.5150)	(0.5363)	(0.5675)	(0.6922)	(0.4956)	(0.5010)
Economic Shock ($\geq 3\%$)		0.0208					
		(1.0574)					
Economic Shock ($\geq 5\%$)			0.7960				
			(1.3714)				
Lowest CAB as % of GDP				0.0463			
				(0.0386)			
Oil Production					87.990†		
					(52.071)		
Diamond Production						-0.1312	
						(0.8610)	
Oil or Diamonds							0.7797
							(0.7905)
Intercept	-1.4299	-1.6974	-1.2194	0.9562	-2.6400	-1.4400	-1.2567
	(3.2612)	(3.2666)	(3.3317)	(3.9547)	(3.1481)	(3.2525)	(3.4460)
N	80	80	80	72	80	80	80

$***p \leq 0.001, **p \leq 0.01, *p \leq 0.05, ^{\dagger}p \leq 0.10$

Table D.13 – Constitutional Power Transfers Robustness Checks: Military Personnel and Expenditures

	baseline	robustness checks					
		coup attempt after power transfer (logit)					
Ethnic Change	1.5718	1.2846	1.3200	1.3590	1.4979	1.7324	1.5915
	(1.1417)	(1.1256)	(1.1170)	(1.1690)	(1.2105)	(1.1526)	(1.1187)
Prior Ethnic Stacking	1.8459*	1.5499*	1.7630*	1.6160*	2.0125*	1.5200†	1.3943†
	(0.7331)	(0.7395)	(0.7641)	(0.7496)	(0.8622)	(0.7772)	(0.7751)
Ethnic Parties	-0.3232	-0.1483	-0.2504	-0.3298	-0.6925	-0.5676	-0.5431
	(0.7608)	(0.7731)	(0.8288)	(0.8239)	(0.8888)	(0.8538)	(0.8605)
Ethnic Diversity	-0.8835	-0.6957	-0.1510	-0.6121	1.5397	0.2331	0.4014
	(1.8804)	(1.8841)	(1.9770)	(1.9680)	(2.1278)	(1.9660)	(1.8810)
Ln GDP/k	-0.2652	-0.4396	-0.1622	-0.1171	-0.5512	-0.2386	-0.5215
	(0.4684)	(0.5186)	(0.4753)	(0.6709)	(0.6982)	(0.5027)	(0.6196)
Economic Shock	0.4074	0.5996	0.3804	0.3407	0.8223	0.6395	0.6189
	(0.8569)	(0.8886)	(0.8701)	(0.8754)	(0.9390)	(0.8747)	(0.8868)
Prior Coups	0.5571*	0.5595*	0.5925*	0.5427*	0.6767*	0.5712*	0.5047†
	(0.2569)	(0.2572)	(0.2629)	(0.2564)	(0.2896)	(0.2680)	(0.2661)
Δ Civil Liberties	-0.6485	-0.9985†	-0.8333	-0.7219	-0.7871	-0.5680	-0.7406
	(0.4971)	(0.6042)	(0.5363)	(0.5170)	(0.5963)	(0.5189)	(0.5552)
Military Personnel		-0.0144					
		(0.0136)					
Military Expenditures			-0.0000				
			(0.0000)				
Expenditures per Soldier				-0.0000			
				(0.0000)			
Δ Military Personnel					0.5716*		
					(0.2315)		
Δ Military Expenditures						-0.2586	
						(0.5690)	
Δ Expenditures per Soldier							-0.6452
							(0.7209)
Intercept	-1.4299	0.1152	-2.1840	-2.0130	-1.5263	-2.2676	-0.2246
	(3.2612)	(3.5727)	(3.3840)	(4.2520)	(4.6684)	(3.5254)	(4.1319)
N	80	77	78	75	71	72	69

$***p \le 0.001$, $**p \le 0.01$, $*p \le 0.05$, $^\dagger p \le 0.10$

Table D.14 – Constitutional Power Transfers Robustness Checks: Legitimacy and Regime Type

	coup attempt after power transfer (logit)						
	baseline	robustness checks					
Ethnic Change	1.5718	1.8986†	3.3474*	3.6912*	4.6680*	4.3077*	2.1095†
	(1.1417)	(1.0922)	(1.4678)	(1.6237)	(2.0023)	(1.8200)	(1.1423)
Prior Ethnic Stacking	1.8459*	2.0376**	3.0241***	3.1440***	2.2053*	2.4208**	1.9635**
	(0.7331)	(0.7263)	(0.8877)	(0.9056)	(0.8984)	(0.8804)	(0.7204)
Ethnic Parties	-0.3232	-0.1492	-0.2731	-0.2932	-0.7871	-0.4752	-0.1578
	(0.7608)	(0.7263)	(0.8154)	(0.8369)	(0.8990)	(0.8761)	(0.7488)
Ethnic Diversity	-0.8835	-0.6662	-3.8131†	-3.9883†	-5.7808*	-5.2129*	0.1349
	(1.8804)	(1.7404)	(2.0626)	(2.2089)	(2.7376)	(2.5371)	(1.8566)
Ln GDP/k	-0.2652	-0.1541	-0.3309	-0.4273	0.3667	0.3405	-0.3995
	(0.4684)	(0.4748)	(0.5059)	(0.5156)	(0.5782)	(0.5828)	(0.4605)
Economic Shock	0.4074	0.3858	0.5617	0.7451	0.7085	0.7578	0.9070
	(0.8569)	(0.8592)	(0.9350)	(0.9524)	(1.0104)	(0.9991)	(0.8420)
Prior Coups	0.5571*	0.5437*	1.0775**	1.1641**	1.1022**	1.0000**	0.6136*
	(0.2569)	(0.2551)	(0.3379)	(0.3785)	(0.3894)	(0.3791)	(0.2725)
Δ Civil Liberties	-0.6485						
	(0.4971)						
Civil Liberites		0.1334					
		(0.3152)					
Polity			-0.0125				
			(0.0755)				
Polity^2				0.0149			
				(0.0208)			
Liberalizing					0.8171		
					(0.9607)		
Electoral Democracy						-0.7072	
						(1.0405)	
Democracy (GWF)							-0.4380
							(0.7756)
Intercept	-1.4299	-3.1922	-1.4710	-1.8315	-5.4581	-5.0354	-1.6428
	(3.2612)	(3.7757)	(3.3992)	(3.2519)	(4.1074)	(4.0076)	(3.1786)
N	80	80	82	82	64	65	75

$***p \leq 0.001$, $**p \leq 0.01$, $*p \leq 0.05$, $^\dagger p \leq 0.10$

Table D.15 – Constitutional Power Transfers Robustness Checks: Prior Coups and Instability

	baseline	robustness checks				
		coup attempt after power transfer (logit)				
Ethnic Change	1.5718	1.0986	1.7013	1.7459	1.4994	1.8760
	(1.1417)	(1.0785)	(1.2517)	(1.1232)	(1.1672)	(1.1737)
Prior Ethnic Stacking	1.8459*	1.8754*	2.2632**	2.1878**	1.9632*	2.0909**
	(0.7331)	(0.7489)	(0.8587)	(0.7758)	(0.7931)	(0.7792)
Ethnic Parties	-0.3232	-0.1759	0.5877	-0.5308	-0.1425	-0.1085
	(0.7608)	(0.7927)	(0.8807)	(0.8092)	(0.7976)	(0.8018)
Ethnic Diversity	-0.8835	-0.6049	-3.5274†	-1.3677	-0.7432	-0.7516
	(1.8804)	(1.7405)	(2.0720)	(2.0561)	(1.9497)	(1.8719)
Ln GDP/k	-0.2652	-0.3611	-0.2945	-0.1642	-0.4844	-0.1217
	(0.4684)	(0.4583)	(0.4904)	(0.4831)	(0.5090)	(0.4980)
Economic Shock	0.4074	0.1298	-0.6445	0.2139	0.8361	0.3342
	(0.8569)	(0.8865)	(1.0801)	(0.8912)	(0.9214)	(0.9033)
Prior Coups	0.5571*				0.6165*	0.6184*
	(0.2569)				(0.2585)	(0.2711)
Δ Civil Liberties	-0.6485	-0.8009	-1.4042*	-0.4870	-0.8535	-0.4302
	(0.4971)	(0.5430)	(0.6508)	(0.4972)	(0.5722)	(0.5181)
Prior Successful Coups		1.3513*				
		(0.5791)				
Coup Caused Transfer			4.2821**			
			(1.3508)			
Years since Last Attempt				-0.1008*		
				(0.0399)		
Civil Armed Conflict					-1.8950†	
					(1.0837)	
Popular Unrest						-0.4541
						(0.3259)
Intercept	-1.4299	-0.6872	-0.6085	-0.0448	-0.0683	-2.1447
	(3.2612)	(3.1435)	(3.3741)	(3.0435)	(3.5854)	(3.4489)
N	80	80	80	80	80	77

$***p \leq 0.001, **p \leq 0.01, *p \leq 0.05, ^\dagger p \leq 0.10$

Table D.16 – Constitutional Power Transfers Robustness Checks: Colonial Experience and Other

	baseline		robustness checks		
		coup attempt after power transfer (logit)			
Ethnic Change	1.5718	2.4514†	1.3039	1.4682	1.6182
	(1.1417)	(1.3922)	(1.1167)	(1.1409)	(1.1689)
Prior Ethnic Stacking	1.8459*	1.7687*	1.7916*	1.7534*	1.8098*
	(0.7331)	(0.7225)	(0.7568)	(0.7474)	(0.7586)
Ethnic Parties	-0.3232		-0.2056	-0.4603	-0.3259
	(0.7608)		(0.7648)	(0.8066)	(0.7608)
Ethnic Diversity	-0.8835	-2.6933	-0.5902	-0.5736	-0.9331
	(1.8804)	(2.0339)	(1.7983)	(1.9661)	(1.8992)
Ln GDP/k	-0.2652	0.1208	-0.3083	-0.3160	-0.2389
	(0.4684)	(0.4950)	(0.5143)	(0.4733)	(0.4894)
Economic Shock	0.4074	0.1467	-0.2113	0.5930	0.3618
	(0.8569)	(0.8611)	(0.9070)	(0.9297)	(0.8914)
Prior Coups	0.5571*	0.8716*	0.7492**	0.5510*	0.5617*
	(0.2569)	(0.3441)	(0.2908)	(0.2563)	(0.2582)
Δ Civil Liberties	-0.6485	-0.8872†	-0.8091	-0.6930	-0.6247
	(0.4971)	(0.5290)	(0.5141)	(0.5067)	(0.5131)
Ethnic Violence		-1.5232			
		(0.9967)			
French Colonialism			1.4086		
			(0.8623)		
Herbst Difficult Geography				-0.4879	
				(0.9331)	
AU Member					-0.1434
					(0.7880)
Intercept	-1.4299	-3.2499	-1.8180	-1.0395	-1.4943
	(3.2612)	(3.4680)	(3.4273)	(3.3006)	(3.2759)
N	80	81	80	80	80

$***p \leq 0.001, **p \leq 0.01, *p \leq 0.05, ^\dagger p \leq 0.10$

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Table D.17 – Electoral Power Transfers Robustness Checks: Ethnic Diversity and Dominance

	baseline	robustness checks					
		coup attempt after power transfer (logit)					
Ethnic Change	4.1004*	1.0248	1.8041	1.6811	2.9296†	1.7025	1.3951
	(1.8148)	(1.2750)	(1.4720)	(1.3642)	(1.5236)	(1.3630)	(1.1517)
Prior Ethnic Stacking	2.0763*	2.0300*	2.0006*	2.0087*	2.3247*	2.0251*	2.0308*
	(0.9063)	(0.8265)	(0.8151)	(0.8130)	(0.9571)	(0.8138)	(0.8157)
Ethnic Parties	-0.9395	-1.1168	-0.8367	-0.8955	-0.0982	-0.8788	-0.8980
	(0.9352)	(0.9910)	(0.8945)	(0.8838)	(0.9786)	(0.8851)	(0.8940)
Ethnic Diversity	-5.6509*						
	(2.6859)						
Ln GDP/k	0.2539	-0.0718	-0.0783	0.0053	-0.1839	-0.0454	-0.0182
	(0.5812)	(0.5846)	(0.5824)	(0.5710)	(0.7244)	(0.5716)	(0.5670)
Economic Shock	0.8058	0.2543	0.4622	0.4006	0.3328	0.4212	0.3211
	(1.0554)	(0.9640)	(1.0087)	(0.9885)	(1.1309)	(0.9849)	(0.9518)
Prior Coups	1.0383**	0.8818**	0.7803*	0.8315**	0.7495*	0.7897*	0.8059**
	(0.3676)	(0.3261)	(0.3140)	(0.3221)	(0.3694)	(0.3125)	(0.3123)
Δ Civil Liberties	-0.7039	-0.4940	-0.5518	-0.5574	-1.0115	-0.5598	-0.5168
	(0.5912)	(0.5192)	(0.5301)	(0.5331)	(0.7278)	(0.5349)	(0.5201)
EF Alesina		2.0122					
		(3.2438)					
EF Fearon			-1.5209				
			(3.1030)				
CF Fearon				-1.1116			
				(2.6242)			
PREG					-6.7331*		
					(2.9213)		
Largest Group over 50%						1.2450	
						(2.7547)	
Any Group over 50%							0.1343
							(0.9897)
Intercept	-3.9784	-4.0967	-2.1806	-3.2071	-1.3713	-3.8864	-3.3197
	(4.0340)	(4.4079)	(4.4636)	(3.9193)	(4.6367)	(4.1765)	(3.9423)
N	63	63	60	60	58	60	60

$* * *p \leq 0.001, * * p \leq 0.01, *p \leq 0.05, ^\dagger p \leq 0.10$

Table D.18 – Electoral Power Transfers Robustness Checks: Growth and Natural Resources

	baseline	robustness checks					
		coup attempt after power transfer (logit)					
Ethnic Change	4.1004*	3.9136*	3.7865	4.8976*	6.1619*	4.7540*	5.0633*
	(1.8148)	(1.7711)	(1.7721)	(2.0780)	(2.4022)	(2.0749)	(2.2467)
Prior Ethnic Stacking	2.0763*	2.1182*	2.0821*	2.2190*	2.9021*	2.1910*	1.8013
	(0.9063)	(0.9007)	(0.9075)	(1.1213)	(1.1541)	(0.9569)	(0.9418)
Ethnic Parties	-0.9395	-0.7734	-0.8324	-0.6378	-1.0621	-1.1575	-1.5835
	(0.9352)	(0.9277)	(0.9329)	(1.0963)	(1.0429)	(0.9942)	(1.1291)
Ethnic Diversity	-5.6509*	-5.2988*	-5.1951*	-8.4002*	-9.0564*	-6.4610*	-6.9268*
	(2.6859)	(2.5719)	(2.5932)	(3.5461)	(3.6560)	(2.9819)	(3.2036)
Ln GDP/k	0.2539	0.3113	0.2541	0.2533	0.6964	0.3907	0.0776
	(0.5812)	(0.5741)	(0.5955)	(0.6421)	(0.6814)	(0.5698)	(0.6509)
Economic Shock	0.8058				2.6583	0.9797	0.7517
	(1.0554)				(1.4483)	(1.0931)	(1.0810)
Prior Coups	1.0383**	1.1025**	1.0713**	1.1513**	1.1650**	1.1562**	1.1289**
	(0.3676)	(0.3685)	(0.3687)	(0.4270)	(0.4183)	(0.4195)	(0.4074)
Δ Civil Liberties	-0.7039	-0.7439	-0.6536	-1.3474†	-2.2392*	-0.7268	-0.7657
	(0.5912)	(0.5968)	(0.6388)	(0.7674)	(1.0257)	(0.5927)	(0.6092)
Economic Shock ($\geq 3\%$)		-0.1999					
		(1.2894)					
Economic Shock ($\geq 5\%$)			0.4210				
			(1.6865)				
Lowest CAB as % of GDP				0.1209†			
				(0.0680)			
Oil Production					-143.8667*		
					(68.7898)		
Diamond Production						4.9626	
						(4.2330)	
Oil or Diamonds							1.5381
							(1.2333)
Intercept	-3.9784	-4.3775	-3.9611	-2.1639	-6.7364	-5.1603	-3.4589
	(4.0340)	(4.0385)	(4.1646)	(4.4307)	(4.6079)	(4.1129)	(4.2890)
N	63	63	63	58	63	63	63

$***p \leq 0.001$, $**p \leq 0.01$, $*p \leq 0.05$, $^\dagger p \leq 0.10$

Table D.19 – Electoral Power Transfers Robustness Checks: Military Personnel and Expenditures

	coup attempt after power transfer (logit)						
	baseline	robustness checks					
Ethnic Change	4.1004*	3.9788*	3.7580*	4.3250*	4.0145†	4.8272*	4.4858*
	(1.8148)	(1.9061)	(1.8400)	(1.9990)	(2.1289)	(2.2827)	(2.2517)
Prior Ethnic Stacking	2.0763*	2.0397*	2.0840*	1.9760†	2.2468*	1.8705†	1.7657†
	(0.9063)	(0.9493)	(0.9977)	(1.0280)	(1.0360)	(1.0188)	(1.0133)
Ethnic Parties	-0.9395	-0.8963	-0.6715	-0.6867	-1.5093	-1.0326	-0.9873
	(0.9352)	(0.9747)	(1.0420)	(1.0430)	(1.1863)	(1.0349)	(1.0519)
Ethnic Diversity	-5.6509*	-5.4878*	-4.9650†	-6.2890*	-2.9354	-5.3740†	-4.8743
	(2.6859)	(2.7403)	(2.8100)	(3.0950)	(3.1706)	(3.1605)	(3.1049)
Ln GDP/k	0.2539	0.2003	0.2966	0.7739	0.1074	0.2749	0.1649
	(0.5812)	(0.6205)	(0.5865)	(0.7869)	(0.8488)	(0.6617)	(0.7214)
Economic Shock	0.8058	0.7722	0.6867	0.4848	0.8626	1.0095	0.9525
	(1.0554)	(1.0799)	(1.0970)	(4.8480)	(1.1175)	(1.0805)	(1.0786)
Prior Coups	1.0383**	1.0166**	1.0540**	1.0630**	1.3160**	1.2134**	1.1387*
	(0.3676)	(0.3682)	(0.3721)	(0.3824)	(0.4725)	(0.4548)	(0.4476)
Δ Civil Liberties	-0.7039	-0.7181	-0.8191	-0.7032	-0.9025	-0.5887	-0.6347
	(0.5912)	(0.6865)	(0.6327)	(0.6347)	(0.7193)	(0.6357)	(0.6484)
Military Personnel		0.0003					
		(0.0157)					
Military Expenditures			-0.0000				
			(0.0000)				
Expenditures per Soldier				-0.0001			
				(0.0001)			
Δ Military Personnel					0.6349†		
					(0.3326)		
Δ Military Expenditures						0.0296	
						(0.3369)	
Δ Expenditures per Soldier							-0.1206
							(0.4777)
Intercept	-3.9784	-3.6077	-4.3220	-6.4890	-5.2789	-5.1571	-4.3052
	(4.0340)	(4.3629)	(4.0450)	(5.0240)	(5.6940)	(4.5806)	(4.9568)
N	63	61	61	59	57	57	55

$***p \leq 0.001$, $**p \leq 0.01$, $*p \leq 0.05$, $^\dagger p \leq 0.10$

Table D.20 – Electoral Power Transfers Robustness Checks: Legitimacy and Regime Type

	coup attempt after power transfer (logit)						
	baseline	robustness checks					
Ethnic Change	4.1004*	4.3317*	4.3936*	4.7999*	4.6532*	4.3018*	8.9527*
	(1.8148)	(1.8143)	(1.8294)	(1.9742)	(1.9930)	(1.8140)	(3.6312)
Prior Ethnic Stacking	2.0763*	2.3053*	2.9375**	3.2417**	2.1910**	2.4077**	3.5738*
	(0.9063)	(0.9083)	(1.0074)	(1.0316)	(0.8995)	(0.8812)	(1.4510)
Ethnic Parties	-0.9395	-0.5381	-0.5605	-0.6806	-0.7818	-0.4734	-0.8719
	(0.9352)	(0.8978)	(0.9581)	(0.9364)	(0.8973)	(0.8746)	(1.0461)
Ethnic Diversity	-5.6509*	-5.3760*	-7.5815*	-7.1646*	-5.7456*	-5.1930*	-9.9025*
	(2.6859)	(2.5556)	(2.9530)	(2.9827)	(2.7302)	(2.5309)	(4.3751)
Ln GDP/k	0.2539	0.4199	0.6919	0.6658	0.3835	0.3567	0.3434
	(0.5812)	(0.5971)	(0.6830)	(0.7128)	(0.5829)	(0.5874)	(0.8145)
Economic Shock	0.8058	0.7671	0.9968	0.8704	0.6920	0.7433	2.3885
	(1.0554)	(1.0161)	(1.0798)	(1.0451)	(1.0125)	(1.0004)	(1.4852)
Prior Coups	1.0383**	0.9832**	1.1935**	1.2845**	1.1000**	0.9998**	2.0263**
	(0.3676)	(0.3667)	(0.4025)	(0.4490)	(0.3882)	(0.3783)	(0.7560)
Δ Civil Liberties	-0.7039						
	(0.5912)						
Civil Liberties		0.3667					
		(0.4269)					
Polity			-0.1745				
			(0.1481)				
Polity^2				0.0020			
				(0.0235)			
Liberalizing					0.8095		
					(0.9588)		
Electoral Democracy						-0.6954	
						(1.0380)	
Democracy (GWF)							-4.1015*
							(1.9609)
Intercept	-3.9784	-7.2297	-5.2425	-6.8698	-5.5543	-5.1324	-4.9861
	(4.0340)	(4.5942)	(4.5446)	(4.4160)	(4.1278)	(4.0340)	(5.1394)
N	63	63	63	63	63	64	57

$* * *p \leq 0.001$, $* * p \leq 0.01$, $*p \leq 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p \leq 0.10$

Table D.21 – Electoral Power Transfers Robustness Checks: Prior Coups and Instability

	coup attempt after power transfer (logit)					
	baseline	robustness checks				
Ethnic Change	4.1004*	2.1379	2.7493†	3.3714*	3.8728*	6.2889*
	(1.8148)	(1.3058)	(1.4347)	(1.5218)	(1.7933)	(2.4819)
Prior Ethnic Stacking	2.0763*	1.8769*	2.4055*	2.3724**	2.1259*	3.5301*
	(0.9063)	(0.8156)	(0.9567)	(0.9119)	(0.9383)	(1.3731)
Ethnic Parties	-0.9395	-0.5566	0.2041	-1.0435	-0.8699	0.1526
	(0.9352)	(0.8808)	(0.9708)	(0.9189)	(0.9570)	(1.1274)
Ethnic Diversity	-5.6509*	-3.2766	-6.2652*	-5.3017*	-5.5621*	-7.7253*
	(2.6859)	(2.1456)	(2.6673)	(2.5816)	(2.7315)	(3.3077)
Ln GDP/k	0.2539	-0.1808	-0.1866	0.0957	0.1197	0.5505
	(0.5812)	(0.5161)	(0.5296)	(0.5965)	(0.6022)	(0.7013)
Economic Shock	0.8058	0.6477	-0.4082	0.7537	1.1183	1.1053
	(1.0554)	(1.0305)	(1.3281)	(1.0667)	(1.1290)	(1.2043)
Prior Coups	1.0383**				1.0663**	1.4361**
	(0.3676)				(0.3756)	(0.5198)
Δ Civil Liberties	-0.7039	-0.7532	-1.4535*	-0.5201	-0.8429	0.2962
	(0.5912)	(0.5659)	(0.7369)	(0.5618)	(0.6403)	(0.7460)
Prior Successful Coups		1.2990*				
		(0.6246)				
Coup Caused Transfer			4.4002**			
			(1.5501)			
Years since Last Attempt				-0.1174**		
				(0.0455)		
Civil Armed Conflict					-1.1744	
					(1.1503)	
Popular Unrest						-1.2516*
						(0.5989)
Intercept	-3.9784	-0.6265	-0.1948	0.0397	-2.9492	-5.7407
	(4.0340)	(3.3777)	(3.4818)	(3.4948)	(4.1328)	(4.7229)
N	63	63	63	63	63	61

$* * * p \leq 0.001, * * p \leq 0.01, * p \leq 0.05, \dagger p \leq 0.10$

Table D.22 – Electoral Power Transfers Robustness Checks: Colonial Experience and Other

	coup attempt after power transfer (logit)				
	baseline	robustness checks			
Ethnic Change	4.1004*	5.6118*	3.3868†	4.0083*	4.0748*
	(1.8148)	(2.3612)	(1.8848)	(1.8350)	(1.8263)
Prior Ethnic Stacking	2.0763*	2.2118*	2.0134*	2.0352*	2.1130*
	(0.9063)	(0.8941)	(0.9421)	(0.9223)	(0.9403)
Ethnic Parties	-0.9395		-0.8075	-0.9764	-0.9410
	(0.9352)		(0.9526)	(0.9433)	(0.9376)
Ethnic Diversity	-5.6509*	-8.3329*	-4.8352†	-5.4570†	-5.5918*
	(2.6859)	(3.4535)	(2.8484)	(2.7909)	(2.7054)
Ln GDP/k	0.2539	0.7608	0.1526	0.2208	0.2325
	(0.5812)	(0.6563)	(0.6467)	(0.5936)	(0.5988)
Economic Shock	0.8058	0.0179	-0.0957	0.9432	0.8425
	(1.0554)	(1.1668)	(1.2029)	(1.2052)	(1.0851)
Prior Coups	1.0383**	1.7309**	1.3207**	1.0310**	1.0358**
	(0.3676)	(0.6195)	(0.4406)	(0.3676)	(0.3682)
Δ Civil Liberties	-0.7039	-1.3198†	-1.0046	-0.7239	-0.7271
	(0.5912)	(0.7977)	(0.6396)	(0.6000)	(0.6099)
Ethnic Violence		-2.6142†			
		(1.5021)			
French Colonialism			1.8723		
			(1.1562)		
Herbst Difficult Geography				-0.2742	
				(1.1431)	
AU Member					0.1464
					(0.9360)
Intercept	-3.9784	-7.0164	-4.3857	-3.7295	-3.9691
	(4.0340)	(4.4677)	(4.2736)	(4.1250)	(4.0653)
N	63	64	63	63	63

$*** p \leq 0.001, ** p \leq 0.01, * p \leq 0.05, ^{\dagger} p \leq 0.10$